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I. REMEDIES AVAILABLE UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
A. Reasonable Accommodation of a Known Disability 
1. Employee must request accommodation. 
2. Requested accommodation must be reasonable. 
3. Employer and employee both have a duty to engage in an 
interactive process to discuss reasonable accommodations. 
Employee's failure to do so relieves employer of liability. 
4. Employer's duty is to provide ~ reasonable accommodation. The 
accommodation provided need not be the accommodation 
requested by the employee. 
5. Forms of reasonable accommodation: 
a. Making existing facilities used by employees readily 
accessible to and useable by individuals with disabilities; 
and 
b. Job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, 
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or 
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate 
adjustment or modifications of examinations, training 
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or 
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for 
individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C § 12111(9). See also 
29 CFR 1630.9; EEOC Technical Assistance Manual, Section 3; 
EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and 
Undue Hardship Under the American With Disabilities Act 
(March 1, 1999); EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Workers' 
Compensation and the ADA (September 3, 1996). 
6. Employer is relieved of obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation if that would result in an undue hardship to the 
employer. 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
B. Remedies for Violations 
1. Back pay. 42 U.S.C § 12117; 42 U.S.C § 2000e-6(g). 
2. Reinstatement. ld. 
3. Compensatory damages. 42 U.S.C § 1981a (a)(2). 
a. Future pecuniary losses, emotional pain and suffering, 
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and 
other nonpecuniary losses; 
b. Personal injury? Smith v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Kansas, 894 
F. Supp. 1463 (D. Kan. 1995) (liTo the extent that plaintiff was 
attempting to raise a claim of personal injury, plaintiff's 
remedy was in tort or pursuant to the Workers' 
Compensation' Act. "). 
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4. Punitive damages if employer acted with malice or with reckless 
indifference to the federally protected rights of the aggrieved 
individual. 42 U.S.C § 1981a (b). 
5. Where an alleged discriminatory practice involves the provision 
of a reasonable accommodation, compensatory and punitive 
damages may not be awarded IIwhere the covered entity 
demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the person 
with the disability who has informed the covered entity the 
accommodation is needed, to identify and make a reasonable 
accommodation that would provide such individual with an 
equally effective opportunity and would not cause an undue 
hardship on the operation of the business. II Id. at § 1981a (a)(3). 
6. Limitations on the amount of compensatory and punitive 
damages. 42 U.s.C § 1981a (b)(3). 
a. 15-100 employees - $50,000 
b. 101-200 employees - $100,000 
c. 201-500 employees - $200,000 
d. More than 500 employees - $300,000. 
7. Attorney fees. 42 U.s.C § 12117; 42 U.S.C § 2000e-6(k). 
8. Workers compensation benefits and unemployment insurance 
benefits are collateral sources, and the collateral source rule bars 
deduction of such benefits from an award of backpay for 
discrimination under federal law. Hamlin v. Charter Township of 
Flint, 165 F.3d 426, 433-34 (6th. Cir. 1999). 
II. REMEDIES AVAILABLE UNDER KRS 344 FOR DISABILITY 
DISCRIMINATION 
A. Reasonable Accommodation 
Same as above 
B. Remedies for Violations 
1. Injunctions to enjoin further violations. KRS 344.450. 
2. Actual damages sustained. Id. 
3. Damage for humiliation, embarrassment, personal indignity, and 
other intangible injuries. Mitchell v. Seaboard Sys. RR, 883 F.2d 
451 (6th Cir. 1989); Easton v. Louisville & Jefferson County Board of 
Health, 706 F.Supp. 536 (W.D. Ky. 1987); Meyers v. Chapman 
Printing Co., 840 S.W. 2d 814 (Ky. 1992). 
4. Compensatory damages. Mitchell v. Seaboard Sys. RR, 883 F.2d 
451 (6th Cir. 1989). 
5. Punitive Damages? Union Underwear Co. d/b/a Fruit of the Loom v. 
Barnhart, 1999-SC-91DG (Ky. Supreme Court) (pending). 
6. Costs and reasonable attorney fees. KRS 344.450. 
7. Workers compensation benefits may be deducted from backpay 
liability. Hardaway Management Co. v. Southerland, 977 S.W.2d 910 
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(Ky. 1998). However, if the plaintiff's inability to work was 
caused by the employer's violation of the plaintiff's civil rights, 
then no offset is allowed. Knafel v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers of Akron, Inc., 
899 F.2d 1473 (6th Cir. 1990). 
III. REMEDIES UNDER THE KENTUCKY WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT 
A. A disability for purposes of workers' compensation benefits is not 
necessarily the same as a disability under the ADA. EEOC Enforcement 
Guidance: Workers' Compensation and the ADA (September 3,1996). 
B. Income benefits. KRS 342.730. 
C Medical benefits. 342.020. 
D. Vocational Rehabilitation Services. KRS 342.710. 
E. Retraining Incentive Benefits for Coal Miners Pneumoconiosis. KRS 
342.732. 
F. No right to time off or reinstatement. 
G. Exclusiveness of remedy. KRS 342.690. . 
H. Does pursuit of workers compensation benefits constitute an election of 
remedies which bars a claim under KRS 344 for the same injury? Meyers v . 
Chapman Printing Co., 840 S.W. 2d 814, 819 (Ky. 1992). 
IV. SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY BENEFITS 
A. Income benefits. 
B. Workers compensation benefits are offset. 42 U.S.C § 424a (a); 20 CF.R. § 
404.408; Frost v. Chater, 952 F. Supp. 659 (D. N. D. 1996); Bubnis v. Chater, 
958 F. Supp. 111 (E. D. N. Y. 1997). 
C A disability for purposes of the Social Security Act is not necessarily a 
disability for purposes of the ADA. Social Security Forum, Vol. 15, No.7 
Guly 1993). 
V. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 
Filing an application for Social Security Disability Benefits, in which the claimant 
alleges inability to work, does not judicially estop the plaintiff from alleging that the 
plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, if the plaintiff can 
explain the apparent inconsistency. Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 
U.S. 795, 797 (1999). However, the application is further evidence of the plaintiff's 
inability to work, with or without a reasonable accommodation. Griffith v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1998); Blanton v. Inco Alloys Inter., Inc., 123 F.3d 916 (6th 
Cir.1997). 
VI. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
A. Consider the following scenario. 
Smith has been employed at ABC Coal Company for approximately sixteen 
years. At all relevant times before January 1998, Smith was a scoop operator. The 
scoop is a wheeled vehicle which is used to clean up loose coal at the mine face and to 
transport parts and supplies. The operator sits in the scoop and operates it with 
hydraulic hand and foot controls. Loose coal is cleaned up by pushing it with the 
A-3 
bucket attached to the scoop. The job sometimes requires the operator to manually lift 
materials such as concrete blocks weighing 25 lbs. each into the scoop's bucket if they 
cannot not be "scooped Upll by the bucket. Other duties of the scoop operator include 
rock dusting, which is the process of scattering rock dust over the interior surfaces of 
the mine. Bags of rock dust weigh 50 lbs. each. For Smith, the rock dusting task was 
easier than the other tasks of the job, because he could put the bag of rock dust on top of 
the scoop, and did not have to carry it in his arms. 
On August 16, 1997, Smith fell at work trying to pick up a bag of rock dust, 
allegedly injuring his back and wrist. Smith was initially treated by his family doctor 
and remained off work. On September 28, 1997, at the request of ABC, Smith was seen 
by Dr. Orthopod, who examined and tested both Smith's back and wrist. Smith's 
complaint about his back was mainly pain and stiffness in the morning. Dr.Orthopod 
noted that Smith presented "without brace, cane, or TENS unit." Smith had normal 
strength and sensation in his legs, and a negative straight leg raising test, without 
atrophy of the calf or thigh. Dr. Orthopod reviewed MRI and x-ray images of Smith's 
back, which revealed no disk herniation. Dr. Orthopod's diagnosis was IIlumbar strain 
superimposed on active pre-existing degenerative disk disease L5-S1 with 
osteoarthritis. II 
Smith' complaint about his wrist at that time was that it felt "weak" and that it 
"swells. II However, Dr. Orthopod noted that Smith's wrist had "no visible swelling" 
and had "full passive motion. II Dr. Orthopod also noted that Smith's "left wrist 
diagnosis sounds like sprain although certainly poor effort on testing." Dr. Orthopod 
diagnosed Smith's wrist problem as a IIsprain.1I 
Dr. Orthopod stated that Smith would be able to return to his previous job after 
10-12 weeks, with lifting restrictions of 75 lbs. maximum, 30 lbs. frequent lifting, and 
recommendations to change positions every one to two hours. 
Smith then went to see Dr. Sawbones about his wrist. On November 11, 1997, 
Dr. Sawbones performed an arthroscopy on Smith's wrist, at which time he did "laser 
smoothing of the tear of the triangular fibro-cartilagineous complex. 1I The procedure 
was successful. Following surgery, Smith had a short course of physical therapy and 
has had no treatment since then. According to Smith, his wrist healed well, and the 
only problem it now gives him is that it is IIstiff" when the weather changes. 
On December 2,1997, some 31/2 months after the accident at work, and while 
still off work collecting workers' compensation benefits, Smith was observed at a flea 
market lifting heavy racks of clothing and boxes of merchandise, using his left arm and 
wrist. This event was captured on videotape by an investigator for ABC's third party 
workers' compensation administrator. The videotape was sent to Dr. Orthopod, who 
watched it and then reported to ABC in a letter, stating: "My conclusions after viewing 
the videotape are that the August 1997 injury has not resulted in permanent 
impairment." He went on to state: "Also, my opinion is that he could return to a belt 
head job requiring shoveling and repeated bending. I do think that after light duty that 
he could return to his regular scoop operator job without restrictions." Later Dr. 
Orthopod testified that he meant IIwithout further restrictions," and he did not intend to 
say that Smith no longer had a 75 lb lifting restriction. 
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Dr. Sawbones was not consulted about whether Smith could return to work. 
Until April 1998, Smith continued to see Dr. Sawbones for checkups on his wrist, and 
Dr. Sawbones noted in his chart that Smith was totally disabled at those times. Dr. 
Sawbones' office notes were regularly sent to ABC's third-party workers' compensation 
administrator and ABC's workers' compensation attorney. 
Based upon Dr. Orthopod's letter, ABC notified Smith that his worker's 
compensation benefits were being terminated, and he should return to work. Smith 
protested that his own doctor, Dr. Sawbones, had not yet released him, but he returned 
to work anyway, as he needed the income. Smith returned to work in January 1998, 
when he was placed in the head drive operator's position, a light duty job. The 
essential duties of a head drive operator, which were performed on a daily basis, 
included shoveling spilled coal, rock dusting, and greasing belt rollers. Smith 
performed the rock dusting task by carrying a 50 pound bag of dust in his arms or over 
his shoulder, breaking open the bag, and scattering the dust with his hand. Just how he 
spread the rock dust was left to his discretion, but ABC recommended that employees 
who had difficulty carrying the whole bags of rock dust should cut them in half. 
On February 15, 1998, Smith filed an Application for Adjustment of Claim with 
the Workers' Compensation Board, relating to the alleged 1997 injury to his back and 
wrist. Dr. Orthopod assigned Smith a 7% impairment rating to the lumbar spine, Dr. 
Sawbones assigned a 10% impairment rating to Smith's wrist, Dr. Liberal assigned a 
12% rating to Smith's back and a 5% rating to his wrist, andDr. Conservative found no 
impairment at alL ., 
On May 31, 1998, Smith wrote a memorandum to his supervisor,l complaining 
that the head drive job was causing him pain because of his left wrist and back injury. 
Smith requested to be "put back on workers' compensation" or placed in an easier job. 
The only "easier" jobs he specifically mentioned were fire boss and tram motor operator. 
His request was denied, because there were no openings in those positions at the time, 
and Smith was able to perform the essential functions of the head drive job without 
accommodation. Smith agreed that the head drive job was much easier than his 
previous job as a scoop operator. Smith subsequently bid unsuccessfully for a position 
as a fire boss, first in June 1998 and again in January 1999. He was not selected for this 
job because he was not a certified electrician, which ABC contends was a requirement 
for the job. Smith, however, says that other employees who did not have electrical 
cards were permitted to hold this position. 
On December 14, 1998, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Opinion and 
Award, dismissing Smith's claim for occupational disability. The Judge based her 
findings and conclusions upon the medical testimony of the doctors, as well as her own 
review of the videotape of Smith at the flea market. Of the videotape, she noted that it 
shows Smith able to "lift, bend, and stand, without difficulty, and that the majority of 
reaching and lifting was performed with his left hand." The Judge ruled that Smith was 
entitled to retain the temporary total disability benefits he had already been paid by 
I This memorandum was delivered to the supervisor the day before the supervisor testified in a 
workers' compensation deposition taken by Smith' attorney. 
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ABC, but he was not entitled to more. On June 10, 1999, the Workers' Compensation 
Board affirmed the the ALJ's Opinion and Award as to her conclusions about 
occupational disability. 
Smith worked as a head drive operator until March 1999, when he was 
reassigned to a position as a scoop operator. He held this position until April 2, 1999, 
when he alleges that he injured his back at work. He does not remember any specific 
moment when he hurt his back that day, but he says that it got progressively more 
painful through the course of the shift. 
Smith has not worked since April 2, 1999 Since then, he has been drawing 
workers' compensation benefits. He has also applied for Social Security Disability 
Insurance benefits, claiming that he has been totally disabled since April 1999. His 
claim was denied twice by the Social Security Administration, but for Smith the third 
time was a charm. The SSA recently determined that he is disabled and awarded him 
$1250 per month in benefits. Smith filed another workers' compensation claim in 1999 
over the alleged injury to his lower back on April 2, 1999. This claim is still pending. 
Smith has sued ABC in state court, alleging a violation of KRS 344. Smith 
specifically alleges that his back and wrist conditions were disabilities, that ABC failed 
to accommodate him by requiring him to perform the head drive job and then by 
reassigning him to the scoop operator's job in March 1999. He claims that he is now 
totally disabled due to the April 1999 injury and that the injury came about while 
performing duties in excess of his restrictions. Smith relies upon the medical evidence 
in the first workers' compensation case to prove that he was disabled before April 1999. 
As for damages, current medical evidence shows that Smith now has a herniated 
disk. There is a dispute about whether or not he can perform light to medium level 
jobs in the local economy with this condition. Smith seeks back pay, lost future wages 
to age 65, emotional damages due to the shame of being unable to work, and punitive 
damages. 
B. Questions 
1. Was Smith a qualified individual with a disability prior to April 
2. 
3. 
4. 
1999? Was Dr. Orthopod's recommendation of lifting restrictions 
evidence of a disability? What about the impairment ratings? 
Did Smith request a reasonable accommodation? When? What? 
Was Dr. Orthopod's recommendation a request for an 
accommodation? 
Was Smith entitled to a reasonable accommodation when he was 
in the head drive job, assuming that he was able to perform all of 
the essential functions of the job without any accommodation? 
Did ABC fail to provide Smith with a reasonable accommodation? 
How? When? 
5. If Smith proves all of the elements of liability, and further proves 
that his current disabling condition came about while performing 
duties as a scooP' operator which exceeded the restrictions 
recommended by Dr. Orthopod, what are his damages? Should 
he be allowed to recover lost income due to his alleged inability 
A-6 
to work? Isn't his current back problem just a work-related injury 
which is covered by workers' compensation? If so, is his claim 
under KRS 344 barred by the exclusiveness of the workers' 
compensation remedy? By filing a workers' compensation claim 
for this injury, has Smith elected his remedy? 
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I. Introduction 
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was enacted by Congress on February 3,1993. The funda-
mental purpose of the FMLA was to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of employees to deal 
with certain medical necessities (including maternity related disabilities) and compelling family matters by 
providing a minimum employment standard for unpaid leave, and the right of the employee to reinstatement to 
their former position or an equivalent position at the conclusion of the qualifying leave. It also was the ex-
pressed intent of Congress to "accomplish [this purpose] in a manner that accommodates the legitimate inter-
ests of employers." 29 U.s.c. §§ 2610(b)(2) and (3). 
The FMLA provides for two types of broad protections to employees. The first protections confer affir-
mative entitlements to employees and thus are prescriptive obligations of the employer. 29 U.s.c. §§ 2612 and 
2614. Subsection (a)(1) of Section 2612 provides, in part, that "an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 
12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period" for any of four specific reasons, as follows: (1) the birth of 
a son or daughter of the employee and in order to care for such son or daughter; (2) the placement of a son or 
daughter with the employee for adoption or foster care; (3) in order to care for the spouse, child or parent of the 
employee, if such spouse, child, or parent has a serious health condition; and (4) because of a serious health 
condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee. 
Subsection (a)(l) of Section 2614 further provides, in part, that after a qualifying absence, the employer 
must restore the employee to the same position or to a position comparable to that held by the employee before 
the leave. This restoration right is subject to a number of limitations, including two articulated in subsection 
(a)(3) of Section 2614. These limitations provide that a restored employee is not entitled to (1) the accrual of any 
seniority or employment benefits during any period of leave and (2) any right, benefit, or position of employ-
ment other than any right, benefit, or position to which the employee would have been entitled had the em-
ployee not taken the leave. 
The second protections provided employees by the FMLA prohibit the employer from, among other 
actions, (1) interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise of any right provided under the FMLA, or (2) 
discharging or in any other manner discriminating against any individual for opposing any practice made un-
lawful by the FMLA, or because the individual has filed any charge, or has instituted or caused to be instituted 
any proceeding, under or related to the FMLA. 29 U.s.c. § 2615(a) and (b). Where an employer has violated 
these prescriptive and proscriptive provisions, the employee is entitled to compensatory damages equal to the 
amount of any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation which the employee was denied or 
lost as a result of the violation, and interest on the compensatory damages. Additionally, unless the court con-
cludes that the employer acted in good faith and reasonably believed it has complied with the FMLA, the em-
ployee is entitled to liquidated damages equal to the amount of compensatory damages, plus interest. 29 U.s.c. 
§ 2617(a)(1)(A). Finally, an employer is liable for equitable relief if appropriate, including employment, rein-
statement, or promotion. 29 U.s.c. § 2617(a)(1)(B). 
Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to promulgate regulations "necessary to carry out" the 
FMLA. 29 U.s.c. § 2654. The Secretary of Labor issued final regulations implementing Title I of the FMLA, 
which affects private employers and state and local governments, on January 6, 1995, with an effective date of 
April 6, 1995. The final regulations provide detailed guidance on the scope, meaning, and application of the 
FMLA. Because these administrative regulations have been promulgated in response to an express delegation 
of authority, they are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute. 
This article examines the developments and application of the FMLA through the implementing final 
regulations and relevant case authority. It is intended as a basic reference tool and guide to access the compre-
hensive scheme of federal regulation which characterizes the FMLA, as well as a source of practical information 
in the consideration of FMLA issues. The citations to sections of the final regulations are in shorthand through-
out the article and have eliminated the full citation 29 c.F.R. § _. 
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II. Scope of Coverage of the FMLA 
A. Employer Coverage (29 U.s.c. § 2611(4); § 825.104) 
"Employer" is defined as any person engaged in commerce or in an industry or activity affecting com-
merce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar work 
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 
Employer coverage also extends to any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of a cov-
ered employer to any of the employees of the covered employer, or any "public agency" as defined in Section 
3(x) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). 
"Joint employer" and "successor in interest" relationships also may be covered under the FMLA. (§§ 
825.106,825.107). 
B. Employees Eligible for Leave under the FMLA 
(29 U.s.c. § 2611(2); § 825.110) 
To be eligible for FMLA leave, an employee must meet each of the following three requirements: 
a. The employee must have been employed by the employer for at least 12 months. 
b. The employee must have been employed for at least 1,250 hours of service during the 12-
month period immediately preceding the commencement of the leave. 
c. The employee must be employed at a work site where 50 or more employees are employed 
by the employer within 75 miles of that work site. 
The FMLA's definitions of "employ" and "employee" are borrowed from the FLSA. If a particular oT-
rangement in fact constitutes an employer-employee relationship within the meaning of the FLSA as contem-
plated by the statutory definitions, and the "employee" satisfies the FMLA eligibility criteria, the employee is 
entitled to the benefits of the FMLA. 
The following cases address the existence of an employment relationship generally: 
(i) Termination of employment relationship-Mayo v. Trinity Marine Industries, Inc., 137 
Lab. Cas. (CCH) 'J[33,839 (ED. La. 1999) (where the individual was either no longer em-
ployed by reason of his voluntary resignation, or was in the process of being terminated at 
the time the request for FMLA leave was made, the individual is not an eligible employee 
under the FMLA and is not entitled to FMLA leave; eligibility for FMLA leave does not 
survive the termination of the employment relationship) - 29 U.s.c. §2611; §§825.110 and 
825.216(a). 
(ii) Effect of prior resignation-Hammon v. PHL Airways, Incorporated, 165 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 
1999) (an employee's actions of expressing his intention to quit his job and taking steps to 
relinquish his position constituted a voluntary "effective resignation" of his employment 
which was properly accepted by the employer, even though acceptance of the resignation 
occurred during a conversation where the employee attempted to withdraw the resigna-
tion and sought FMLA leave to address his nervous condition; the Court of Appeals af-
firmed that "an employee cannot bring a claim under the FMLA unless he notifies his em-
ployer of his condition and requests relief during his employment") - 29 U.S.c. §§2611 and 
2613; §§825.110, 825.208 and 825.302. 
A true independent contractor relationship within the meaning of the FLSA would not constitute an 
employer-employee relationship. 
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PRACTICE POINTER: Because an employee who voluntarily resigns their employment cannot claim 
that they suffered an adverse employment decision under the FMLA or other statutory protection, it is 
beneficial to document - e.g., by a confirriling letter to the employee - the voluntary resignation and 
acceptance of the resignation. 
Determination of employment for at least 12 months is governed by § 825.110(b), (c) and (d). 
TI,e 12 months employment need not be consecutive. Employment for any part of a week counts as a week 
of employment. Employment for the 12-month period includes any period of paid or unpaid leave during which 
other benefits or compensation are provided. Intermittent, occasional, and casual employment also counts towards 
the 12-month employment requirement. Employment in a total of 52 weeks is deemed to equal 12 months. 
PRACTICE POINTER:UndertheFMLA eligibility requirement that an empl()yee musthavebeen em-
ployed by the eIl).ployedor 12months (29U.S.C. §2611(2)(A»,such employmentdoes IlQ!have tobe 
continuous in nature and the requirement will be satisfied by separate periods of employment which in 
the aggregate equals 12 months of employment. 
The "1,250 hours of service" requirement is addressed in § 825.110(b)(c), and (d) of the FMLA. The 
requirement is determined according to principles established under the FLSA for determining compensable 
hours of work. Under FLSA principles, an employee receives credit toward the FMLA "hours of service" re-
quirement only for actual hours worked. Under the FLSA, payments made for occasional periods when no 
work is performed due to vacation, holiday, illness ... and other similar causes are not considered compensation 
for hours worked. 29 U.s.c. § 207(e)(2). Any accurate accounting of actual hours worked under FLSA principles 
may be used. Full-time teachers of an elementary or secondary school system, or institution of higher education, 
or other educational establishment or institution are deemed to meet the 1,2S0-hour test. See Robbins v. The 
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 896 F. Supp, 18 (DD.C. 1995) (an employee who had worked only 875.75 hours 
in the 12-month period preceding commencement of her maternity leave and sought credit for paid holiday 
time, vacation time, sick leave and previous maternity leave properly was denied FMLA leave; the Court held 
that because neither paid nor unpaid leave is considered "hours worked" under the FLSA, such leave should 
not be considered "hours of service" for FMLA purposes.) See FMLA Advisory Opinion No. 78, 1996 Lab. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 'j[ 32,431 (1996). 
The employer has the burden to "clearly demonstrate" that the 1,250-hour service requirement in a 12-
month period was not satisfied if FMLA leave is to be denied any employee with respect to which: 
l. the employer does not maintain an accurate record of hours worked, or 
2. no hours-worked records have been kept because the employee is a full-time, FLSA-ex-
empt employee. 
Sufficient hours of service must be accrued in the 12-month period prior to FMLA. In Clark v. Allegheny 
University Hospital, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 'j[33,667 (E.D. Pa. 1998), an employee had less than 1,250 "hours of 
service" in the 12-month period preceding his request for FMLA leave and was not eligible for FMLA leave; 
"hours of service" for FMLA purposes is determined by the same principles used in the FLSA to determine 
"hours of work" for payment of overtime compensation-i.e., actual hours worked-and payments made for 
occasional periods when no work is performed due to vacation, holiday, illness and other similar causes are not 
considered hours of service within the meaning of the FMLA-29 U.S.c. §2611(2)(C); §825.110 
PRACTICE POINTER: Although employers generally maintain accurate records of actual hours worked 
by non-exempt employees, the same is not necessarily true for exempt employees. In the absence of 
accurate records of hours worked byan exempt employee, the employer has the burden of showing that 
the employee has not worked the requisite hours and, if the employer is unable to meet this burden, the 
employee is deemed to have met this test. Therefore, employers should review record-keeping prac-
tices to ensure that exempt employees' actual hours worked can be established in some manner. 
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In the event the employer is unable to meet this burden, the employee is deemed to have met the 1,250 
hours of service requirement. 
The requirement of 50 employees within 75 miles of the employment site is governed by §§ 825.110(f), 
825.111 of the regulations. Whether 50 employees are employed within 75 miles is determined when the em-
ployee gives notice of the need for leave. Once an employee is determined eligible in response to a notice of the 
need for leave, the employee's eligibility is not affected by any subsequent change in the number of employees 
employed at or within 75 miles of the employee's work site. An employer may not terminate employee leave 
that already has started if the employee count drops below 50. 
In Schlett v. Avco Financial Services, 950 F. Supp. 823 (ND. Ohio 1995), the employee was employed by 
the employer for less than 12 months and the employer employed fewer than 50 employees within 75 miles of 
the employee's work site. The court held that the employee was not entitled to coverage under the FMLA even 
though the employer failed to notify the employee of her ineligibility within two business days of receipt of 
notice of need for leave pursuant to § 825.110(d). The employer does not waive general coverage criteria by its 
failure to timely act under § 825.110(d). 
PRACTICE POINTER: When an employee requests FMLA-qualifying leave, the employer should first 
make certain they satisfy the basic employment requirements for eligibility (i.e., covered situs of em-
ptoyment; covered relationship; 12 months employment; 1,250 hours actuallywotked). 
An employee's worksite under the FMLA ordinarily will be the site the employee reports to or, if none, 
from which the employee's work is assigned. For employees with no fixed worksite (e .g., construction workers, 
truck drivers, seamen, pilots), the worksite is the site to which they are assigned as their home base, from which 
their work is assigned, or to which they report. When an employee is jointly employed by two or more employ-
ers, the employee's worksite is the primary employer'S office from which the employee is assigned or reports. 
The determination whether an employee has worked for the employer for at least 1,250 hours in the 12 
months preceding the leave, and has been employed by the employer for a total of at least 12 months, must be 
made as of the date leave commences. According to the FMLA Final Regulations, if an employee notifies the 
employer of need for FMLA leave before the employee meets the eligibility requirements, the employer must 
either: 
1. confirm the employee's eligibility based upon a projection that the employee will be eli-
gible on the date the leave would commence; or 
2. advise the employee when the eligibility requirement is met. 
If the employer fails to advise the employee whether the employee is eligible prior to the date the requested 
leave is to commence, the employee will be deemed eligible for FMLA leave. In this circumstance, the employer 
is "estopped" to deny the leave. 
If the employer confirms eligibility at the time the notice for leave is received, the employer may not 
subsequently challenge the employee's eligibility. The following cases address the "estoppel provision" of the 
FMLA Final Regulations. Some courts have rejected this provision. 
1. Seaman v. Downtown Partnership of Baltimore. Inc., 991 F.Supp. 751 (D. Md. 1998), (where 
the employee had been employed by the employer for less than 12 months when she re-
quested maternity leave under the FMLA, the employer was not estopped, pursuant to 
§825.110(d) of the regulations, from terminating her employment, even though the em-
ployer previously had designated on the leave request form that the leave request was 
granted and charged against the employee's FMLA entitlement. The Court held that 
§825.110(d) of the regulations was invalid to the extent it "rewrote" the eligibility require-
ments of the FMLA, noting that the plain language of the eligibility provisions of the FMLA 
require that an employee must have worked for the employer for at least 12 months, and 
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that nothing in the relevant statutory provision or the FMLA indicates that the Department 
of Labor has the power to require employers to waive this eligibility requirement, either by 
their action or their inaction.) 29 U.s.c. §2611 (2)(A); §825.110(d). 
2. Wolke v. Dreadnought Marine. Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Va. 1997), (where the employee 
was employed by the employer for less than 12 months and the employee was not entitled to 
FMLA coverage even though the employer failed to notify the employee of this ineligibility 
within two business days of receipt of notice of need for leave pursuant to § 825.110(d), the 
Court held that § 825.110, which purports to transform employees who are ineligible under 
the FMLA to eligible status, was invalid because it impermissibly contradicts the clear intent 
of Congress to restrict the class of eligible employees by shortening the twelve-month eligibil-
ity period.) 
3. In Tessie v. Carter Health Care Center aka Sterling Acquisition Corp., 926 F.Supp. 613 (E.D. 
Ky. 1996), the employee was denied eligibility status for FMLAleave by way of the estoppel 
provision of regulations, where the employee failed to notify the employer of the need for 
leave, the Court finding that conversations regarding the employee's medical condition 
concerned the availability of light duty work and not leave. 
PRACTICE POINTER: Notwithstanding these cases, it is the employer's obligation todesignate leave 
as FMLA leave (§ 825.208(a», and this designation normally must be made when the employer learns 
the reason for the leave(§ 825.208(b)(1» ; the employer must be diligent in designating qualifying leave, 
including workers compensation]eave, as FMLA leave) 
C. Circumstances Under Which Employer Is Required to Grant Family or Medical Leave (29 U.s.c. § 2612; 
§ 825.112) 
Employers covered by the FMLA are required to grant leave to eligible employees for : 
a. the birth of a son or daughter, and to care for the newborn child; 
b. placement with the employee of a son or daughter for adoption or foster care; 
c. care for the employee's spouse, son, daughter or parent with a serious medical condition; 
and 
d. because of a serious medical condition that makes the employee unable to perform the 
functions of the employee's job. 
Entitlement to FMLA leave for a birth or placement expires 12 months from the date of birth or place-
ment (29 U.s.c. § 2612(a)(2); § 825.201). Both the father and the mother may take family leave for the birth, or 
placement for adoption or foster care of a child. 
An employee is "unable to perform the functions of the position" where the health care provider finds 
that the employee is unable to work at all, or is unable to perform anyone of the essential functions of the 
employee's position within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act. (§ 825.115). An employee who 
must be absent from work to receive medical treatment for a serious health condition is considered to be unable 
to perform the essential functions of the position during the absence for treatment. In requiring certification 
from the health care provider, the employer may provide a statement of the essential functions of the employee's 
position for the health care provider to review. 
The employee must show proof of incapacity. In Austin v. Shelby County Government. 3 S.W. 3d 474 
(Tenn. App. 1999), the FMLA certification from a physician indicated that the employee suffered from hyperten-
sion, set forth the drug regime prescribed by the physician, and indicated that the probable duration of employee's 
leave was "undetermined." However, the physician failed to indicate in the space provided on the form that it 
was medically necessary for the employee to be off work for any period of time (the physician in fact noted that 
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the employee was able to perform the functions of his position). The employee failed to establish that he suf-
fered from a serious health condition which entitled him to leave. In order to establish the right to FMLA leave 
based upon a serious health condition, the serious health condition must render the employee "unable to per-
form the functions of [his] position." 29 U.s.c. §2612(a)(1); §§825.114(a)(2), 825.115. 
The employee must prove that the condition incapacitated him for the full time of the leave. In Haefling 
v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 169 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 1999), the employee was unable to demonstrate through any 
probative evidence that a purported neck injury resulted in any period of incapacity from work of more than 
three consecutive days, or that the neck injury resulted in an inability of the employee to perform daily routine 
activities on the days he was not scheduled to work. Consequently, the employee was not entitled to FMLA 
leave for a serious health condition and discharge for excessive absenteeism was affirmed. Whether an illness or 
injury constitutes a serious health condition under the FMLA is a legal question that is not established either by 
the employee's own self-serving assertions regarding the severity of his medical condition, or by treatments that 
are not medically necessary. 29 U.s.c. §2612(a)(1)(D); §825.114(b). 
PRACTICE POINTER: When medical certification of an employee's serious health condition is pro-
vided, th~ employer should make certain that it contains information that the employee either is pres-
ently unable to work, and/ or will be required to miss periods of work in the future as the result of the 
serious health condition. 
The medical certification provision that an employee is "needed to care for" a family member encom-
passes both physical and psychological care. (§ 825.116). The care contemplated by the regulation includes situ-
ations where the family member is unable to address their own basic medical, hygiene, or nutritional needs due 
to a serious health condition. The term also includes circumstances where the employee may provide psycho-
logical comfort and reassurance that would be beneficial to the covered family member with a serious health 
condition. 
Definitions of "spouse," "parent," and "son or daughter" under the FMLA are addressed under (29 
U.s.c. § 2611(7), (12), and (13); § 825.113). "Spouse" is a husband or wife as defined or recognized under state 
laws for purposes of marriage, including common law marriage where recognized. "Parent" means the biologi-
cal parent or an individual who stands or stood in loco parentis to an employee when the employee was a son or 
daughter. The term parent does not include parents-in-law. "Son or daughter" entails a biologicat adopted, or 
foster child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person standing in loco parentis. For the purpose of FMLA 
eligibility, the son or daughter must be under 18, or age 18 or older and "incapable of self-care because of a 
mental or physical disability." 
In the case of Sakellarion v. Iudge & Dolph, Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 800 (N.D. Ill. 1995), the employee was 
absent from work to care for her 36-year old daughter suffering from an asthmatic condition and failed to prove 
that the daughter was incapable of self care because of a physical or mental disability. Consequently, the em-
ployee was not entitled to leave under the FMLA; the Court held that: 
[A] plaintiff's assertion that her adult daughter needed to stay in bed, without more, is not 
sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that the daughter was incapable of self care. 
The employer may require the employee giving notice of the need for leave to provide reasonable docu-
mentation or a statement of family relationships, such as a birth certificate, a court document, or a statement 
from the employee. 
D. "Serious Health Condition" Under the FMLA (29 U.s.c. § 2611(11); § 825.114) 
A "serious health condition" is an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that in-
volves inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential care community, or continuing treatment by a health 
care provider. Any period of incapacity or treatment connected with inpatient care (i.e., an overnight stay) and 
any period of incapacity or subsequent treatment in connection with such inpatient care is a serious health 
condition. A serious health condition involving continuing treatment by a health care provider includes anyone 
or more of the following: 
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a. any period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or for prenatal care; 
(i) absences from work due to morning sickness, regardless of the duration of the absence, 
are covered. (§ B2S.114(e)). 
(ii) treatment from a health care provider is not required during the absence; 
b. a period of incapacity (i.e. inability to work, attend school or perform other regular daily 
acti\'ities) due to a serious health condition (including treatment therefor, or recovery there-
from) lasting more than three consecutive days and any subsequent treatment or period of 
incapacity relating to the same condition that also involves: 
(i) treatment two or more times by or under the supervision of a health care provider; or 
(ii) treatment by a health care provider one time with a continuing regiment of supervised 
treatment; 
c. any period of incapacity due to a chronic serious health condition (e.g., asthma, diabetes, 
epilepsy); 
(i) a chronic condition may cause episodic rather than a continuing period of incapacity; 
(ii) treatment from a health care provider is not required during the absence; 
d . a period of incapacity which is permanent, or long-term conditions for which treatment 
may not be effective (e.g., Alzheimer's, severe stroke, terminal stages of a disease). Only 
supervision by a health care provider is required, rather than actual treatment; or 
e. any period of incapacity to receive multiple treatments, and conditions which would result 
in incapacitation in the absence of multiple treatments (e.g., chemotherapy, physical therapy, 
dialysis). 
Unless complications arise, the following are examples of conditions that generally do not meet defini-
tions of a serious health condition and therefore do not qualify for FMLA leave: 
• common cold 
• flu 
• ear aches 
• upset stomach 
• minor ulcer 
• headaches other than migraine 
• routine dental or orthodontic problems 
• periodontal disease 
Where the employee is incapacitated for more than three days, has been treated by a health care pro-
vider on at least one occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment prescribed by the health care 
provider, minor illnesses are treated as serious health conditions. A regimen of continuing treatment sufficient 
for purposes of FMLA leave involves a course of prescription medication (e.g., an antibiotic) or therapy requir-
ing special equipment to resolve or alleviate the health condition (e.g., oxygen). A regimen of continuing treat-
ment not sufficient, by itself, for purposes of FMLA leave is one that can be initiated without a visit to a health 
care provider, such as taking over-the-counter medications such as aspirin, antihistamines, or salves; or bed-
rest, drinking fluids, exercise and other similar activities. 
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The Appendix to this article sets forth various cases that address the issue of what constitutes a serious 
health condition under the FMLA. 
III. Rights and Obligations Created by the FMLA 
A. Employer Notice Requirements 
Every employer covered by the FMLA is required to post and keep posted, in a conspicuous place, a 
notice explaining the FMLA's provisions and procedures for filing complaints. (29 U.s.c. § 2619; §82S.300). An 
employer that fails to post the required notice cannot take any adverse employment action against an employee, 
including denying FMLA leave, for failing to furnish the employer with advance notice of the need to take 
FMLA leave. Where an employer's workforce is comprised of a significant portion of workers who are not 
literate in English, the employer is responsible for providing the notice in a language in which the employees are 
literate. The Wage and Hour Division poster is not enough to satisfy all of the FMLAnotice requirements. 
If an.employee handbook or similar document is maintained, the handbook must incorporate informa-
tion concerning FMLA rights and responsibilities and the employer's policies regarding the FMLA. (§825.301(a)(1) 
and (2)). In the absence of an employee handbook or similar document, the employer must provide "written 
guidance" to employees concerning all the employee's rights and obligations under the FMLA. 
The employer is required to provide written notice detailing the specific expectations and obligations of 
the employee . (§825.301(b)(1)). The specific notice must explain the consequences of a failure to meet these 
obligations. It must be provided to the employee in a language in which the employee is literate. Elements of the 
specific notice are itemized at §825.301(b)(1). 
"Specific notice" is different from the notice provided in an employee handbook or through "written 
guidance." The specific notice may include other information, such as whether the employer will require peri-
odic reports of the employee's status and intent to return to work, but is not required to do so. 
The employer must promptly notify the employee in writing that leave is designated and will be counted 
as FMLA leave. (§825.208) . Oral notice of designation is acceptable, but such notice must be confirmed in writ-
ing no later than the following payday, unless the payday is less than one week after the oral notice, in which 
case the notice must be no later than the subsequent payday. 
Notice of cancellation of health insurance coverage is covered under § 825.212. 
B. Notice Requirements Concerning Employee Rights and Obligations During FMLA Leave (§82S.301) 
1. Emplover Notice 
The employer must give an employee notice of their rights and obligations during an FMLA leave 
within a reasonable time after notice of the need for the leave . (§82S.301(c)). Notice generally should be given 
within one to two business days if feasible. Where leave already has begun, notice should be mailed to the 
employee's address of record. 
Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 1997) illustrates the issue of adequacy of notice. There the 
employee filled out an employer-provided leave request form, indicated that the cause was medical need, and 
attached a doctor's note requiring the employee to take the time off. This was adequate to put the employer on 
notice of possible FMLA leave, and it became the responsibility of the employer to inquire further. Employee notice 
of the need for FMLA leave is given when the employee requests leave for a covered reason. 
Employer notice of rights and obligations ordinarily is only required once in each six month period, on 
the first occasion that the employee gives notice of need for leave. (§825.301(c)). Individual notice must be given 
to the employee each time medical certification or a "fitness-for-duty" report is required, unless the requirement 
is clearly set forth in the six month notice and any employee handbook. Where subsequent written notice is not 
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required, at least oral notice shall be provided. If the employer fails to provide notice in accordance with the 
regulations, the employer may not take any adverse action against the employee for failure to comply with any 
provision set forth in the notice. (§825.301(f)). 
2. Employee Notice (29 U.s.c. § 2612(e); §§ 825.302, 825.303) 
Employees need only give notice of leave under the FMLA once, whether it is to be taken continuously, 
intermittently, or on a reduced leave schedule. The employee is not required to assert rights under the FMLA or 
even mention the FMLA when requesting leave. (§825.302(c)). The employee need only state their need for a 
leave for particular circumstances. It is the obligation of the employer to inquire further if it is necessary to have 
more information about whether FMLA leave is being sought. 
In Browning v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 178 F.3d 1043 (8 th Cir. 1999), the employee failed to 
provide sufficient information of serious health condition. In this case, an employee who was released to return 
to work by her physician following a cubital tunnel release procedure failed as a matter of law to give sufficient 
information to the employer such that the employer would be on notice that a subsequent four-day absence 
from wo~k was for a qualifying FMLA. The only information provided to the employer was on the first day of 
absence to the effect that the employee's arm had gone numb and she would not be at work that day, and the 
physician's release to work had not been rescinded. Notice to the employer of a serious health condition which 
qualifies an employee for FMLA must be adequate and timely under established reporting procedures of the 
employer. §825.303. 
PRACTICE POINTER: Under theFMLA, the employer's duties are triggered when the employee pro-
vides enough information to put the employer on notice that the employee mm::. be in need of FMLA 
leave. The employee need not specifically mention FMLA leave/but must .state thatleave is needed, 
and the statement should be made within one or two working days of learning of the need for leave, 
except in extraordinary circumstances. {§§825.208, 825.302 and 825.303) 
PRACTICE POINTER: Employers should make certain that any employee who is responsible for receiv-
ing information on absences (e.g., switchboard operator, supervisors)is trained on when to make at 
least some preliminary inquiries to determine whether the absence is FMLAqualifying, and knows to 
forward this information immediately to the person responsible for FMLA matters. 
Satterfield v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc.,135 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1998) illustrates another case in which the em-
ployee failed to provide sufficient information regarding a serious health condition. In this case, the employee, 
who had been absent from work three times in the preceding three weeks, informed her employer at the time of 
her fourth absence only that she would not be at work "that day" because she was "having a lot of pain in her 
side" or was "sick" (the employee also specifically failed to apprise the employer that she had scheduled a 
doctor's appointment for four days later and that she did not expect her condition to improve prior to that 
appointment). The information was insufficient to reasonably apprise the employer that the request to take time 
off was for a serious health condition within the meaning of the FMLA, or to cause the employer to undertake an 
inquiry whether FMLA leave was appropriate. Insofar as employee notice is concerned, what is practicable, 
both in terms of timing and content, will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, but the critical 
question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the 
employee's request to take time off for a serious health condition. 29 U.s.c. §2612(e)(1) and (2); §§825.302, 825.303. 
PRACTICE POINTER: Because the issue of whether an employee's notice of absence is sufficient to 
trigger an FMLA leave inquiry will always arise after the fact, the employer should establish a protocol 
for recording in writing ona daily basis the specific reasons for absence provided by employees as they 
call in to report that they will not be at work. 
Employee notice generally must be provided directly by the employee. However, notice of the need for 
FMLAleave may be provided in certain circumstances, such as incapacity, by the employee's "spokesperson." A 
"spokesperson" includes the employee's spouse, adult child, parent, or doctor. . 
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In Holmes v. The Boeing Company, 166 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1999), the employer properly terminated an 
employee for excessive absenteeism when the employee failed to follow specific absence notification proce-
dures - i.e., that if he was going to miss any more work because of illness, he would need to speak directly with 
his supervisor or his personnel representative - even though the absence which resulted in the employment 
termination may have been for an FMLA-qualifying serious health condition. The FMLA does not prohibit an 
employer from requiring its employees to give notice to specific company personnel on the day the employee is 
going to be absent in non-emergency cases. 29 U.s.c. §2614; §§825.302, 825.303. 
Where the employee fails to give 30 days notice of foreseeable leave without a reasonable excuse, leave 
may be delayed until at least 30 days after the employee provides notice of the need for leave. (§825.302(b». It is 
mandatory that the employee consult with the employer when planning medical treatment. Reasonable effort 
must be made by the employee to schedule leave so as not to disrupt unduly the employer's operations, subject 
to the approval of the health care provider. 
In the case of foreseeable leave, where the employee originally was approved for FMLA leave for surgery 
based upon 30-day notice, a request to move the leave forward on six days notice because of a change in insurance 
coverage may' constitute adequate notice under § 825.302(a) due to a "change in circumstances." Hopson v. Quitman 
County Hospital & Nursing Home, Inc., 119 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 1997). In this case the Court held that what constitutes 
a "change in circumstances," whether an employee'S notice is given "as soon as practicable," and whether the 
employee has made a reasonable effort to schedule leave so as not to disrupt unduly the operations of the employer 
requires an inquiry into the particular facts and circumstances of each case. 
PRACTICE POINTER: If an employee provides less than 30 days notice of an FMLA leave, all the facts 
surrounding the circumstances of the leave must · be ascertained in order to . determine whether the 
notice was adequate. (§825.302 and .303) 
If an employee fails to provide medical certification requested by the employer, the leave is not FMLA 
leave. (§825.311(b». The following cases address the adequacy of employee notice of the need for FMLA leave: 
1. Johnson v. Primerica aka The Travelers, Inc., 131 Lab. Cases (CCH) ']I 33,346 (SD.N.Y. 1996). 
Where the employee's written notice advised of the need for leave to take care of "family-
related business matters," the Court held such notice was insufficient to place the employer 
on notice of the need for FMLA leave, or to trigger the duty of the employer to inquire 
under the FMLA, rejecting the employee's claim that the employer should have inquired 
further to determine whether the leave qualified under the FMLA because the employer 
had prior knowledge of the serious health condition of the employee's son (asthma). "Noth-
ing in the FMLAor the governing regulations ... suggests that an employer's duty to inquire 
may be triggered solely by the employer's knowledge of prior medical events." 
2. Bramlon v. Oshkosh B'Gosh, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1028 (M.D. Tenn. 1995). The employee ad-
vised the employer that her child was ill and that she may have to miss work due to this 
illness. The court held that the employer was sufficiently aware that the employee's subse-
quent absence may have qualified as FMLA leave and thus was obligated to inquire whether 
the child had a serious medical condition. 
3. Hendry v. GTE North, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 816 (ND. Ind. 1995). Where the employee reported 
to the employer that she would be absent from work due to a migraine headache, notice 
was sufficient to trigger the duty on the part of the employer to inquire further from the 
employee whether FMLA leave was being sought, and to obtain the necessary details of the 
leave to be taken. 
4. Reich v. Midwest Plastic Engineering, Inc., 2 Wage & Hours Cas. 2d (BNA) 1409 (W.o. 
Mich. July 26, 1995). The employee informed the employer that she had chicken pox, but 
failed to provide the requested doctor's excuse explaining her absence or to inform the 
employer that she was under continuing treatment of a health care provider for chicken 
pox and that the condition required inpatient care at a hospital. The employee had not 
provided sufficient notice for her employer to determine that she had a serious health con-
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dition. The Court held that adequate notice requires "sufficient detail to make it evident 
that the requested leave was protected as FMLA-qualifying leave. An employer should not 
have to speculate as to the nature of an employee's condition." 
5. Manuel v. Westlake Polymers, Inc., 66 F. 3d 758 (5th Cir. 1995). Where the employee advised 
the employer that an absence from work was necessary due to complications from toe sur-
gery, the employee was not obligated to invoke the FMLA by name. "The critical question 
is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of 
the employee's request to take time off for a serious health condition." 
C. Employer Designation of Leave as FMLA Leave (§825.208) 
It is the employer's responsibility to designate leave, paid or unpaid, as FMLA leave. (§825.208(a» . The 
designation must be in writing, (§825.208(b)(2», and designation of FMLA leave normally must be made when 
the employer learns the reason for the leave. (§825.208(b)(1». 
~e employer may make such a designation even when an employee would rather not use any of their 
FMLA entitlement. The employer designation must be based on information obtained from the employee or an 
employee spokesperson (e.g., spouse, parent, physician, adult child, etc.). 
The employer is permitted to designate leave as FMLA leave after the leave ends in two limited circum-
stances (§825.208(e»: 
l. If an employee was absent for an FMLA reason and the employer did not learn the reason 
for the absence until the employee's return to work, 
a. designation must be made within two business days after the employee's return to 
work, and 
b. appropriate notice of this designation must be given to the employee. 
2. If the employer knows the reason for the leave, but has been unable to confirm that the 
leave qualifies under the FMLA, 
a. the employer should make a preliminary designation, and so notify the employee, at 
the time the leave begins, and 
b. upon receipt of medical information, confirmation or withdrawal of the preliminary 
designation must be made. 
An example of inappropriate retroactive designation of leave is Viereck v. City of Gloucester, 961 F. 
Supp. 703 (D. N.J. 1997). The employee adequately placed the employer on notice that an absence from work 
was for FMLA-qualifying reasons. The employer's designation of the leave as FMLAleave retroactive to date of 
first absence was unreasonable where it waIted at least five weeks to do so. The Court held that where an 
employer has the requisite knowledge to determine that leave is FMLA-qualified but fails to do so, it may not 
designate leave as FMLA leave retroactively, and may designate it only prospectively as of the date of notifica-
tion to the employee of the designation. 
PRACTICE POINTER: Because of the numerous time limitations and other affirmative employer com-
pliance obligations, procedures should be established to handle compliance obligations in a timely manner 
with responsibility for handling leave/absence issues being delegated only to those employees who 
have a knowledge of the FMLA. 
PRACTICE POINTER: An employer should deal with requests for FMLA leave quickly, preferably within 
24 hours from the receipt of information which indicates that the leave may be FMLA qualifying. As a 
"safe harbor" position, an employer can always make a preliminary designation and so notify the em-
ployee. (§825.208(e» . 
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D. Intermittent Leave 
FMLA leave may be taken "intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule" under certain circumstances 
(§ 825.203(a» . 
"Intermittent leave" is defined as leave taken in separate blocks of time due to a single qualifying rea-
son. "Reduced leave" is defined as a change in the employee's schedule for a period of time, normally from full-
time to part-time. 
The employer may limit leave increments to the shortest period of time that the payroll system uses to 
account for absences or use of leave. Under the payroll time system, the required minimum leave increment 
CaImot be more than one hour. An employee may not be required to take more FMLA leave than is necessary to 
address the circumstances that precipitated the leave. 
An employee who needs intermittent leave or leave on a reduced schedule must attempt to schedule 
their leave so as not to disrupt the employer's operations. 
There must be a medical need to support intermittent or reduced leave. Voluntary treatments and pro-
cedures are insufficient. It must be that such medical need can best be accommodated through an intermittent or 
reduced leave schedule. 
However, leave may be taken intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule when medically necessary: 
• for planned and/ or unanticipated medical treatment of a related serious health condition 
by or under the supervision of a health care provider, 
• for recovery from treatment or recovery from a serious health condition, or 
• to provide care or psychological comfort to an immediate family member with a serious 
health condition. (§ 825.203). 
Circumstances where intermittent leave may be appropriate are leave taken on an occasional basis for 
medical appointments; leave taken several days at a time spread over a period of time, such as for chemo-
therapy; and leave for prenatal examinations. Leave taken after birth or placement of a child for adoption or 
foster care is not subject to intermittent leave or reduced schedule leave unless the employer agrees. 
The employer may require the employee to transfer temporarily, during the period of intermittent leave 
or reduced schedule leave, to an available alternative position for which the employee is qualified and which 
better accommodates recurring periods of leave. (§ 825.204). The alternative position must have equivalent pay 
and benefits, but equivalent duties are not required. The employer may not transfer the employee to an alterna-
tive position in order to discourage the employee from taking leave, or otherwise to work a hardship on the 
employee. 
In determining the amount of leave used (§ 825.205), only the amount of leave actually taken may be 
counted toward the 12 weeks of leave. Where an employee normally works a part-time schedule or variable 
hours, the amount of leave to which the employee is entitled is determined on pro rata or proportional basis. 
In situations where employees who are "suffered and permitted" to work for the employer during 
FMLA leave, time worked is considered "hours worked" under the FLSA. This amount of time CaJU10t be counted 
against the employee's 12-week FMLA leave allowance. 
E. Medical Certification (29 U.s.c. § 2613; §§825.305; 825.306; 825.307) 
An employer may require that a request for FMLA leave for the employee's own serious health condi-
tion, or to care for a spouse, child or parent with a serious health condition, is supported by a written certifica-
tion issued by the health care provider of the eligible employee or of the child, spouse, or parent, as appropriate. 
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An employer is limited in the nature and amount of medical information that it can require the em-
ployee to provide in support of a request for FMLA leave involving a serious health condition. The Department of 
Labor has developed an optional form (Form WH-380) for the employee's (or their family members') use in obtain-
ing medical certification from health care providers that meets the FMLA's certification requirements. Either Form 
WH-380, or any other form requesting the same basic information may be used by employer. Information in addi-
tion to that provided by Form WH-380 may not be requested to support FMLA leave. In all instances, information 
on the form must relate only to the serious health condition for which the current need for leave exists. 
Stoops v. One Call Communications, Incorporated, 141 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. March 31, 1998) considers the 
issue of medical certification of inability to work. In this case, the employee's treating physician indicated that the 
employee suffered from a chronic serious health condition-i.e" chronic fatigue syndrome-but that the employee 
was not presently incapacitated and would not have to work intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule. The 
employee was properly terminated under the employer's no-fault attendance policy for absences due to chronic 
fatigue syndrome and the employer was not required to investigate the employee's condition further or seek a 
second medical verification. The regulation which requires an employer to make preliminary designation of whether 
leave is FMLA-qualifying based solely on information that the employee provides to the employer (§825.208(a)) 
does not require that the employer base its decision solely on information provided by the employee at the time of 
the request for leave, nor does the regulation prohibit an employer from basing its decision on a prior certification 
by the employee's physician that the employee was not qualified for FMLA leave. 29 U.S.c. §2612(a)(I)(D); 
§825.208( e )(2). 
PRACTICE PQINTER: When medical certification of a serious health condition is requested, insist that 
the treating physician provide all information requested and that any certification form, such as the 
Form WH-380, is completed in its entirety. Where an employer properly requests a physician's certifi-
cation under the FMLA and that certification indicates the employee is not entitled to FMLA leave, the 
employer does not violate the PMLA by relying upon that certification in the absence of some overrid-
ing medical evidence. 
Certification requirements for chiropractic treatment are examined in Sievers v. Iowa Mutual Insurance 
Company, 581 N.W. 2d 633 Iowa Sup Ct., Quly 29, 1998). There an employee claim that the employer discour-
aged her from taking FMLA leave and forced her to resign because of her request for time off failed because the 
employee failed to establish that the daughter's chiropractor was qualified as one "capable of providing health 
care services" to the daughter. Under FMLA regulations, specific requirements to qualify chiropractic treatment 
as "health care services" for FMLA coverage purposes must be established by the employee and the failure to do 
so will result in non-entitlement to FMLA leave. 29 U.S.c. §2611(6)(B); §825.118(b). 
PRACTICE POINTER: Chiropractic treatment qualifying as "health care services" under the FMLA is 
limited to "manual manipulation of the spine to correct a subluxation," and x-rays must demonstrate 
the existence of the subluxation. 
Where an employee submits a complete certification signed by the health care provider, the employer 
cannot request additional information from the health care provider. However, a health care provider represent-
ing the employer may contact the employee's health care provider for purposes of clarification and authenticity 
of medical certification. Permission for such contact must be provided by the employee. 
The employer should request that an employee furnish certification from a health care provider at the 
time (or within two business days thereafter) the employee gives notice of the need for foreseeable leave, or in 
the case of unforeseen leave, within two business days after the leave commences. When leave is foreseeable 
and at least 30-days notice has been provided, the employee should provide medical certification before the 
leave begins. The employee must provide the requested certification within the time frame requested by the 
employer (which must allow at least 15 days after the employer's request), unless it is not practical to do so 
under the particular circumstances. 
At the time the employer requests certification, the employee must be advised of the anticipated conse-
quences of their failure to provide adequate certification. In addition, the employer must advise the employee 
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whenever the employer finds a certification incomplete. The employee must also be provided a reasonable 
opportunity to cure any such deficiency. 
Health care providers should be given accurate job descriptions so informed decisions can be made 
when issuing medical certification to employees. 
F. Employer Requirement of "Fitness-for-Duty" Report (29 U.s.c. § 2614(a)(4); § 825.310) 
An employer may require an employee whose FMLA leave was occasioned by the employee's own 
serious health condition to obtain and present certification from the employee's health care provider that the 
employee is able to resume work as a condition of restoring the employee to employment. Such fitness-for-duty 
certification may only be required pursuant to a uniformly applied policy or practice of the employer requiring 
certification of similarly situated employees. If state or local law, or the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment govern an employee'S return to work, those provisions shall be applied. The requirements of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act that any return-to-work physical be job-related and consistent with business necessity 
also apply. However, an employee's right to require a fitness-for-duty certification shall not apply in the case of 
intermittent leave. 
An employer may seek fitness-for-duty certification only with regard to the particular health condition 
that caused the employee's need for leave. It is sufficient for purposes of certification that the statement from the 
employee's health care provider indicate simply that the employee is able to return to work. A health care 
provider employed by the employer may contact the employee's health care provider, with permission from the 
employee, for purposes of clarification of the employee's fitness to return to work. However, no additional 
information may be acquired by the employer's health care provider, and clarification may be requested only 
for the serious health condition for which FMLA was taken. The employee must be returned to work while 
contact with the employee'S health care provider is being made. No additional fitness-for-duty certification may 
be required. 
Employees must be notified in advance of their return to work of an employer's requirement that a 
fitness-for-duty certification must be provided as a condition of job restoration. Specific notice of the fitness-for-
duty requirement also must be given at the time notice of the leave is given or immediately after leave com-
mences and the employer is notified of the medical circumstances requiring the leave. Notice must be provided 
by the employer in the notice required by Final Regulation § 825.301 regarding an employee's rights and obliga-
tions under the FMLA. 
Where an employer maintains a handbook explaining policies and benefits, the handbook should ex-
plaul the employer's general policy regarding fitness-for-duty certification to return to work. 
G. Reulstatement Rights of Emplovees (29 U.s.c. § 2614; §§825.214; 825.215; 825.216) 
Any eligible employee who takes FMLA leave is entitled, upon return from such leave, to be restored to 
employment in either the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced, or an 
"equivalent" position. An equivalent position is a position with equivalent pay, benefits, and other terms and 
conditions of employment (i.e., duties; conditions; responsibilities; privileges; and status). An equivalent posi-
tion must involve the same or substantially similar duties and responsibilities, which must entail substantially 
equivalent skill, effort, responsibility, and authority. The requirement to restore an employee to the same or 
equivalent job does not extend to de l11ini1ll1lS or ultangible, unmeasurable aspects of the job. 
Taylor v. Cameron Coca-Cola Bottling Co, Inc. , 134 Lab. Cas. (CCH) '1133,583 (WD. Pa. 1997) illustrates 
the issue of elimination of certain employee job duties. In that case an employee who claimed that, upon her 
return from covered FMLA maternity leave, she no longer performed certain price correction duties in her 
accounts receivable clerical position, which duties constituted "a lot of her work," raised a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether she was returned to equivalent employment. 
Peterson v. Slidell Memorial Hospital and Medical Center, 133 Lab. Cas. (CCH) '1133,532 (E.D. La. 1996), 
on the other hand, illustrates a situation Ul which the employee was given more demanding duties upon her 
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return to work. The Peterson court held that an employee who asserted that, upon her return from covered 
FMLA leave, she was transferred to a secretary position that had more demanding typing requirements than her 
former secretarial position, has stated a claim under the FMLA upon which relief could be granted. 
PRACTICE POINTER: Where an employee is not returned to their former position following FMLA 
leave, the employer is vulnerable to a claim that the new position is not "virtually identical" to the 
former position (§825.215(a») and the burden is onthe employer to prove that any differences in a new 
position are "de minimus or intangible, unmeasurable aspects of the job." (§ 825.215(£). 
PRACTICE POINTER: The regulations do not provide that an employee be returned to "substantially" 
equivalent employment, but rather to "equivalent employment," and a generically similar position 
may not be adequate to meet the employer's obligations under § 825.215. 
An employee is entitled to restoration of employment even if the employee has been replaced, or their 
position has been restructured to accommodate the employee's absence. 
In Roshetko v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc. dlbla Eastern Shore Health Care Center, 137 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 
'1133,841 (S.D. AI. 1999), an employee who worked on a "Baylor Plan" schedule-i.e., Saturday /Sunday double 
shift schedule-at a premium to her regular pay and normal shift differentials was not entitled to be restored to 
that schedule following her return from maternity leave where the employer eliminated the Baylor Plan sched-
ule practice at the time of employee's leave for non-retaliatory business reasons. An employee's right under the 
FMLA to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of 
employment is a qualified right, and a restored employee is not entitled to any right, benefit or position of 
employment other than any right, benefit or position to which the employee would have been entitled had the 
employee not taken the leave. 29 U.s.c. §2614(a)(1); § 825.216. 
PRACTICE POINTER: Under the FMLA, a restored employee does not step back on the "employee 
benefit escalator" at the point they stepped off; rather, they step back on at the precise point they would 
have occupied had they kept their position continuously. 
In Brown v. T. C. Penney Corporation, 924 F. Supp. 1158 (S.D. Fla. 1996), the job of the employee was 
given to another while the employee was out on FMLA leave. The employer did not violate the FMLA through 
the mere act of replacing the employee, even if it intended this change to be permanent. The FMLA does not 
require that an employee be returned to the exact position held prior to embarking on leave and a violation 
occurs only when the employee returns from FMLA leave and is not offered "equivalent" employment. 
PRACTICE POINTER: When it is necessary for an employer to install a substitute employee for an 
employee on FMLA leave, care should be taken in the representations that are made to the substitute 
employee (e.g., temporary or permanent position), and if the substitute is a permanent arrangement, an 
equivalent position for the employee on FMLA leave must be available upon their return. 
Vv'here an employee is unable to perform an essential function of the position because of a physical or 
mental condition, including the continuation of a serious health condition, the employee has no right under the 
FMLA to restoration to another position. § 825.214(b). 
An employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to any other benefits and conditions of employ-
ment than if the employee had been continuously employed during the FMLA period. If an employee is laid off 
and employment terminated during the course of an FMLA leave, the employer's responsibility to continue 
FMLA leave, maintain group health plan benefits and restore the employee to employment ceases at the time of 
the layoff. If an employee's job is eliminated while the employee is on FMLA leave, and the job elimination is for 
reasons unrelated to the leave, the employee does not have to be reinstated. 
In Garcia v. Fulbright & Taworski. L.L.P., 132 Lab. Cas. (CCH) '1133,437 (S.D. Tex. 1996), an employee was 
discharged for poor job performance approximately one month after the return from FMLA leave. Discrimina-
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tory intent cannot be inferred merely from the timing of discharge after returning from the FMLA leave. The 
Court found that although an employee is entitled to reinstatement to the former position or an equivalent one 
with the same benefits and terms, "the FMLA does not provide to employees assurances of permanent employ-
ment or assurances that a certain position will have some permanence to it." 
PRACTICE POINTER: Although timing alone is insufficient to establish discriminatory intent, it can be 
an important factor evidencing discrimination where there are other facts which suggest impropermotive 
for an employer's actions (such as, for example, disparaging comments relating to an employee's use of 
FMLAleave). 
According to Day v. Excel Corporation, 132 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 'lI33,477 (D. Kan. 1996), an employee's 
termination from employment one week after their return to work from FMLA leave for surgery was not evi-
dence of a violation of the FMLA. The employer demonstrated that the discharge was part of a general and 
independent decision to downsize the employee's department and cut back on departmental expenses. The 
Court held that [aJn employee returning from FMLA leave is not entitled to greater rights than he had prior to 
the leave ... "LnJor can a discriminatory intent be inferred merely from the time an employee is terminated fol-
lowing FMLA leave." 
PRACTICE POINTER: An employer should be prepared to justify any job elimination decision with 
documentation and legitimate business reasons; job elimination should not be advanced by the em-
ployer as a basis for refusing to return an employee to workfollowing an FMLAlea\!e if the job elimina-
tion is only a temporary arrangement. 
H. Compensation and Benefits During FMLA Leave 
(29 U.s.c. §§ 2612 and 2614; §§ 825.207, 825.209) 
FMLA leave generally is unpaid (§825.207). Providing unpaid FMLA leave shall not affect the status of 
an employee as exempt pursuant to section 13(a)(l) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. (§825.206). The employer 
may make deductions from the exempt employee's salary for any hours taken as FMLA leave within a work-
week. The special exception to the "salary basis" requirements of the FLSA exemption applies only to employ-
ees of covered employers who are eligible for FMLA leave and to leave which qualifies as FMLA leave. Similar 
treatment of FMLA leave is permitted for employees paid in accordance with the "fluctuating workweek" method 
of payment for overtime. 
PRACTICE POINTER: The exempt status of an employee may be adversely affected where a deduction 
in salary is taken for non-covered leave under the FMLA. For example, where an employee has not 
worked long enough to be eligible for FMLA leave, the employer's policy permits leave in excess of the 
12 weeks provided for under the FMLA, or leave is permitted for a reason which does not qualify as 
FMLA leave (e.g., care of a grandparent; a medical condition which does not qualify as a serious health 
condition), a deduction from the employee'S salary is not permitted. 
During any FMLA leave, the employer must maintain the employee's coverage under any group health 
plan for the duration of such leave. (§825.209). Coverage must be maintained at the level and under the same 
conditions coverage would have been provided if the employee had been continuously employed during the 
entire leave period. If an employer provides a new health plan or benefits, or changes health benefits or plans 
while an employee is on FMLA leave, the employee is entitled to the new or changed plan/benefits to the same 
extent as if the employee was not on leave. Maintenance of health insurance policies which are not part of the 
employer's group health plan are the responsibility of the employee. 
Any share of group health plan premiums paid by the employee prior to the FMLA leave must continue 
to be paid by the employee during the period of FMLA leave. The employer must provide advance written 
notice of the terms and conditions under which payment of the employee's share of the premium must be made. 
Such notice properly is provided by the employer when it informs the employee of their specific expectations 
and obligations, as required by § 825.301(b) of the Final Regulations. Where paid leave is substituted for FMLA 
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leave, the employee's share of the premium must be paid by the method normally used during any paid leave. 
Where FMLA leave is unpaid, a number of options are provided in the regulations for obtaining payment from 
the employee. (§825.210(c)). 
Where the employee premium payment is more than 30 days late, the obligation of the employer to 
maintain coverage normally will end. An exception to this rule is created where the employer policy provides 
for a longer grace period. The employer must provide written notice to the employee that payment has not been 
received, and that coverage will be dropped on a specified date, at least 15 days prior to termination of coverage. 
Under certain circumstances, an employer's obligation to maintain health benefits during leave (and to 
restore the employee to the same or equivalent employment) under the FMLA is terminated, as follows: 
a. when the employment relationship would have terminated if the employee had not taken 
FMLA leave; 
b . when an employee informs the employer of their intent not to return from leave (including 
before starting the leave if the employer is so informed before the leave starts); and 
c. when the employee fails to return from leave or continues on leave after exhausting their 
FMLA leave entitlement in the 12-month period. 
An employee's entitlement to benefits other than group health benefits during a period of FMLA leave 
(e .g., holiday pay) is determined by the employer's established policy for providing such benefits when the 
employee is on other forms of paid or unpaid leave. 
1. Substitution of Paid Leave for Unpaid Leave (29 U.s.c. § 2612(d)(2); §§825.207, 825.208) 
An employer may require that an employee substitute accrued paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave. 
Where the employer does not require the substitution of paid leave, the employee may elect to use paid leave for 
unpaid FMLA leave. Substitution of paid sick/medicalleave may be elected to the extent the circumstances 
meet the employer's usual requirements for the use of sick/medicalleave. The employer is not required to 
allow substitution of paid sick or medical leave for unpaid FMLA leave where the employer's uniform policy 
normally would not allow such paid leave. Where the employer does not require the substitution of paid vaca-
tion or personal leave, no limitations may be placed by the employer on an employee's right to substitute such 
leave for any qualifying FMLA leave. 
Where an employee on FMLA designated leave is entitled to compensation for the leave pursuant to 
any existing leave plan or program (e.g., short-term disability plan; workers compensation insurance), the leave 
is not unpaid and the provisions for substitution of paid leave are inapplicable. § 825.207(d)(I) and (2). Where 
the requirements to qualify for payments pursuant to a temporary disability plan are more stringent than those 
of the FMLA, the employee must meet the more stringent requirements of the plan. 
The employee may choose not to meet the requirements of the plan and receive no payments from the 
plan. In this circumstance, leave is unpaid and the provisions for substitution of paid leave are applicable. When 
the employer or the employee elects to substitute paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave, and procedural require-
ments for taking paid leave are less strin'gent than the requirements of the FMLA (e.g., notice or certification 
requirements), only the less stringent requirements may be imposed. § 825.207(h). 
Employee compliance with less stringent leave plan requirements cannot result in delay or denial of 
FMLA leave on grounds that the employee has not complied with stricter requirements of FMLA. Where ac-
crued paid vacation or personal leave is substituted for unpaid FMLA leave for a serious health condition, the 
employee may be required to comply with any less stringent medical certification requirements of the employer's 
sick leave program. 
If the employer requires paid leave to be substituted for unpaid leave, or that paid leave taken under an 
existing leave plan is counted as FMLA leave, the decision must be made by the employer within two business 
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days of the time the employer gives notice of the need for leave. § 82S.208(c). However, where the employer 
does not initially have sufficient information to make a determination that leave qualifies as FMLA leave, the 
decision must be made at such time as the employer has sufficient information to make such determination. 
The employer's designation must be made before the leave starts, unless the employer does not have 
sufficient information as to the employee's reason for taking the leave until after the leave commenced. See 
Cline v. Wal- Mart Stores. Incorporated, 144 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 1998), where the employer failed to notify the 
employee that vacation days taken in conjunction with FMLAleave were to be designated as part of the employee's 
twelve weeks of FMLA leave. The employee was entitled to twelve weeks of FMLA leave plus five days of 
vacation leave, and the employer violated the FMLA when it failed to restore the employee to equivalent em-
ployment because the employee was absent from work for a serious health condition beyond the statutory 
twelve weeks. To designate employer-provided leave as FMLA leave an employer must "promptly (within two 
business days absent extenuating circumstances) notify the employee that the paid leave is designated and will 
be counted as FMLA leave." 29 U.S.C §2612(a)(2); §82S.208(d). 
PMcnC;E POINTER: Employer policy statements relating to employee rights under the FMLA, as well 
as the request for leave form, should clearly provide that paid leave used in conjunction withFMLA 
leave is designated as part of the employees' twelve weeks of leave. Althoughan employer has the 
option of requiring an employee to designate vacation or other leave asFMLA leave, that option can be 
waived if the employer fails to give proper notice of its intentions. . . 
IV. Prohibited Acts And Enforcement Mechanisms 
A. Interference with an Employee's Rights, or Proceedings or Inguiries under the FMLA (29 U.s.C § 261S, 
§ 825.220) 
It is unlawful for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exer-
cise, any right provided by the FMLA. An employer interferes with the exercise of an employee's rights by 
refusing to authorize FMLA leave, as well as discouraging an employee from using FMLA leave. Employer 
interference also includes manipulation by a covered employer to avoid responsibilities under the FMLA (e.g., 
reducing hours available to work in order to avoid employee eligibility). See Mardis v. Central National Bank & 
Trust of Enid, 173 F.3d 864 (lOth Cir. 1999), an employer is not entitled to summary judgment on a claim of 
interference with the exercise of FMLA rights where the employer allegedly conditioned the grant of FMLA 
leave for an employee to care for her husband with multiple sclerosis on forfeiture of her vested rights to vaca-
tion and sick leave, even though the employee did not avail herself of FMLA rights by actually applying for 
leave. The Court of Appeals held that threatening an employee with absolute forfeiture of accrued but unused 
vacation and sick leave as a condition of taking leave under the FMLA would operate as a powerful disincentive 
to assertion by an employee of their rights under the FMLA and may establish a violation of the FMLA. 29 
U.s.C §2615(a)(1); §82S.220. 
P MCnCE POINTER: Although the FMLA does not define "interference," the regulations provide that 
the term includes "not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from 
using such leave."Therefore, written employment policies which misstate an employee's entitlement 
to FMLA leave in a negative way could constitute "interference" and a violation of the Act. 
It is unlawful for an employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual 
for opposing any unlawful practice under the FMLA. An employer is prohibited from discriminating against 
employees or prospective employees who have used FMLA leave. See Bocalbos v. National Western Life Insur-
ance, 162 F.3d 379 (5 th Cir. 1998), where an employee's claim of retaliation for taking FMLA leave was rejected 
when the employee failed to attain actuarial examination credits in the time required by the employer. The 
attainment of such credits had been a job requirement for at least three years prior to the FMLA leave, and the 
employee acknowledged that leave could have been scheduled for a time that did not conflict with test dates for 
earning actuarial examination credits. The Court of Appeals found that notwithstanding an employee's leave 
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for FMLA-qualifying reasons, the failure of an employee to satisfy a legitimate job requirement constitutes a 
nondiscriminatory reason and sufficient grounds for termination of the employee's employment. 29 U.s.c. 
§2615(a); §825.220. 
A causal link between employer action and leave request must be shown. See Gleken v. Democratic 
Congressional Campaign Committee, 38 FSupp. 2d 18 (D.C.C. 1999), where an employee refused employer 
requests to resume working a full-time schedule due to legitimate business demands. The employee's employ-
ment was properly terminated notwithstanding the employee's announced intention to request FMLA leave 
later in the year. The District Court found as a matter of law that the employee could not establish a causal link 
between the employer's April request that she resume a full-time schedule and the impending birth of her child 
in August, relying in part on the fact that no employee ewr had been denied maternity or paternity leave. 29 
U.s.c. §2612(a)(1)(D); §825.112(a)(1). 
PRACTICE POINTER: Although an employee request for FMLA leave does not prevent an employer 
from terminating an employee's employment for valid and legitimate business reasons, it is imperative 
that the business reason is capable of being proved. Also, prior compliance with the FMLA and em-
ployment policies and practices can provide strong evidence of a lack of discriminatory motive in sub-
sequent cases. 
The use of FMLA leave by an employee cannot be considered as a negative factor in employment ac-
tions (e.g., hiring, promotion), nor can FMLA leave be counted under Uno fault" attendance policies. The scope 
of protection for "opposition discrimination" (i.e., retaliation for opposing any act which is unlawful under the 
FMLA, or which is believed to be unlawful under the FMLA or its regulations) extends to both employees and 
"individuals." It is unlawful under the FMLA for any person to discharge or in any other manner discriminate 
against any individual because the individual has: 
a. filed a charge or instituted (or caused to be instituted) any proceeding under or related to 
the Act; 
b. given, or to give, any information in connection with an inquiry or proceeding; or 
c. testifies, or is about to testify, in any inquiry or proceeding. 
Employees cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their rights under the FMLA. 
B. Enforcement of the FMLA (29 U.s.c. § 2617; § 825.400) 
An employee who belie\'es that their rights under the F'vlLA have been violated has both an adminis-
trative and a judicial remedy. A written complaint may be filed with the Secretary of Labor by the employee, or 
by an individual acting on behalf of the employee. Additionally, a complaint may be filed with any local office of 
the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor. No particular form of complaint is required. 
A private lawsuit may be filed by the employee in any state or federal court of competent jurisdiction. A 
private lawsuit must be filed within two years after the last action which the employee contends was in viola-
tion of the FMLA, or three years if the violation was willful. A complaint filed with the Secretary of Labor should 
be filed "within a reasonable time" of the discovery of a violation, but in no event later than the limitations 
periods set forth above. See Wenzlaff v. NationsBank, 940 F Supp. 889 (D. Md. 1996), where an employee solic-
ited but allegedly was refused equivalent employment by their former employer follO\'\'ing the termination of 
the employment relationship. No violation of the FMLA occurred and the two-year statute of limitations period 
was measured from the date of the employee's employment termination. The Court held that the statutory 
language of the FMLA implicitly limits the scope of any violation to interactions between individuals sharing an 
employer-employee relationship at the time of the alleged violation; to read the statute otherwise would enable 
any potential plaintiff to "revive" a time-barred claim at any time simply by reapplying for their former posi-
tion. 
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Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight. 154 F.3d 641 (6 th Cir. 1998) examines the right to jury trial. The 
district court erred when it rejected the employee's jury demand and proceeded to conduct a bench trial on her 
FMLA claim. Although the FMLA does not expressly provide for the right to a jury trial, the Court of Appeals 
found that the structure of the remedial provisions of the FMLA, the reference in the FMLA's legislative history 
to the Fair Labor Standards Act, and other fragments of FMLA legislative history reveal Congress's intent to 
create a right to a jury trial in the FMLA. 29 U.s.c. §2617. 
An employer who violates the FMLA shall be liable to any affected employee for damages and such 
equitable relief as may be appropriate. 
An employee's damages may include: 
1. wages, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost; 
2. any actual monetary loss sustained by the employee as a direct result of the violation (e .g., 
the cost of providing care) up to a sum equal to 12 weeks of wages for the employee; 
3. interest on such sum; and 
4. liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amounts permitted in subparagraphs 1-3. 
Where an employer proves that the violation of the FMLA was in good faith and that it had reasonable 
grounds for believing that it was not acting in violation of the FMLA, the liquidated damages amount may be 
reduced by the court. See Morris v. VCW, Inc., 133 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 'j[ 33,502 (W.O. Mo. 1996). In order to avoid an 
award of liquidated damages, the employer bears the burden of proving that it acted with subjective good faith 
and that it had an objectively reasonable belief its conduct did not violate the law. The good faith requirement 
demands that the employer establish that it honestly intended to ascertain the dictates of the FMLA, to act in 
conformance with it, and generally requires some duty to investigate potential liability under the Act. Success-
fully establishing reasonable grounds for the conduct taken generally requires a showing that the employer 
relied on a reasonable, although erroneous, interpretation of the Act or its implementing regulations. 
Equitable relief available to an employee may include employment, reinstatement, and promotion. An 
employee also may recover a reasonable attorney's fee, reasonable expert witness fees, and other costs of the 
action from the employer when a violation is found. See McDonnell v. Milley Oil Company Incorporated, 134 
F.3d 638 (4th Cir. 1998), where based upon the limited success of the employee on her FMLA claim-i.e., nominal 
damages of $1.00, doubled to $2.00 in accordance with the statute, and prejudgment interest of $.10-an award 
of attorneys' fees of $19,698.81 by the district court was excessive. Even when an award of attorneys' fees is 
mandatory, as it is under the FMLA, the amount to be awarded remains within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and the most critical factor in calculating a reasonable fee award "is the degree of success obtained." 29 
U.s.c. §2617(a)(3); §825.400. 
Holt v. Welch Allyn, Inc., 1997 WL 210420 (N.D. N.Y., 1997) examines individual liability for FMLA 
violations. The definition of "employer" in the FMLA is unlike the definition of "employer" in Title VII, but 
tracks the definition of "employer" in the Fair Labor Standards Act. Under the FLSA, the term "employer" has 
been interpreted to include individuals with substantial control over the aspect of employment alleged to have 
been violated and, therefore, liability under the FMLA is extended to all those who controlled in whole or in part 
the employee's ability to take an FMLA leave and return to their position following the leave. 
V. Miscellaneous Provisions of the FMLA 
A. Interaction with Workers' Compensation (§§827.702; 825.207) 
FMLA leave may run concurrently with a workers' compensation absence. However, a workers' com-
pensation injury /illness must meet the criteria for a FMLA serious health condition. (§825.207(d)(2)). When an 
employee is receiving workers' compensation or other disability benefits, the employee may not elect, and the 
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employer may not require the employee to exhaust any form of accrued paid leave provided by the employer 
during workers' compensation leave. (§825.702(d)(2)) . 
Under workers' compensation statutes, an employer may offer "light duty" assignments. The employer 
must still afford the employee their FMLA rights while at the same time fulfilling requirements under the re-
spective state law. Where an employee is able to return to a light duty assignment, but is unable to return to the 
same or equivalent job, the employee may decline the employer's offer of a light duty job and may elect to 
continue on FMLA leave. If the workers' compensation program provides for forfeiture of benefits upon refusal 
of a light duty assignment, the employer's obligation to provide such benefits may cease notwithstanding the 
FMLA. See §825.207(d)(2); FMLAAdvisory Opinion No. 55. 
If the employee on FMLA leave voluntarily accepts a light duty assignment, such employee retains rights to 
job restoration to the same or equivalent position until 12 weeks have passed in the 12-month period, including all 
FMLA leave taken and the period of light duty. (§825.220(d)). A cumulative period of 12 weeks for purposes of job 
restoration is measured by the time designated as FMLA leave for the workers' compensation leave of absence and 
the time the employee works in a light duty assignment. Any period of time employed in light duty assignment 
cannot count against the 12 weeks of FMLA leave. (§825.220(d); FMLAAdvisory Opinion No. 55). 
B. Substance Abuse (§§825.114(d); 825.112(g)) 
FMLA leave is available for treatment for substance abuse under certain circumstances (§825.114(d)). 
Conditions described in the definition of "serious health condition" must be met. Additionally, leave may only 
be taken for treatment for substance abuse by a health care provider or by a provider of health care services on 
referral bya health care provider. 
Absence because of an employee's use of the substance, rather than for treatment, does not qualify for 
FMLA leave. (§825.114(d)). Treatment for substance abuse does not prevent the employer from taking employ-
ment action against the employee pursuant to a published and uniformly applied policy providing for employ-
ment termination for substance abuse in specified circumstances. (§825.112(g)). The employer may not take 
action against the employee because the employee has exercised their right to take FMLA leave for treatment. 
Action may be taken against the employee, including discharge, pursuant to a substance abuse policy 
whether or not the employee is presently taking FMLA leave. FMLA leave is available to employees to care for 
an immediate family member who is receiving treatment for substance abuse. The employer may not take ac-
tion against an employee in this circumstance. However, medical certification that the employee is "needed to 
care for" a covered family member may be required . 29 U.s.c. § 2612(b); §§ 825.203,825.204. 
C. The "Holiday Effect" 
The amount of leave used by an employee is not affected by a holiday which occurs within a week of 
FMLA leave. (§825.200(f)) . The temporary shutdown of operations for one or more weeks (e.g. annual shutdown 
of plant for retooling or repairs) is treated differently. Days that an employer's activities have ceased do not 
count against an employee's FMLA leave entitlement. 
D. The "Twelve-Month Period" for Determining Leave Entitlement (§ 825.200) 
Anyone of four designated methods may be used for determining the 12-month period in which the 12 
weeks of leave entitlement occurs as follows: 
• the calendar year; 
• any fixed 12-month "leave year" (i.e ., fiscal year, employee's anniversary date of employ-
ment); 
• the 12-month period measured forward from the date any employee's first FMLA leave 
begins; or 
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• a "rolling" 12-month period measured backward from the date an employee uses any FMLA 
leave. 
(§ 825.200). 
Sample policy language: 
Leave Policy. In accordance with the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), the 
Company will provide up to 12 weeks of unpaid family or medical leave in a 12-month period 
for eligible employees. Any combination of family leave and medical leave may not exceed this 
maximum limit. The phrase "12-month period" for determining when the 12 weeks of leave 
entitlement occurs means the 12-month period measured forward from the date an employee's 
first FMLA leave begins. 
The employer is permitted to choose anyone of the four methods. (§825.200(d)(1». The method must 
be applied uniformly and consistently. The employer may change to an alternative method. However, employ-
ees must be provided with 60-days notice of such change. Transition to an alternative method must permit 
employees to retain the full benefit of 12 weeks of leave under whichever method affords the greatest benefit to 
employees. 
Consequences of employer failure to select a method for determining 12-month period are set forth in 
§825.200(e). The 12-month period that provides the most beneficial leave outcome for the employee will be 
used. Subsequent designation of a method for determining the 12-month period is permitted only after 60-days 
notice to employees of the method selected. During the 60-day notice period, the method providing the most 
beneficial outcome to the employees is followed. A designated method may be implemented only at the conclu-
sion of the 60-day period. 
VI. Appendix 
• Flu-like symptoms - Procopio v. Castrol Industrial North America, Inc., 132 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ':II 33,473; 
(ED. Pa, 1996) (flu-like symptoms exhibited by the employee were held not to be a serious health condition 
where the employee felt ill at work, sat down and later was found in an unconscious state, visited his family 
doctor that evening, and returned to work the following day; a brief episode of flu-like symptoms does not meet 
the statutory requirements of either a "disability" or a "serious health condition") 
• Sleep apnea - Brohm V. JH Properties. Inc. d Ib/a Iewish Hospital Shelbyville, 149 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(where the employee was discharged for sleeping during surgical procedures and not for sleep apnea, a claim 
that the employer was required to provide him leave under the FMLA to seek treatment for his sleep apnea 
failed; the employee never requested medical leave during the time of his employment and the ex-employee 
does not have a claim for FMLA leave after their employment has been terminated) 
• Child's alleged molestation - Martyszenko V. Safeway, Inc., 120 F.3d 120 (8th Cir. 1997) (an employee's 
absences from work to observe her child who allegedly had been sexually molested was not covered by the 
FMLA where the child's doctor only recommended that the child's behavior should be supervised, but not 
observed continuously, and the alleged molestation did not create a mental condition that hindered the child's 
ability to participate in any activity; the FMLA requires some incapacity to prove a serious health condition; the 
FMLA was designed to permit a parent to tend to the child where the child is unable to participate in school or 
in regular daily activities, but not to cover short-term conditions for which treatment and recovery are very 
brief) 
• Rectal bleeding - Bauer v. Varity Dayton - Walther Corporation, 118 F.3d 1109 (6th Cir. 1997) (an 
employee's medical problem was not a serious health condition under the FMLA since the employee never 
sought or received inpatient care and the condition did not cause him to be absent from his position for more 
than three calendar days; the employee's course of action after his employment terminated (i.e., failure to seek 
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medical treatment and regular attendance at work) were relevant to the issue whether objective evidence estab-
lishes that the individual had a serious health condition at time of the employment action) 
• Rectal Bleeding - Bauer v. Dayton - Walther Corporation, 910 F. Supp. 306 (ED. Ky. 1996) (rectal bleed-
ing was neither a serious health condition nor a "chronic" serious health condition, where the employee sought 
medical attention for the condition on one occasion, no treatment for the condition was administered, and the 
condition caused the employee to miss work only one full day and leave early twice, nor did the condition 
present the sort of episodic period of incapacity contemplated by the FMLA; the Court also rejected the employee's 
"potentiality" claim - i.e., the potentiality of a condition to have turned out to be a serious medical condition 
such as rectal cancer - holding that the condition must be taken for what it was during the relevant time period, 
and not for what it conceivably could have become) 
• Cumulative effect of multiple diagnoses - Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(several different and seemingly unrelated illnesses all afflicting a single individual at the same time, but no one 
of which rises alone to the level of a serious health condition, can taken together give rise to a serious health 
condition under the FMLA; the employee simultaneously suffered from elevated blood pressure, hyperthyroid-
ism, back pain, severe headaches, sinusitis, infected cyst, sore throat, swelling throat, coughing and feelings of 
stress and depression, which caused her doctor to conclude that the employee could not perform her job) 
• Miscarriage - Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1108 (WD. NY. 1996) (absences of 
the employee in order to recover from miscarriage and its "devastating emotional impact" on her was covered 
under FMLA; the FMLA's legislative history specifically includes miscarriages along with a number of other 
pregnancy-related conditions that the Congress intended the FMLA to cover) 
PRACTICE POINTER: An employer should move with caution when handling requests for leave for 
pregnancy, childbirth, or complications arising therefrom as they are accorded speciaI.treatment under 
the FMLA. (See §§ 825.114(a)(2)(iii); 825.114(e); 825.202; and 825.308(a» 
• Sinusitis bronchitis - Hott v. VDO Yazaki Corporation, 922 F. Supp. 1114 (WD. Va. 1996) (sinusitis 
bronchitis was not a serious medical condition where the employee's medical certification excused her from 
work only for one day and indicated that she was able to perform the functions of her position, and the em-
ployee did not prove that sinusitis bronchitis is an illness that, if not treated, would likely result in a period of 
incapacity of more than three days) 
• Personal opinion about medical condition - Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 132 Lab. 
Cases (CCH) 'Il33,410 (D. Kan. 1996) (an employee's personal opinion that her pregnancy prevented her from 
performing the functions of her job for more than one-half of each work day was insufficient to establish a 
serious health condition under the FMLA) 
• Proof of incapacity of child with fever - Brannon v. Oshkosh B'Gosh, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1028 (MD. 
Tenn. 1995) (the employee's gastroenteritis and upper respiratory infection was not a serious health condition 
because although the employee saw a doctor and was given three prescriptive drugs, the employee did not 
prove through competent medical evidence that she was "incapacitated" for more than three days; but the 
daughter of the employee, who visited a health care provider and was given a course of prescription medica-
tion, had a serious health condition where the doctor's instructions were that the daughter should not return to 
day care while she had a fever and this resulted in her remaining out of day care for more than three consecutive 
days) 
• Chicken pox - Reich v. Midwest Plastic Engineering, 4'lc., 130 Lab. Cases (CCH) 'Il 33,287 (W.D. Mich. 
1995) (chicken pox was a serious health condition where the employee, who was pregnant, was treated on three 
separate occasions for chicken pox in conjunction with scheduled pre-natal doctor appointments and was ad-
mitted to the hospital and retained overnight as a direct result of her chicken pox) 
• Ear infection did not result in incapacity - Seidle v. Provident Mutual Life Insurance Company. 871 F. 
Supp. 238 (ED. Pa. 1994) (a child's ear infection did not constitute a serious health condition where the treat-
B-23 
ment consisted of one twenty-minute doctor's examination and a ten-day regimen of antibiotics, where the 
child was not absent from day care for more than three days) 
• Serious health condition ends at death - Brown v. J. C. Penney Corporation, 924 F. Supp. 1158 (5.0. Fla. 
1996) (where the employee took FMLA leave to care for ailing father with a serious health condition, but did not 
return to work until almost a month after his father's death, the employer was not obligated to restore the 
employee to his former or equivalent position because "serious health condition" is limited to health problems 
that afflict the living; efforts by an employee on behalf of a deceased family member's estate does not come 
within the FMLA definition of "to care for" since no serious health condition existed after death) 
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SECTION C 

I. Introduction 
Any discussion of the law of workers' compensation in Kentucky must begin with an understanding 
that major changes in this area of law are frequent. The General Assembly currently convenes in regular session 
every two years. In the past thirteen years, there have been two additional special sessions of the General As-
sembly devoted entirely to workers' compensation. The law of workers' compensation consists not only of the 
statute, but also includes published opinions of the Kentucky Court of Appeals and Kentucky Supreme Court, 
and Regulations promulgated by the Kentucky Department of Workers' Claims. Changes in the statute usually 
result in new court decisions interpreting those amendments, and in new regulations providing more detail as 
to administration, insurance, claims adjusting, or adjudication of claims. As an illustration of the frequency of 
change, in 1999, there were thirty-nine published opinions of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court dealing 
with workers' compensation. 
The Workers' Compensation Act appears in Chapter 342 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS). Ac-
cess to the statute is available on the internet at http://162.114.4.13/krs/342-00/CHAPTER.HTM. The regulations 
promulgated by the Kentucky Department of Workers' Claims appear in Chapter 25 of Title 803 of the Kentucky 
Admi.nis~rative Regulations (KAR), and are available at http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/karffITLE803.HTM. The 
published court opinions are published by West Publishing Company, and appear in the Southwestern Re-
porter. The West publication of the published court decisions is available in book form, on CD rom, and on the 
internet for a fee at http://www.westlaw.coml. 
Additional information regarding Kentucky Workers' Compensation is available on the internet. The 
address for the Kentucky Department of Workers' Claims website is http://www.state.ky.us/agencies/labor/ 
dwcl. That site contains various publications, including a Workers' Compensation Guidebook, forms, current 
and proposed regulations, and information on the various DWC programs, such as Electronic Data Interchange 
(EDI). The Workers' Compensation Act is published in annotated form, along with the Regulations and other 
information such as life expectancy tables, present value discount tables, and the schedule of benefit rates, by 
CompEd, Inc. The website for CompEd, Inc. is http://www.comped.net/.This site also contains news, Workers' 
Compensation Board opinions, and published and unpublished Court opinions. 
Other resources for the law of Kentucky workers' compensation are Kentucky Workers' Compensation 
authored by Ronald W. Eades, and published by The Harrison Company. That book can be ordered by calling 
800588-6840. Kentucky Workers' Compensation. authored by Norman E. Harned, and published by Lawyers 
Cooperative Publishing has been cited as an authoritative treatise by the courts. The series of treatises Kentucky 
Practice, published by West Publishing Company has a section in Volume 3A on Kentucky workers' compensa-
tion authored by Glenn L. Schilling, the first Commissioner of the Department of Workers' Claims, and is up-
dated annually. Finally, the Office of Continuing Legal Education at the University of Kentucky College of Law 
(UK/ CLE) publishes a very useful practice handbook, Workers' Compensation in Kentucky. 
As of the writing of this article, it appears that the 2000 Regular Session of the Kentucky General Assem-
bly will pass House Bill 992, which would make significant changes in the Workers' Compensation Act. It is 
assumed that HB 992 will be signed by the Governor, and will become law effective July of 2000. Some proce-
dural changes will become effective upon signature of the Governor. Those amendments will be summarized in 
this article. It is likely that these amendments will result in the promulgation of new regulations by the DWC, 
and there will no doubt be new issues to be decided by the courts. 
This article will not attempt to present a historical overview of the Kentucky workers' compensation 
program, which began in 1916. Rather, we will focus on current law and current issues facing Kentucky employ-
ers. This article is not written as a technical guide for attorneys involved in litigation of claims, but rather is an 
effort to provide a basic understanding for employers and employment practitioners of the law of Kentucky 
workers' compensation. 
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II. Administration of the Program 
The current Kentucky Department of Workers' Claims was created by amendments effective on Octo-
ber 26,1987, and is the government agency responsible for the administration and adjudication of all aspects of 
the workers' compensation program. Prior to the 1987 amendments, the program was administered by the 
three-member Workers' Compensation Board, and was headed by a Chairman. 
The OWC reports that this program currently encompasses 1.7 million Kentucky workers employed by 
80,000 businesses, and that covered workers incur approximately 66,000 reportable injuries per year. According 
to the OWC, total program costs in terms of premium, simulated premium, and assessments are presently al-
most $1 billion per year. 
The OWC is administered by a Commissioner, who is appointed by the Governor, with the consent of the 
Senate. The Commissioner has no set term of office, and may be removed at any time by the Governor. The Commis-
sioner is charged with supervising the employees of the OWC, which include the Administrative Law Judges, Arbi-
trators, Ombudsmen, and Benefit Specialists. The OWC is charged with overseeing employers, insurance companies 
and self-insu:r:ance programs, treatment and billing by medical providers, and enforcing the provisions of the Work-
ers' Compensation Act. 
III. Adjudication of a Claim 
A. Arbitrator 
A workers' compensation claim begins with the filing of an Application for Resolution of Claim with 
the OWe. Currently, every claim is then assigned by the OWC to an Arbitrator. If the Arbitrator believes that the 
claim presents factual issues best resolved through hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, the Arbitrator 
can enter an Order transferring the claim to the ALJ for further proceedings. Otherwise, from the date of the 
assignment, the employer and the employee have sixty (60) days in which to submit evidence in support of their 
positions. 
The submission of evidence to the Arbitrator is limited. The parties cannot take depositions of medical 
witnesses, and are limited to submission of medical records or reports. The parties cannot take deposHions of 
lay witnesses, except for a deposition of the claimant, and only if the claimant agrees to allow such a deposition. 
Evidence from lay witnesses can be submitted only by affidavit. 
At the end of that period of proof time, the Arbitrator holds a Benefit Review Conference. At the BRC, 
the parties discuss material facts upon which there is agreement, and identify those issues that remain con-
tested. There is usually some discussion of the position of the parties with regard to possible settlement. If the 
claim is not settled, the Arbitrator is required to issue a benefit review determination within ninety (90) days of 
the date of the assignment of the claim to the Arbitrator. 
Either party can file a petition for reconsideration within fourteen (14) days of the benefit review deter-
mination to request that the Arbitrator correct any patent errors in the benefit review determination. The Arbi-
trator will enter an Order either granting or denying the petition. 
B. Administrative Law Judge 
Either party then has the right to appeal from the Arbitrator's benefit review determination. This is 
done by filing a Request for a Hearing before an ALI, within thirty (30) days of the benefit review determination 
or Order on reconsideration. If there is no appeal, the Arbitrator's benefit review determination becomes the 
final resolution of the claim. If there is an appeal to an ALJ by either party, the litigation of the claim virtually 
starts all over again, as this is called a de novo proceeding. The Arbitrator's benefit review determination is no 
longer relevant for purposes of determining the employee's entitlement to benefits. 
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The litigation at this level starts with an Order assigning the claim to one of the ALI's. Within fifteen (15) 
days of the date of that assignment, each party is directed to file a document stating the material facts that are 
stipulated, the issues that are contested, and the evidence that was presented to the Arbitrator that each party 
wants the ALJ to consider. The assignment Order provides forty-five (45) days of proof time for all parties, fol-
lowed by thirty (30) days of proof time for the employer, followed by fifteen (15) days of rebuttal proof time for the 
employee. Evidence from lay witnesses must be submitted by deposition. Evidence from medical witnesses can 
be submitted by medical report, or by deposition. 
At the end of the proof time, the ALJ holds an Informal Conference. The parties again discuss stipula-
tions and contested issues, and the ALJ makes an attempt to encourage settlement. If the claim cannot be settled, 
the ALJ will schedule a formal Hearing. The claimant testifies under oath at the hearing. The employer is al-
lowed to present the testimony of a company representative. The ALJ decides what witnesses will be allowed to 
testify at the Hearing. The ALJ decides whether to allow oral argument on the issues at the Hearing, or whether 
to allow briefs to be filed by the parties. Within sixty (60) days of the Hearing, the ALJ must issue an Opinion 
ruling on the issues and the claimant's entitlement to benefits. 
The partjes are allowed fourteen (14) days to file a petition for reconsideration to request correction of patent 
errors. 
C. Workers' Compensation Board 
Either party can appeal a decision of the ALJ to the Workers' Compensation Board within thirty (30) 
days of the ALI's final Order. No further evidence can be submitted before the Board. The Board reviews briefs 
submitted by the parties, and issues an Opinion within sixty (60) days of the last brief. 
D. Court Of Appeals And Supreme Court 
Any party may appeal to the Court of Appeals from a decision of the Board. Any party may also appeal 
as a matter of right to the Supreme Court from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The standard of review for 
issues of fact is very limited. The Court cannot substitute its opinion on the weight of the evidence for that of the 
ALJ. The court is required to determine whether the ALI's decision was supported by substantial evidence, or 
whether the evidence is so overwhelming as to compel a contrary finding. 
E. 2000 Amendments 
The amendments enacted by the 2000 Regular Session of the General Assembly repeal those provisions 
of the Act regarding Arbitrators. As of the effective date of the amendment, the terms of the existing Arbitrators 
will terminate. The claims that are currently pending before the Arbitrators on the effective date of the amend~ 
ment will have to be assigned to an ALJ. 
The adjudication of claims before the ALJ would possibly change in one respect. The amendment dis-
cusses that the initial assignment of the claim to an ALJ will include notice of the time and place of a Benefit 
Review Conference. It has been left to the Commissioner to determine by regulation at what stage the BRC will 
take place, and whether one ALJ will conduct the BRC, and another ALJ conduct the hearing and make the 
decision on the merits. 
The amendment provides for the appointment of nineteen ALJs. The current statute provided for six-
teen, but the Commissioner was only using thirteen of the available sixteen appointments. 
The 1996 amendments to the Act had provided for elimination of the Workers' Compensation Board effec-
tive June 30, 2000. The 2000 amendments reverse that enactment, and allow the Board to continue as a level of 
appellate review. 
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IV. Compensability 
A. Definition of Injury 
Prior to the 1996 amendments to the Act, "injury" was defined simply as a work-related harmful change 
in the human organism arising out of and in the course of employment. This was a very broad definition of 
injury. For injuries on or after December 12,1996, that definition was amended to provide as follows: 
"Injury" means any work-related traumatic event or series of traumatic events, including cu-
mulative trauma, arising out of and in the course of employment which is the proximate cause 
producing a harmful change in the human organism evidenced by objective medical findings. 
It was believed that by adding these three new requirements to the definition of injury, that the General 
Assembly intended to exclude from compensation many events that were previously properly found to be com-
pensable under the earlier definition. The experience to date with the Arbitrators and ALI's as a whole has not been 
in line with that expectation. In many claims, the sentiment appears to be that because the income benefits for many 
injured workErs were significantly reduced by the 1996 amendments, much to the financial benefit of Kentucky 
employers, the answer for some adjudicators is to attempt to find the claim to be compensable, and at least award 
the minimal benefits. There have not yet been any court decisions interpreting this new definition. 
1. Traumatic Event 
The additional requirement of a traumatic event should be significant. It is not the result that must be 
traumatic, but rather the event. The term "traumatic event" was not defined. Employers will generally argue 
that this term requires more than the employee simply performing normal daily activity, such as bending over, 
or simply walking up or down a step or stairs, or lifting a small object. The word "traumatic" implies that there 
is some element of unusual force or torque that acts upon the body. This may also involve some element of an 
unexpected or sudden event. Somewhere there is a line between being run over by a freight train, and simply 
standing still in one spot. The placement of that line will be a topic of dispute until the Supreme Court speaks to 
the issue. To date, this is not an issue that has been generally resolved in favor of employer'S. 
2. The Proximate Cause 
The Act does not define the term "the proximate calise". Employers maintain that this means the pri-
mary cause, and not merely a contributing cause. If the primary cause of the harmful change in the human 
organism is a pre-existing condition, then the employer has an argument that the event at work is not compens-
able. If the medical wih1ess testifies that in the absence of the pre-existing condition, the traumatic event, in and 
of itself, would not have caused a harmful change in the human organism, then that is evidence that would 
support a finding that the claimant has not met his burden of proof to establish the requirements of the defini-
tion of injury. 
The employee argues that while he may have had a pre-existing condition, he was able to work and had 
no functional impairment or physical restrictions as a result of that condition until he sustained the traumatic 
event. The argument is that the traumatic event aroused the pre-existing dormant condition into disabling real-
ity. To date, this issue has generally been resolved in favor of claimants. The issue is presently pending before 
the Court of Appeals. 
3. Objective Medical Findings 
The experience prior to the 1996 amendments was that awards were being made to claimants on the basis 
of subjective complaints with no objective medical evidence to support those complaints. The legislature sought to 
change that situation by requiring that the claimant prove by objective medical findings that he had sustained a 
harmful change in the human organism. "Objective medical findings" was defined as "information gained through 
direct observation and testing of the patient applying objective or standardized methods". The Supreme Court is 
currently being asked to define what that definition means. As with the other parts of the 1996 amendment to the 
definition of injury, this is an issue that is rarely resolved with a finding that the alleged injury is not compensable. 
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4. Natural Aging Process 
As part of the 1996 change in the definition of injury, the legislature included this sentence: 
"Injury" does not include the effects of the natural aging process . .. " 
The Act does not define the term "natural aging process". Just as with the other parts of the new defini-
tion of injury, this is an issue that has not been generally resolved in favor of employers. The only Court of 
Appeals decision to date was unpublished (not binding authority), and ruled that all that is excluded from 
compensation by this language is prior active disability. Since there was a long line of court decisions ruling that 
even under the pre-1996 law the effects of a prior active disability were excluded from compensation, the only 
rationalization is that the legislature did not intend to make any change in the law, but rather simply codified 
prior case law. 
The employer's position is that the legislature clearly intended to entirely exclude from compensation 
medical conditions that are primarily caused by the natural aging process, even if those conditions were not 
symptomatic or disabling until the occurrence of the traumatic event. 
As part of the 1996 amendments, the Special Fund was eliminated. The Special Fund was previously 
liable for income benefits for permanent occupational disability when the claim involved arousal of pre-existing 
dormant conditions. Employers had reason to believe that the 1996 amendments meant that the conditions 
which previously involved Special Fund liability would no longer be compensable, and that the liability for 
those conditions would not simply be shifted to the employer. 
B. Course and Scope of Employment 
To be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, the injury must occur while the employee is 
in the course and scope of his employment with the employer. These issues arise in a variety of situations, 
including idiopathic falls, parking lot injuries, injuries sustained at recreational activities, injuries sustained 
while traveling, and injuries sustained when performing activity at work that the employee was told not to do. 
The resolution of these issues generally involves some combination of whether the injury occurred on the 
employer's operating premises, whether the activity performed by the employer was for the benefit of the 
employer, whether there was any compulsion by the employer, or whether there was positional risk. 
C. Statute of Limitations 
The injured worker must file a claim with the DWC by way of an Application for Resolution of Claim; 
or reach a settlement, within two years of the date of the injury, or if the employer has paid temporary total 
disability (TTD) benefits, within two years of the last payment of TTD benefits. A claim for an occupational 
disease must be filed within three years of the date of last exposure, and if the symptoms that apprise him he has 
the disease do not arise until after the last exposure, within three years of the onset of symptoms, but not later 
than five years from the date of last exposure. A claim for AIDS, or human immunodeficiency virus, must be 
filed within five years of the exposure to the virus. In cases of radiation disease or asbestos-related disease, the 
claim must be filed within twenty years from the last injurious exposure to the occupational hazard. Also, see the 
discussion in this article regarding cumulative trauma, which contains a discussion of the statute of limitations 
and notice in that type of claim. 
If a claim is barred by limitations, the employee is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits for 
that injury or disease. This includes income benefits and medical benefits. 
D. Notice of Injury 
An injured worker is required to give the employer notice of an injury as soon as practicable. If the 
employee does not give due and timely notice, the claim will be dismissed, unless there is a reasonable excuse 
for the failure to give timely notice. 
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E. False Statement by Employee on Job Application 
KRS 342.165(2) provides that 110 compensation shall be payable for work-related injuries if the em-
ployee at the time of entering the employment falsely represents in writing his physical condition or medical 
history, if all of the following factors are present: 
(a) The employee has knowingly and willfully made a false representation as to his physical 
condition or medical history. 
(b) The employer has relied upon the false representation, and this reliance was a substantial 
factor in the hiring, and 
(c) There is a causal connection between the false representation and the injury for which com-
pensation has been claimed. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act has not entirely ended the employer's ability to conduct a pre-
employment physical examination, and any such exam should closely follow the requirements of that law. This 
is an examp~e of one important value of the pre-employment physical examination. 
F. Employee's Refusal to Seek or Follow Medical Advice 
KRS 342.035(3) provides that no compensation shall be payable for the death or disability of an em-
ployee if his death is caused, or if and insofar as his disability is aggravated, caused, or continued, by an unrea-
sonable failure to submit to or follow any competent surgical treatment or medical aid or advice. 
V. Income Benefits 
The Act provides benefits to workers who are injured on the job, or who sustain disease due to exposure 
at the workplace. There are four types of benefits, i.e. income, medical, vocational rehabilitation, and death 
benefits. Kentucky provides income benefits for temporary total disability (TID), permanent partial disability 
(PPD), and permanent total disability (PID). The law does not provide for temporary partial disability benefits. 
A Temporary Total Disability Benefits 
In general, TID benefits are paid for the period of time following an injury during which the employee 
is unable to return to work. KRS 342.0011 (11 )(a) defines TID as meaning "the condition of an employee who has 
not reached maximum medical improvement from an injury and has not reached a level of improvement that 
would permit a return to employment." Those simple and plain words of the English language are not quite so 
clear when it comes to applying the law to the facts of a particular claim. 
The definition of TID was enacted effective December 12, 1996. There are not yet any published court 
opinions interpreting that amendment. There are several recurring situations: 
(1) The employee has been released to return to work by a doctor with or without restrictions, 
and actually returns to work. He is no longer entitled to TID benefits. 
(2) The employee has been released to return to work by a doctor without restrictions, but 
chooses not return to work because he does not believe that he is physically able to per-
form the work. He is probably no longer entitled to TID benefits. The Arbitrator or ALJ can 
choose to believe a claimant's testimony that he is not able to work, and disregard the 
opinion of the doctor, but usually the medical opinion is credited over the self-serving tes-
timony from the claimant. 
(3) The employee has been released to return to work with restrictions, and the employer has 
offered to accommodate those restrictions, but the employee chooses not to return to work. 
He is probably no longer entitled to TID benefits. 
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(4) The employee has been released to return to work without restrictions, but the employer 
does not have a job available for him. The employer may have already filled the job while 
the employee was off work, or the employer may simply want to terminate the employ-
ment relationship. He is not entitled to TID benefits, but beware of potential liability for 
wrongful discharge, breach of contract, or ADA benefits. 
(5) The employee has been released to return to work with restrictions, but the employer does 
not have a job available for him that would accommodate the restrictions. 
This is the fact situation that has generated the most disputes, but again there are not yet any published 
court opinions on this issue. The Commissioner of the DWC has issued a policy statement to the employees of 
the DWC stating his opinion that in this situation, the employee is entitled to TID benefits. 
Most defense attorneys would argue that if the employee has been released to return to work with 
restrictions, then he has "reached a level of improvement that would permit a return to employment", and is not 
entitled to further payments of TID benefits. If he is able to work, he is no longer totally disabled. The statute 
does not state that the employee must have reached a level of improvement that would permit him to return to 
the identical job he performed when injured, or to return to employment with this same employer, or that the 
definition of TID depends in any degree upon the willingness or ability of the employer to accommodate re-
strictions. 
On the other hand, the plaintiff's attorney will argue that the words "return to employment" do mean a 
return to the employee's usual type of occupation. There is some appeal to the argument that an employee 
should not be forced to terminate his employment relationship when his employer cannot or will not accommo-
date temporary restrictions, seek other employment that would fit within his temporary restrictions, and then 
seek to renew his employment relationship when he is eventually released to return to work without restric-
tions. 
Other TID issues involve the situation of a dispute between doctors as to the employee's physical ability 
to return to work. The usual situation is the treating doctor keeping the employee off work entirely, while another 
treating or examining physician believes that the employee is able to return to work, either with or without restric-
tions. The employer and the insurance carrier can choose to believe the opinion of any medical provider when 
making the decision of whether to payor continue to pay TID benefits. However, if the claim is litigated the 
Arbitrator or ALJ can also choose which medical opinion to believe. 
The ultimate goal of the law is for the employee to return to the workforce as quickly as possible, in a 
manner that does not involve a significant danger of further injury to the employee, and to employment that is 
suitable for the employee. Too often, this process seems to devolve into the employer who believes that the 
employee is trying to fraudulently milk the system for a paid vacation, and the employee who believes that his 
employer does not care about him and the insurance company just wants to deny payments to which he is 
clearly entitled. 
The weekly rate for TID benefits is a factor of the date of injury and the employee's average weekly 
wage. The calculation is average weekly wage multiplied by 66 2/,%, and then reduced to the statutory maxi-
mum. The year of the date of injury, not the year involved in the period of TID, determines the applicable 
statutory maximum. There is also a statutory minimum TID rate. The maximum and minimum TID benefit 
rate for recent years is as follows: 
Year Of Injur):: Maximum Minimum 
1996 $415.94 $83.19 
1997 447.03 89.41 
1998 465.36 93.07 
1999 487.20 97.44 
2000 509.03 101.81 
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B. Permanent Partial Disabilitv Benefits 
( 
KRS 342.0011(1l)(b) defines permanent partial disability as meaning "the condition of an employee 
who, due to an injury, has a permanent disability rating but retains the ability to work. "Permanent disability 
rating" is defined as the permanent impairment rating times the factor set forth in the table in KRS 342.730(b). 
"Permanent impairment rating" is defined as the percentage of whole body impairment caused by the injury as 
determined by the latest edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment. 
The AMA Guides provide a somewhat scientific approach to measuring the permanent effects of an 
injury on the human body's ability to function, and expresses that impairment in terms of a percentage to the 
body as a whole. The most recent edition is currently the fourth edition, and consists of 339 pages. 
Prior to the adoption of the AMA Guides as the basis for rating impairment, physicians based their 
opinions of the percentage of impairment on any number of factors . Some used the AMA Guides, some used 
Guides published by Academies of the various medical specialties, and others simply pulled numbers out of the 
air. The AMA Guides were adopted by the General Assembly to bring more uniformity to the determination of 
the extent of permanent disability. However, the AMA Guides contain much room for disagreement between 
doctors as to how to properly rate impairment. Some doctors have taken special courses in interpretation and 
application of the AMA Guides, while others have only a fleeting familiarity with it. 
The percentage of functional impairment is multiplied by the factor in the table in KRS 342.730(b). This 
converts impairment to disability, i.e. PPD: 
AMA ImI1airment Factor 
o to 5% .75 
6 to 10%, 1.00 
11 to 15% 1.25 
16 to 20% 1.50 
21 to 25%, 1.75 
26 to 30% 2.00 
31 to 35% 2.25 
36% and above 2.50 
PPD benefits are payable for a maximum period of 425 weeks if the percentage of PPD is 500;(, or less. If 
the PPD is over 50% the maximum period for payment of income benefits is 520 weeks. 
The calculation of PPD benefits is average weekly wage multiplied by 66 2/,%, then reduced to the 
statutory maximum for PPD, multiplied by the PPD rating (impairment multiplied by factor). TI1ere is no statu-
tory minimum weekly rate for PPD benefits. The statutory maximum for PPD benefits is as follows: 
Year Of Injur~ Maximum 
1996 $311.96 
1997 335.27 
1998 349.02 
1999 365.40 
2000 381.77 
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C. Return to Work at Equal or Greater Wages 
If the employee returns to work at equal or greater wages, his PPD benefit rate is multiplied by .50, 
which reduces the weekly income benefits by one-half. The test is not whether the employee is able to earn that 
wage, but only whether he is in fact earning that equal or greater wage. The wages do not have to be earned 
from the same employer where he was injured. During any period of cessation of that employment, temporary 
or permanent, for any reason, with or without cause, the weekly PPD payment is restored to the full amount. 
The unresolved dispute is how to determine the post-injury wages. The employer'S position is that this 
is an average weekly wage analysis that involves each 52 week period after the return to work. Just as the 
average weekly wage for purposes of determining the benefit rate is based upon the best of the four 13-week 
periods prior to the date of injury, the comparison to post-injury wages should be determined on the best of the 
four 13-week periods for each year of the compensable period of the PPD award. 
The claimant's argument is that this is a week-by-week analysis. For every week after his return to work 
following the injury that his wage is equal to or greater than his average weekly wage, his PPD benefit would be 
reduced ,by one-half. But, for every week when his post-injury wage was not equal or greater, he would be 
entitled to the full PPD benefit. 
This issue is currently pending in the Supreme Court, and it is anticipated that there will be no decision 
until late 2000 or early 2001. The position advanced by the claimant does find support in the language of the 
statute. The employer will argue that a week-by-week analysis would be overly time consuming and expensive 
to administer. 
D. Loss of Physical Capacity 
If, due to the injury, the employee does not retain the physical capacity to return to the type of work 
that he performed at the time of the injury, the PPD benefit is multiplied by 1.50. Here is more clear English 
language that does not explain what happens in everyday situations. 
What if the employee has been released to return to work with restrictions that would prevent him from 
being able to perform his usual job, but the employer can accommodate those restrictions and allow him to 
return to his usual job? The answer is probably that the 1.5 multiplier does not apply in that situation, but there 
are not yet any court decisions interpreting this amendment. 
What is meant by "the same type of work"? Does that mean the exact job that the employee performed 
when injured? Probably not. If a long-haul over-the-road truck driver, who has lost the physical capacity to 
perform that job, still retains the physical capacity to handle short runs, is this the same type of work. If an 
industrial electrician has lost the physical capacity to perform all of the heavy labor or dangerous aspects of his 
job, but retains the physical capacity to perform many other forms of lighter electrician work, has he lost the 
physical capacity to perform his usual type of work? If the bulldozer operator can no longer operate the biggest 
bulldozer, but can operate smaller pieces of heavy equipment, has he lost the physical capacity to perform his 
usual type of work? There is a line somewhere, as yet unknown, that separates the same type of work from not 
the same type of work. Perhaps by the year 2001, we will begin to fill in more of this picture. 
What if the employee has returned to work at equal or greater wages, but does not retain the physical 
capacity to perform his usual type of work? Do both the .50 and the 1.5 multipliers apply? Again, there is not yet 
a court decision, but the Arbitrators and ALJs have generally tended to apply both multipliers in that situation, 
with the result being the PPD benefit multiplied by a combined factor of .75. 
The PPD benefit when the 1.5 multiplier is calculated in the same manner as for PPD without the 1.5 
multiplier, but there is a different cap at the end of the calculation. The PPD award with the 1.5 multiplier is 
limited to 100% of the state average weekly wage (which is the statutory maximum for total disability) or 99% of 
66 2/"% of the employee's average weekly wage, whichever is less. This issue is presently pending before the 
Supreme Court, and should be decided in 2000. 
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E. Permanent Total Disability 
KRS 3542.0011(1l)(c) defines permanent total disability as meaning "the condition of an employee who, 
due to an injury, has a permanent disability rating and has a complete and permanent inability to perform any 
type of work." "Work" is defined as providing services to another in return for remuneration on a regular and 
sustained basis in a competitive economy. 
This amendment to the Act was intended to dramatically reduce the number of awards for permanent 
total disability benefits in injury claims by eliminating the old loss of wage earning capacity standard . But, that 
has not been the result. The reason for this development lies primarily with the application of the amended 
language to the facts in the individual claims by Arbitrators and ALJs. The ALJ is often faced with a choice of 
two potential awards, with one award being around $50.00 per week for 425 weeks, and the other being $509.03 
per week to retirement age. This can literally mean the difference between an award that is worth $20,000.00 and 
one worth $500,000.00 in income benefits. The ALJ will often tend toward the higher award when he believes 
that the employee has lost the physical capacity to return to his usual job. 
The same statutory maximum and minimum rates apply to PID as those for TID discussed earlier. The 
duration for PID benefits is to normal retirement age, as discussed in the next paragraph. 
F. Termination Of Income Benefits 
All income benefits shall terminate when the employee qualifies for normal old-age Social Security retire-
ment benefits, or two years after the employee's injury or last exposure, whichever last occurs. Social Security law 
has changed that age from 65 for all employees to the following schedule based upon the employee's year of birth: 
Year Of Birth Full Retirement Age 
1937 or earlier 65 
1938 65 and 2 months 
1939 65 and 4 months 
1940 65 and 6 months 
1941 65 and 8 months 
1942 65 and 10 months 
1943 to 1954 66 
1955 66 and 2 months 
1956 66 and 4 months 
1957 66 and 6 months 
1958 66 and 8 months 
1959 66 and 10 months 
1960 and later 67 
For older workers' the compensable period is at least two years from the date of injury. Some employ-
ees continue to work beyond the normal old-age retirement date, and should be entitled to some period of 
income benefits for work-related injuries. 
G. Offsets Against Income Benefits 
If the employee receives unemployment benefits, there is a corresponding offset as against an award of 
TID or PTD benefits, but not as against PPD benefits. If the employee receives benefits from a disability (usually 
long term disability or short term disability plans) or sickness and accident plan which extends income benefits 
for the same disability covered by workers' compensation, there is an offset against PPD, TID, and PID income 
benefits, if two conditions are present. First, the plan must be entirely employer-funded. Second, the plan must 
not contain an internal offset provision for receipt or an award of workers' compensation benefits. 
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H. 2000 Amendments 
There were no changes in income benefit s for temporary total disability or permanent total disability. 
However, there were major changes in the calculation of income benefits for permanent partial disability. 
The factors were reduced as follmvs: 
AMA Im12airment Factor 
o to 5% 0.6SftH5J 
6 to 10% 0.85tr.OOt 
11 to 15% 1.00{-H5t 
16 to 20% 1.00ft:5B} 
21 to 2S '?o 1.15ft:7Z5t 
26 to 30"/0 1.3S{Z:001 
31 to 3S'~/() 1.50tr.-r5t 
36% and above 1.70tr.5Bt 
The multiplier for loss of physical capacity was changed from 1.5 to 3. Further, when this multiplier is 
applicable, there is an add-on to the multiplier for certain ages and certain levels of education as follows: 
Age On Date Increase In 
Of Inju~ Multi121ier 
60 0.6 
55 0.4 
50 0.2 
Increase In 
Education Multi121ier 
Less than 8 years 0.4 
Less than 12 years 
AndnoGED 0.2 
The amendment appears to allow an increase in the multiplier for age and education, where applicable, 
not one or the other. Thus, the 60 year old worker with a 7 th grade education and no GED, who has lost the 
physical capacity to return to the type of work he performed at the time of injury, would be allowed a total 
multiplier of 3.0 + 0.6 + 0.4 = 4.0. 
The multiplier for return to work at equal or greater wages was changed. Instead of applying a .50 
reduction when the employee has returned to work at equal or greater wages, a multiplier of 2.0 would apply 
when the employee has not returned to work at equal or greater wages. 
The word connecting the provisions for loss of physical capacity and return to work at equal or greater 
wages is "or, " which indicates the legislative intent that both multipliers should not apply to the same claim. 
VI. Survivor 's Benefits 
The amount and duration of benefits available to survivors depend upon whether the employee's death 
was due to the injury or disease. Work-related death is covered by KRS 342.750. Nonwork-related death is 
covered by KRS 342.730. 
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A. Work-Related Death 
For a work-related death from an injury on or after December 12, 1996, there is an immediate lump sum 
payment to the estate of the deceased of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00). The date of death must be 
within four years of the date of injury. Out of that payment, the estate is to pay the cost of burial and the cost of 
transportation of the body to the employee's place of residence. 
If there is a widow or widower only, the award is 50% of the average weekly wage of the deceased. 
However, the average weekly wage of the deceased shall be taken as not more than the average weekly wage of 
the state (see the chart for the statutory maximum for TID discussed earlier). For a work-related death from an 
injury in 2000, the widow could receive up to, but not more than, $254.51 per week, which is $509.03 multiplied 
by 50%. 
If there is a widow or widower and a child or children under the age of 18, the payment to the widow is 
45% of the average weekly wage, or 40% of the average weekly wage if the child or children do not live with the 
widow or widower. In addition, the child shall receive 15% of the average weekly wage. This is up to a limit of 
two children, with 15% each. If there are more than two children, then the 30% is divided equally among them. 
If the widow or widower remarries, he or she is paid a lump sum representing the next two years of 
benefits. 
If there are children, but no widow or widower, 50°/" of the average weekly wage for one child, and 15% 
for each additional child, divided among the children, share and share alike. Death benefits to a child terminate 
when he dies, marries, or reaches age 18, unless the child is physically or mentally incapable of self-support. If 
a child is enrolled as a full-time student in any accredited educational institution, he can continue to receive 
benefits to age 22. 
There are circumstances in which a parent, grandparent, brother sister, or grandchildren can qualify for 
death benefits, if they were actually dependent upon the employee. 
The aggregate weekly income benefits payable to all beneficiaries shall not exceed 66 ' /,% of the 
employee's average weekly wage. 
Death benefits also terminate upon the date that the employee would have qualified for normal old-age 
Social Security retirement benefits. The language in the Act in this regard is confusing as to exactly when the 
benefits terminate, but this author believes that the initial statement in this paragraph is a correct interpretation 
of the statute. 
B. Nonwork-Related Death 
If the employee had filed a claim and was awarded income benefits prior to his death from a cause other 
than the injury, eligible survivors can file a motion to substitute the survivors for the employee as the plaintiff, 
and can receive a percentage of the remainder of the awarded income benefits . If the employee had filed a claim, 
and the litigation was still pending, the sur\'ivors can likewise file a motion for substitution, but this motion 
must be filed within one year of the date of death, or the claim by the survivors is barred. Also, even if the 
employee did not file a claim prior to his death, the survivors can file the claim for income benefits. The estate 
would be eligible for payments that would have accrued prior to the date of death, and the survivors would 
have a claim for a percentage of benefits due after the date of death. 
The calculation of benefits for the survivors is essentially the same as for a work-related death, with the 
percentages being applied to the amount of the avvard of weekly income benefits that was, or would have been, 
made to the deceased employee. There is a difference in the duration of survivors benefits for a work-related 
and nonwork-related death . The benefits to a child do not continue past age 18. Also, the duration of benefits for 
survivors is only for the remainder of the employee's compensable period (J.e. 425 or 520 weeks) that remained 
on the date of death. 
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C. 2000 Amendments 
The legislature has increased the lump sum payment to the estate from $25,000.00 to $50,000.00 for a 
work-related death. What is not as clear is the addition of the following language: "Annually, the Commissioner 
shall compute, in accordance with KRS 342.740, the increase or decrease in the state average weekly wage, and 
consistent therewith, shall adjust the amount of the lump sum payment due under this subsection for injuries 
occurring in the succeeding year." This language would appear to require the Commissioner to adjust the 
$50,000.00 lump sum payment up or down in subsequent years, depending upon changes in the state average 
weekly wage. Since the state average weekly wage has increased every year in recorded history, this would 
mean that the $50,000.00 lump sum payment would also increase annually. The exact formula for computing 
that increase is not entirely clear, but would likely increase by the same percentage as the state average weekly 
wage increases: 
VII. Medical Benefits 
Entitlement to medical benefits is governed by KRS 342.020, which provides: "the employer shall pay 
for the cure and relief from the effects of an injury or occupational disease the medical, surgical, and hospital 
treatment, including nursing, medical, and surgical supplies and appliances, as may reasonably be required at 
the time of the injury and thereafter during disability. 111e employer's obligation to pay medical benefits shall 
continue for so long as the employee is disabled regardless of the duration of the employee's income benefits. 
The DWC has adopted fee schedules by regulation, which limit the allowable charges by physicians, 
hospitals, and pharmacies. The DWC has adopted clinical practice parameters for low back injuries, which 
provide direction to the medical provider as to what is proper medical treatment for that type of injury. 
The employee can seek medical treatment from the physician of his choice, unless the employer has an 
approved managed care organization, in which case the employee must select a treating physician from the 
physicians approved in that plan. The employee is required to designate the treating physician by completing a 
Form 113, and providing that to the employer or its insurer. The employee can then make one change in desig-
nated physician without approval of the employer or insurer. After that one change, the employee cannot change 
the designated physician without the agreement of the employer or insurer. These provisions were designed to 
eliminate "doctor shopping". 
Only the designated physician can make a referral to another medical provider. In a MCO, the referral 
must be made to another provider in the MCO. When the employer has a MCO, the only medical treatment that 
is compensable is that received within the MCO, except for two situations: (1) emergency treatment and (2) the 
MCO does not include the needed medical specialty. 
If the designated physician is not providing proper medical care or is proposing treatment or surgery 
that is not reasonable and necessary, the employer or insurer can file a motion to allow the employer or insurer 
to select the treating physician. 
VIII. Vocational Rehabilitation Benefits 
KRS 342.710 governs the employee's entitlement to vocational rehabilitation benefits, and provides that 
one of the primary purposes of the Act is the restoration of the injured employee to gainful employment, and 
preference shall be given to returning the employee to employment with the same employer or to the same or 
similar employment. 
When the injured worker is unable to perform work for which he has previous training or experience, 
he is entitled to those vocational rehabilitation services, including retraining and job placement, that are reason-
ably necessary to restore him to suitable employment. "Suitable employment" has been interpreted to mean a 
C-13 
similar wage as he earned at the time of the injury. Typically, the claimant who seeks rehabilitation benefits 
makes that request in the Application for Resolution of Claim. 
A frequently occurring situation is one in which the injured employee is released to return to work with 
restrictions, and the employer cannot, or will not, accommodate the restrictions to return the employee to work. 
At that point, one analysis that should be made is whether the employer or carrier should make an offer of 
voluntary vocational rehabilitation benefits. 
Many times, all that is needed is job placement services to assist the employee locate a position with 
another employer that can accommodate his restrictions. Job placement services can be relatively inexpensive. 
From the employer's viewpoint, retraining benefits are much more costly, and are generally considered only as 
a final option to avoid or limit exposure to an award for PID. 
Prior to an award of rehabilitation benefits, the employer cannot force the employee to participate in or 
cooperate with job placement services or retraining. However, following an award, usually based upon PID, 
the employee must accept rehabilitation or his award of income benefits can be reduced by 50%. 
Vocational rehabilitation benefits may include tuition, supplies, and mileage, and if the rehabilitation 
requires residence away from the employee's customary residence, board and lodging. The Act provides that 
vocational retraining is not to extend for a period exceeding 52 weeks, except in unusual cases, but the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the requirement of "unusual" liberally. 
IX. Cumulative Trauma 
A. What Is Cumulative Trauma? 
What is the nature of this creature? "Cumulative trauma" is a term that is not defined in the Kentucky 
Workers' Compensation Act, or in any Kentucky Court decision, regulation, or the AMA Guides. As a matter of 
practice, cumulative trauma has come to include virtually any work activity. There is no mandatory require-
ment that the work activity be repetitive, or that it involve unusual or excessive exertion, or that it must be 
performed over any particular length of time. The term cumulative trauma has become synonymous with "wear 
and tear". 
B. How Did Cumulative Trauma Get Into Our Workers' Compensation Law? 
How did the concept of cumulative trauma enter the world of Kentucky workers' compensation law? 
Prior to 1972, the Act limited compensation to injury from a work related traumatic event or occupational dis-
ease. There was no leeway for the Workers' Compensation Board to grant compensation for a gradual type of 
injury unless it could be classified as an occupational disease. In 1972, the General Assembly changed the defi-
nition of injury to mean "any work related harmful change in the human organism". 
On October 1, 1976, the Kentucky Supreme Court rendered the decision in Haycraft v. Carhart Refracto-
ries Co., Ky., 544 S.W.2d 222 (1976). Norman Haycraft was 44 years old and had worked continuously for Corhart 
for 17 years. His work involved hard physical labor, including using a sledgehammer and lifting and sliding 
heavy objects. He first injured his low back at work in 1959, and would have "flare ups" two or three times per 
year. He had injuries or re-injuries at work, and on two occasions away from work. Those two events consisted 
of falling down steps at home, and when an automobile in which he was riding turned over. 
In March of 1972, Norman was engaged in turning over heavy slabs of granite, and as he dismounted 
from a truck, went down to his knees with back pain. He was off work two days, and continued to see his 
regular physician. He continued to work at hard manual labor for the next two years until April 11, 1974. On that 
day, Mr. Haycraft was visiting his mother in a hospital, and sat in a chair all day. Upon reaching home, his back 
and leg were giving him so much pain that he could hardly get out of the car. On April 23, 1974, he underwent 
a discectomy at L4-L5. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Workers' Compensation Board decision 
denying the claim. The Court held as follows: 
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On the basis of the evidence it seems obvious to us that this claimant has undergone a "harmful 
change in the human organism" that is to some degree work-related. We agree that not all 
degenerative diseases or conditions are compensable. We agree also that it is difficult to assess 
the degree of relationship between this claimant's work and his disability. But difficult or not, 
that such a relationship does exist can hardly be avoided. Not only is it beyond question that 
the nature of the work was such that it probably aggravated and accelerated the degenerative 
disc condition, but also there have been two incidents of actual injury to the man's back arising 
out of and in the course of his employment. 
To the extent that the claimant was actively disabled prior to April 11, 1974, he cannot be com-
pensated. For the remainder of his disability attributable to the present condition of his back he 
is entitled to compensation to be divided between the employer and the Special Fund, the 
employer's portion to be assigned not on the basis of how much of it would have occurred in 
the absence of the degenerative disc disease, but on the basis of how much the work has con-
tributed to it. 
The first mention of cumulative trauma in the statute, KRS Chapter 342, was with the amendments 
which became effective on December 12, 1996, thirty years after Haycraft. The term "cumulative trauma" is now 
specifically included in the definition of "injury". Since the General Assembly has not enacted any statute con-
cerning cumulative trauma claims (with the exception just noted), virtually all of the law inthis area of workers' 
compensation has come from the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. And, it has come one little bit at a time, 
rather than in any comprehensive fashion. There are still questions that have not been answered, and others that 
are in the "gray" area. 
C. How Do We Know Whether a Condition Is Cumulative Trauma or Occupational Disease? 
In O.K.Precision Tool & Die Co. v. Wells, Ky., 678 S.W.2d 397 (1984), Dora Goble developed a condition 
diagnosed as lateral epicondylitis, an inflammation of the tensor muscles near the elbow, more commonly known 
as "tennis elbow", caused by 15 years of assembly line work imparting torque to a screwdriver. Her condition 
became disabling on august 13, 1980, only 21/2 months after she had been employed at OK. The Board found 
50% PPD, and dismissed the Special Fund. On appeal to circuit court, OK argued that this was an occupational 
disease, and that the Special Fund should therefore have 25% of the liability. (The Court of Appeals decision in 
Southern Kentucky Concrete Contractors was not yet final and published.) The circuit court agreed with OK, 
and decided that Goble's condition was an occupational disease as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals re-
versed with instructions to assess all liability against OK. 
By the time the Kentucky Supreme Court decided this case, the opinion in Campbell was final and 
published, and OK probably changed its position as to whether the condition was an injury or an occupational 
disease, because under Campbell the Special Fund would have had 99% of the liability, as opposed to only 25% 
if the condition was determined to be an occupational disease. 
The Supreme Court ruled that it is for the doctors to testify, and for the Board (now Arbitrator or Ad-
ministrative Law Judge) to find as a fact, what should be classified as a gradual type injury and what is an 
occupational disease. Except as to diseases expressly labeled as occupational diseases in the Act, the question 
what is an injury and what is a disease is a question of fact for the Board to decide based on appropriate evi-
dence. The Supreme Court put its stamp of approval on the Court of Appeals decision in Campbell, and re-
manded the case to the Board to apportion the award accordingly. 
D. What Is the Employer's Liability for Medical Benefits for Cumulative Trauma? 
In Derr Construction Company v. Bennett. Ky., 873 S.W.2d 824 (1994), Thomas Bennett worked 21 years 
as an ironworker, but only the last 8 weeks for Derr. His work included heavy lifting and extensive climbing, 
usually while wearing a 60 to 100 pound tool belt. For several years, Bennett had experienced arthritic problems 
in his knee, and had sought medical treatment. He was told that he would probably need a total knee replace-
ment surgery at some point in the future. 
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On October 2,1989, Bennett had an onset of pain in both knees after sliding down a utility pole. There 
was medical testimony that the severity and abnormally rapid progression of his degenerative arthritic condi-
tion were attributable to his many years of strenuous duties as an iron worker. The ALJ found that Bennett was 
100% PTD, but excluded 40% as prior active disability. Of the remaining 60% disability that was determined to 
be compensable, .43% was apportioned to Derr and 59.57% was apportioned to the Special Fund. Derr was 
ordered to pay all medical expenses. 
Derr appealed, arguing that it should only be liable for 60% of the medical expenses, and that Derr was 
personally responsible for the 40% of the medical expenses. After noting that the Special Fund has no liability 
under the Act for medical benefits, the Supreme Court reasoned that regardless of whether future total knee 
replacement surgery had been recognized as an eventuality before the 10/2/89 incident, there was testimony 
that the incident had hastened the date on which the surgery would be required. 
Therefore, although it might seem harsh on the facts of this case to impose liability for future 
medical expenses necessitated by claimant's arthritic condition on this employer, it has been 
determined that work done for this employer contributed, at least to some degree, both to the 
condition and to claimant's resulting disability. Under such circumstances, where work has 
caused the disabling condition, the resulting medical expenses ought to be borne by the work-
ers' compensation system. 
E. Statute of Limitations and Notice 
The Act provides that a claim for injury must be filed within two years of the date of injury or within 
two years of the date of last payment of voluntary income benefits, whichever is later. The Act also requires that 
a claim is barred if the injured employee fails to provide notice of the injury to his employer as soon as practi-
cable after the injury occurs. 
Eunice Pend land worked for Randall Company for 26 years. She operated a punch press machine, 
which required her to stretch her thumb and fingers over the machine in order to complete each operation. She 
performed this maneuver approximately 2,000 each working day. She experienced pain at the base of her thumbs 
for several years. The pain progressed to the point that she could no longer work on January 14, 1983. She had 
surgery, returned to work for a short time, quit work in September of 1984, and has not worked since that time. 
She filed her claim on January 7, 1985. The Workers' Compensation Board found that the date of injury was 
January 14, 1983, and that the claim was not barred by limitations. 
In Randall Co. v. Pendland, Ky. App., 770 S.W.2d 687 (1988), the Court of Appeals held as follows: 
... in cases where the injury is the result of many mini-traumas, the date for giving notice and 
the date for clocking a statute of limitations begins when the disabling reality of the injuries 
becomes manifest. While a date earlier than the last work day may be proven to be applicable in 
some situations, such as by a period of temporary or partial disability caused by the series of 
mini-traumas, such is not the situation in this case. 
In her 8 years of employment with Rockwell International, Barbara Brockway's job involved finishing 
fiberglass truck parts, using pneumatic sanders, grinders and routers, as well as performing hand sanding. As 
early as 1987, she began experiencing symptoms of pain in her hands, wrists, and arms. In 1989, she was re-
ferred to Dr. Kasdan, a hand surgeon, who diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, which he attributed to 
her work at Rockwell. He advised her that she should avoid repetitive pinching and gripping activities and 
constant and repetitive use of intense or heavy vibratory tools. Dr. Kasdan also advised Brockway that she 
would need a permanent job change. Rockwell places her on a different job until she stopped working on May 
29,1992. She filed her claim on December 14, 1992 alleging an injury date of May 29,1992. The ALJ found that 
the disabling reality of the injuries became manifest in 1989, and dismissed the claim as barred by limitations. 
In Brockway v. Rockwell International, Ky. App., 907 S.W.2d 166 (1995), the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the dismissal of the claim: 
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In our judgment, Brockway, based upon the evidence adduced in 1989, would have been en-
titled to file for entitlement to an award for disability as a result of the mini-traumas sustained 
by her at that point. 
TI1e major significance of Brockway was the Court's discussion in dicta of the continuing cumulative 
trauma that occurred after the date upon which the disabling reality of the cumulative trauma became manifest. 
The Court indicated that while some part of the claim may be barred by limitations, if the continued work 
activities resulted in additional mini-traumas contributing to the employee's physiological condition and re-
sulting in additional disability, a claim for that additional disability would be compensable. While the Court did 
not mention what liability the employer would have for medical benefits incurred during this additional period 
of work or fu ture medical benefits, Derr Construction Co. v. Bennett could apply, and the employer could have 
liability for 100% of the medical expenses. 
TI1e latest additions to this discussion are Alcan Foil Products v. Huff, Ky., 2 S.W.3d 96 (1999), and 
Special Fund v. Clark. Ky., 998 S.W.2d 487 (1999). Huff was rendered by the Supreme Court on June 17, 1999, and 
Clark was rendered on August 26, 1999. Huff involved three workers, who filed claims for occupational hearing· 
loss. Alcgn began conducting annual audiological examinations of all employees in 1967. These three employees 
all had documented hearing loss in 1967, and the hearing loss progressed very little since the early 1970's. The 
medical evidence established that the current physical limitations due to the hearing loss would have been the 
same limitations the employee experienced since the mid-70's. The use of hearing protection at Alcan became 
mandatory on September 8,1993. The ALJ concluded that each of these employees was aware of their hearing 
loss before 1985. Since all three claims were not filed until September 7, 1995, the ALJ dismissed the claims as 
barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed the ALL and the 
Court of Appea1s-affirmed the Board. The Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeals and reinstated the 
opinion of the ALJ dismissing the claims. 
The Court concluded that the phrase "manifestation of disability" refers to the physical disability or 
symptoms which cause a worker to discover that an injury has been sustained, and does not refer to the occu-
pational disability due to the injury. 
F. Which Emplover or Carrier Is on the Risk? 
There is no published court opinion on point. However, the practice has been to use the same date that 
determines when limitations begins to run and when the duty to give notice arises. The court's decision in 
Brockway discussed above indicates that perhaps more than one employer or more than one carrier may be 
liable for benefits in certain fact situations. 
In Clark, the claimant was a truck driver, who also loaded and unloaded the truck, and worked in the 
warehouse. In 1985, he injured his right knee. In 1987, he underwent surgery on both knees. His symptoms 
became progressively worse until he stopped working on July 27, 1994 and underwent a prosthetic replacement 
of the left knee. 
The ALJ concluded that Clark had sustained 75% permanent partial occupational disability as a result 
of the condition of both knees. He further concluded that the entire disability was due to cumulative trauma, 
that the cumulative trauma first manifested in 1987, and that his disability progressively increased during the 
entire period between his return from surgery and July 27, 1994. The ALJ then concluded that the claim for 
disability due to cumulative trauma was barred by the statute of limitations, except for that disability that was 
caused by the two years of cumulative trauma that occurred prior to the filing of the claim on July 3,1995. Since 
only 55 weeks of the claimant's entire career came within that two-year period, the ALJ determined that only 
3.3% of the 75% PPD was compensable. The ALJ also awarded medical benefits. This decision was affirmed by 
the Workers' Compensation Board. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. The Court noted that there were two gradual injuries; one was prior to 
the surgeries in 1987, and the second was the period of time following the surgeries in 1987 through the last day 
of work. The Court then concluded that the second period of cumulative trauma became manifest on July 27, 
1994, and was not time barred, thus resulting in an award of 45% PPD. 
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The Court reiterated the rule that it had earlier announced in Huff. The Court discussed that once a 
worker is aware of a disabling condition and the fact that it is caused by work, the worker would also be aware 
that continuing to perform the same or similar duties was likely to cause additional injury. For that reason, the 
rationale which supports the decision in Randall Company v. Pendland does not support tolling the period of 
limitations for whatever additional injury is caused by trauma incurred after the worker discovers the existence 
of a work-related gradual injury. 
G. What Factors Determine the Date Upon Which the Disabling Reality of Cumulative Trauma Becomes 
Manifest? 
In Pendland, the Court said that when the injured employee has stopped working, we first consider the 
last day of work. In practice, this idea has been used when the employee stops work temporarily for a surgery, 
but later returns to work, and is still working during the adjudication of the claim. 
The Court went on to explain that the key date can be prior to the date the employee last worked when 
there is a period of "temporary or partial disability". We assume that "temporary" means a period of temporary 
total disability, i.e. the employee is unable to work due to the medical condition, or is taken off work by a doctor 
due to the medical condition. There is nothing defining any requirement as to how many days of work must be 
missed, and even one day may arguably be enough. Thus, it is very important for the employer to maintain 
detailed and accurate attendance records and personnel files to document all time off work and the reason for 
same. 
Most of the litigation centers around the argument of whether the employee has a period of partial 
disability prior to the date he last worked. The factors to consider include: 
l. When did the symptoms begin? 
2. How severe were the symptoms? 
3. How did the symptoms affect the employee's ability to function at work and at home? 
4. When did the employee first seek medical treatment? 
5. How often did the employee require medical treatment? 
6. When did the treating physician suggest that the patient restrict his physical activity be-
cause of the medical condition? 
7. When did the physician first recommend that the patient change occupations? 
8. When did the physician state a functional impairment rating? 
9. When did the employer change the employee's job duties because of the employee's com-
plaints? 
10. When did the employee first notify the employer of his physical problem? 
This analysis has probably been changed with the Supreme Court decision in Alcan Foil Products v. 
Huff. The issue of the date the disability became manifest is determined by the answer to this question: "When 
did the employee discover that an injury had been sustained?" Here are the relevant areas of inquiry: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
When did the symptoms begin? 
When did the employee first think that there could be a causal nexus between his symp-
toms and his work activity? 
Did the symptoms change when the employee was away from work? 
When did the employee first seek medical treatment for the medical condition? 
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• When did a medical provider first tell the employee of a diagnosis of his condition and that 
the condition was work-related? 
The primary potential problem with the Court's new interpretation of "the date the disability became 
manifest" is that it may be subjective, rather than objective. Every "informed" plaintiff will state that he did not 
have any clue that his condition may have been work-related until he was specifically so advised by a doctor, 
and the ALJ can choose to believe or not believe the employee. Is the test when this particular employee admits 
that he actually knew that he had an injury, or when a reasonable employee should have known that he had an 
injury? Does "discovery of an injury" require conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, or is it enough that the 
employee thought his symptoms might be caused by work activity? 
X. Penalty for Safety Violation 
A. Current Law 
KRS 342.165(1) provides that if an accident is caused in any degree by the intentional failure of the 
employer to comply with any specific statute or lawful administrative regulation made thereunder, communi-
cated to the employer and relative to installation or maintenance of safety appliances or methods, the compen-
s.ation for which the employer would otherwise have been liable shall be increased by fifteen percent in the 
amount of each payment. 
This is an element of liability that is curiously very often overlooked by claimants. This is an issue that 
has raised Some problems in the past between the employer and its insurance carrier. Some carriers have taken 
the position that this is a penalty for an intentional act by the employer, and that intentional acts by insureds are 
excluded by the insurance policy. This can lead to disputes between the employer and its insurance carrier as to 
who will pay for the defense of this issue, and who will pay the 15% penalty in the event it is awarded. 
There is also a 15% penalty against the employee if the accident is caused in any degree by the inten-
tional failure of the employee to use any safety appliance furnished by the employer or to obey any lawful and 
reasonable order or administrative regulation of the commissioner or the employer for the safety of employees 
or the public. This 15% penalty probably applies only to income benefits, TID, PPD, and PID, and not to medi-
cal benefits. 
It is important for the employer to immediately investigate the facts following a report of an injury, and 
to advise the insurance carrier as soon as the injury is reported when the accident involves such a violation by 
the employee. 
There are currently only seven published Kentucky court opinions interpreting the provisions of KRS 
342.165. Those decisions provide guidance to employers and employees on issues arising under that section of 
the Act, and are summarized as follows. 
1. Gibbs Automatic Moulding Company v. Bullock, Ky., 438 S.W.2d 793 (1969) 
Glenda Faye Bullock operated a small punch press. The press had two safety levels, so arranged that 
both hands of the operator were required to operate them in order to prevent a hand from being caught in the 
press when it came down. However, it was possible on this machine to anchor one of these levers so that one 
hand could be free, to allow the operator to stamp longer pieces which had to be supported with one hand. 
There was a sign on the machine: DO NOT TIE THE HANDLE DOWN. While operating the press with the lever 
tied and stamping short pieces, the press came down on her right hand, injuring several fingers. 
Bullock argued that the lever was tied down in violation of a regulation adopted pursuant to KRS 
338.040, which became effective ten days before the injury. She argued that the employer had constructive notice 
of the regulation, and was liable for the 15% penalty. 
C-19 
The Board found that the evidence did not suggest an intentional violation of the regulation by the 
employer. The Supreme Court ruled that the Board's finding was supported by substantial evidence. The basis 
of the statutory penalty is that the injury is the result of an intentional failure to comply with a regulation which 
has been communicated to the employer. There was no showing that the employer had actual knowledge of the 
regulation. In order to have an intentional failure to comply, there must be actual knowledge, or such period of 
time must have elapsed as would create a presumption of knowledge. The ten days between the effective date 
and injury are not enough on the absence of actual knowledge. 
2. Childers v. International Harvester, Co., Ky. App., 569 S.W.2d 673 (1978) 
Luegean Childers died due to inhalation of carbon monoxide gas while relining a furnace. The widow 
entered into a settlement agreement for $84.00 per week. Subsequently, OSHA issued a citation to International 
Harvester for three safety violations: excessive employee exposure to carbon monoxide, failure to provide respi-
rators, and improper planning and rescue equipment in case of emergency. Childers filed a motion to reopen the 
settlement on the grounds of mistake or newly discovered evidence and alleged entitlement to the 15% penalty. 
The Board sustained the employer's motion to dismiss. 
On appeal, the employer argued that no statutory penalty is recoverable in a workers' compensation 
proceeding for violation of the Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Act, KRS Chapter 338, because KRS 
338.021(2) provides: 
Noting in this article shall be construed to supercede or in any manner affect any workmen's 
compensation law or to the enlarge or diminish or affect in any manner the common law or 
statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers or employees, under any law with respect to 
injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of or in the course of employment. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that such an interpretation of KRS 338.021 was not intended by the legisla-
ture. The purpose of KRS 338.021(2) rather seems to be the preclusion of independent civil actions based on 
violations of KOSHA. 
The Court further ruled that since Childers had alleged mistake and newly discovered evidence as 
grounds for reopening, that reopening was not precluded by the earlier decision in Preston v. Elm Hill Meats, 
Inc. The case was remanded to the Board for consideration of the motion to reopen. 
3. Barmet of Kentucky v. Sallee, Ky. App., 605 S.W.2d 29 (1980) 
James Ronald Sallee was employed as a shift production supervisor. A machine jammed and resulted in 
a blown fuse. Sallee remarked to fellow employees that he was going to inspect the problem. Later, his body was 
found in front of the electrical cabinet in the control room. One fuse had been removed and another was par-
tially removed. The floor of the control room was wet or moist. The medical evidence established that Sallee was 
electrocuted while changing a fuse. The Workers' Compensation Board found that the leaky condition of the 
roof was known to Bannet prior to the injury, that the wet conditions in the control room were known to Barmet 
prior to the injury, that Barmet was aware of a specific OSHA regulation, and that the failure of Barmet to 
comply with the OSHA regulation contributed to Sallee's death. The Board awarded the 15% penalty. 
The OSHA regulation, 29 CFR Section 191O.22(a)(2), provided that the floor of every workroom shall be 
maintained in a clean, and so far as possible, a dry condition. 
The Court reversed the award of the 15% penalty. There was a complete absence of proof that Barmet 
intentionally failed to keep the floor, so far as possible, in a dry condition. 
There was conflicting testimony as to the cause of the wet condition of the floor on the evening of Sallee's 
death. Some attributed it to the fact that it was raining outside and water was tracked in. Some thought it was due 
to humidity. Some thought it was the result of a leak either in the roof or in another part of the plant. Of those who 
thought it was a leak, some thought the leak had been present for several months, while others thought the leak was 
not known to exist until after the injury. There was uncontradicted testimony from those who acknowledged the 
existence of the leak before Sallee's death, that Barmet had been making efforts to locate and repair it. 
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Barmet also argued that the Board erred by not assessing a 15% penalty against Sallee for his failure to 
use a fuse-puller and his violation of Barmet's role that only maintenance men were to change fuses . In denying 
Barmet's request, the Court noted that there was substantial evidence that fuse-pullers were not available, and 
that even if a policy requiring maintenance men only to change fuses existed, it was not enforced or followed as 
a general policy. Four employees testified that both foremen and maintenance men changed fuses. 
4. Ernest Simpson Construction Company v. Conn, Ky., 625 S.W.2d 850 (1981) 
Simpson was the general contractor for the construction of the Lawrence County High School. Roy 
Cecil Conn was an employee of Geneva Construction Company, a masonry subcontractor. Conn was killed 
when he fell through an incomplete opening in a stairwell, which had been covered with loose boards by Simpson. 
The cover of loose boards was a violation of OSHA regulations promulgated pursuant to KRS 338.051. The 
Board awarded death benefits from Geneva to the widow, and also awarded the 15% penalty against Simpson. 
The Supreme Court reversed. The purpose of KRS 342.165 is not to compensate workers or their fami-
lies, but to penalize those employers who intentionally fail to comply with safety regulations. By its terms, the 
statute requires two conditions to be operative before the penalty can be applied. The accident to the employee 
must have been caused by: 
1) the employer of the injured party; and 
2) the employer must be the employer who would otherwise have been liable for the payment 
of workers' compensation benefits. 
Because Geneva had workers' compensation, Simpson was not liable for compensation benefits. Nei-
ther of the requirements has been met. 
The Court noted that this is a hiatus in the law, which can only be eliminated by legislative action. 
Although it was the intentional violation by Simpson of a safety rule that caused Conn's death. Simpson could 
not be ordered to pay the 15% penalty. Simpson could not be sued in circuit court for negligence, because it is 
allowed immunity under the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act. The legislature has not yet taken any 
action of a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Conn. 
The question remains as to whether Conn could have brought a civil action against Simpson, not based 
upon negligence, but rather upon the exception to the exclusive remedy doctrine carried out in the Act for an 
injury or death that results from an intentional act of the employee to cause such injury or death. Simpson 
would argue that there is a significant difference between an intentional violation of an OSHA regulation, and 
intent to cause injury or death of an employee. 
5. Whitaker v. McClure, Ky., 891 S.W.2d 80 (1995) 
Dorothy McClure was awarded benefits for 100'10 disability, with 4% excluded as prior active disability. 
The ALJ determined that her injury was substantially caused by her willful violation of a safety rule. The award 
of income benefits was apportioned 75% to the employer and 24% to the Special Fund. 
The question presented to the Court was whether the 15% reduction in benefits would apply to that part 
of the award apportioned to the Special Fund? The Court noted that as of July IS, 1982, the employer and Special 
Fund are each directly liable to the claimant for benefits. Prior to that date, the employer paid the entire amount 
to the claimant, and the Special Fund would reimburse the employer for its share quarterly. The express lan-
guage of KRS 342.165 limited the penalty to that portion of the award determined to be the liability of the 
employer. 
6. Apex Mining v. Blankenship, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 225 (1996) 
Sherman Blankenship was permanently and totally disabled as a result of an accident which occurred 
while he was operating a road grader. The ALJ found that Apex had provided Blankenship with a defective 
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grader, the throttle of which was tied wide open with an "0" ring. Additionally, it had defective brakes, the 
decelerator pedal was not in proper condition, and the equipment could only be stopped by lowering the grader 
blade. There was evidence that other operators had been forced to crash the defective machine into other equip-
ment in order to stop it. The ALJ found that the employer knew of the defective condition, and had failed to 
repair it. The Judge concluded that the defective machine had contributed in some degree to Blankenship's 
accident, and that the employer's failure to repair the machine was an intentional act of non-compliance with 
KRS 338.031. The Judge ruled that Apex would have been liable for the 15% penalty, but for the fact that 
Blankenship already was to receive an award for 100% disability. 
KRS 338.031 provided in pertinent part: 
1) Each employer: 
(a) Shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which 
are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious 
physical harm to his employees; 
("b) Shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this 
Chapter. 
Apex first argued on appeal that KRS 342.165 requires an intentional violation of a "specific" statute, 
and that KRS 338.031 was "general" in nature. Apex' second argument was that the 15% could not be awarded 
because the income benefit would then exceed the statutory maximum weekly rate for income benefits. 
The Supreme Court ruled that KRS Chapter 342 permits a worker to receive an income benefit for total 
disability as well as a 15% increase in compensation pursuant to KRS 342.165. 
The Court noted that there was apparently no statute or regulation which explicitly requires an em-
ployer to keep the brakes and decelerator of a grader in good operating condition, as well as to refrain from 
fastening the throttle in the full open position. 
The Court acknowledged that the term "recognized hazards" as used in KRS 338.031 could be con-
strued broadly to include hazards which were recognized by safety experts but which might not be apparent to 
workers or employers. However, the Court observed that this case did not concern a safety hazard of which this 
employer could reasonably have been aware, but one that was obvious, even to the lay person. 
While KRS 338.031 is not as specific a statute as might be desirable, the Court was mindful that the 
Workers' Compensation Act is social legislation which is to be construed liberally and in a manner consistent 
with accomplishing the legislative purpose. 
7. Cabinet for Workforce Development v. Cummins, Ky., 950 S.W.2d 834 (1997) 
Lee Kyle Cummins was a teacher of refrigeration, air conditioning, and heating at an adult vocational 
school. He alleged disability as a result of exposure to freon, acid, oils, lubricants, and solvents, and that his work-
place did not have a ventilation system or monitors. The ALJ determined that Cummins was permanently and 
totally disabled as a result of physical and psychiatric injuries resulting from his exposure to chemicals. The ALJ 
denied his request that the 15% penalty be imposed, because Cummins had failed to cite a specific statute or regu-
lation which required a ventilation system. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the ALI's decision on the grounds that there was no specific statute or 
regulation which required mechanical ventilation or the use of protective gloves or a respirator when working 
with solvents. The Court was not persuaded that the employer'S failure to provide this equipment indicated 
such a gross disregard of patently obvious, basic safety concepts as occurred in Blankenship. 
Unpublished court opinions cannot be cited as legal authority, but can provide insight for many issues. 
We have located three such cases concerning KRS 342.165. 
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8. Pyro Mining Company v. May, 85-CA-880-MR 3/21 / 86 
Bennie May was seriously injured when he slipped and fell while cleaning a clogged coal screen, strik-
ing his back on a piece of angle iron. It had been raining continuously, causing the coal screen to become muddy 
and slick. The Board found that May was 100% disabled, and imposed the 15% penalty. 
The statute cited by May was KRS 338.031, which mandates that each employer furnish each employee 
a workplace free from recognized hazards. May's argument was that Pyro failed to place covers over the coal 
screens to prevent the accumulation of coal dust, which is slippery when wet. Whenever it rained, the coal 
screens clogged, necessitating cleaning of the screens. Such cleaning required workers with shovels to climb 
upon the screens, which were placed at precariously sharp angles. This practice had been used by Pyro for quite 
a while, despite the obvious dangers. By ignoring the hazard and failing to remedy it, Pyro failed to provide a 
safe workplace, thereby violating KRS 338.031. 
The Court disagreed with Pyro's argument that 338.031 lacks the specificity required by 342.165 to 
warrant the imposition of a penalty. "KRS 338.031 imposes upon every employer the affirmative duty to take 
measures to protect his employees from apparent dangers associated with the workplace. The fact that the 
safety measures necessary to comport with this statute would vary according to the particular workplace in no 
way abrogates the employer's duty to ensure that each employee's working environment is safe. In the instant 
case, Pyro failed to do this by sending May to clean the coal screen, thereby subjecting him to risk of injury from 
an obvious hazard. We pause to add that one important factor contributing to our decision that the penalty was 
rightfully assessed against Pyro is the ease with which accidents like the one suffered by May could have been 
prevented." 
9. Porter v. Magoffin County Fiscal Court, 97-CA-2059-WC 8/ 14/98 
Gregory Porter was injured when the sanitation truck in which he was riding was rear-ended by an-
other vehicle. The truck was not equipped with safety belts. The ALJ awarded TID and medical benefits, but 
found no permanent disability. The ALJ assessed the 15% penalty for violation of KRS 189.126(6), and calculated 
the penalty as $23.27 per week for 425 weeks, being 15% of 66 2/,% of Porter's average weekly wage. 
Porter argued on appeal that he was entitled to the 15% penalty regardless of whether he was found not 
to be permanently disabled . The Court of Appeals ruled that "compensation" as used by KRS 342.165 includes 
not only awards for permanent disability, but awards of TID benefits and medical expenses. 
10. Overstreet v. Enro Shirt Company, 1997-CA-2968-WC 9/4/98 
Joyce Hall Overstreet sustained an injury due to an electric shock to her left hand that created a severe 
contraction of her left arm. Enro was cited by OSHA for violation of two regulations: (1) the cover of the electric 
outlet box which was the source of the shock, was secured in an improper manner with a metal strap; and (2) a 
flexible extension cord was used to provide power to this outlet, instead of fixed wiring, for approximately one 
year prior to the accident. 
The ALJ awarded benefits for 100% disability, with 5% excluded as prior active disability. The ALJ also 
assessed the 15% penalty against Enro. Overstreet asked that the 15% penalty also be assessed against medical 
benefits awarded. The ALJ denied that motion. 
Overstreet argued on appeal that "compensation" is defined in the Act as including medical benefits. 
The Supreme Court explained that "compensation" had been interpreted not to include medical benefits when 
the issue involved apportionment to the Special Fund. Claude N. Fannin Wholesale Co. v. Thacker, Ky. App., 
661 S.W.2d 477 (1984). In , Ky. App., 661 S.W.2d 477 (1984). In Thacker, the Court noted that the prefactory 
language to all the definitions provides: "As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:" Thus, 
the term "compensation" cannot automatically be deemed to include medical and income benefits whenever it 
appears in the law. The Court did not believe that application of the 15% penalty to medical benefits was a 
reasonable result intended by legislature. 
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B. 2000 Amendment 
The legislature increased the penalty on employers to thirty percent (30%), but left the penalty on em-
ployees at fifteen percent (15%). There is little doubt that this amendment will encourage claimants to make 
allegations of a safety violation by the employer much more often than in past claims. The penalty would be 
30% of the income benefit awarded, not 30% PPD. For example, an award of income benefits for PPD of $60.00 
per week would become an award of $78.00 per week. An award for TID or PID at the maximum rate of $509.03 
would become $661.74 per week. The final answer to the issue of whether the penalty applies to medical ben-
efits has not yet been stated by the Supreme Court. 
XI. Employer's Right to Request a Physical Examination of the Employee 
KRS 342.205 provides that after an injury and so long as compensation is claimed, the employer has the 
right to have the claimant examined by a physician at any reasonable place and time. If the employee refuses to 
submit himself to, or in any way obstructs the examination, his right to receive benefits is suspended until the 
refusal or obstruction ceases. After an award or settlement, this requires a motion to reopen by the employer 
before the benefits could be suspended. 
XII. Reopening 
A. Current Law 
A settlement or an award of benefits can be reopened by either party upon a showing of certain facts: 
(a) fraud 
(b) newly discovered evidence 
(c) mistake; and 
(d) change of disability as shown by objective medical evidence of worsening or improvement 
of impairment. 
No claim can be reopened within two years of the award, or more than four years following the award. 
This creates a two-year window of opportunity for reopening. Further, no motion to reopen could be filed by the 
same party within two years of a previous motion to reopen. The effect of this provision in conjunction with the 
two~year window of opportunity was to limit a party's ability to reopen to a single opportunity. 
These time limitations do not apply to reopening to resolve medical fee disputes, fraud, or conforming 
the award to KRS 342.730(1)(c) 2, which was the .50 multiplier for return to work at equal or greater wages. 
The most common issue that arose following the 1996 amendments to the Act set forth above was the 
situation in which an employee sustained a period of TID within the two-year waiting period following an 
award or settlement. Many insurers and employers applied the law as written, and would not voluntarily pay 
TID benefits in that situation. 
B. 2000 Amendments 
These amendments made three changes in the reopening provisions. The legislature added to the list of 
situations for which the time limitations do not apply as follows: "or seeking temporary total disability benefits 
during the period of an award,". 
The two-year waiting period would be repealed. An award or settlement could be reopened virtually 
the next day. The provision that no motion to reopen may be filed by the same party within two years of any 
previous motion to reopen by the same party, was reduced to one year. 
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XIII. Average Weekly Wage 
A. The Statute 
An employee's average weekly wage (AWW) is a primary factor in determining his income benefit rate, 
and is calculated according to KRS 342.140 as follows: 
The average weekly wage of the injured employee at the time of the injury or last injurious 
exposure shall be determined as follows: 
(1) If at the time of the injury which resulted in death or disability or the last date of injuri-
ous exposure preceding death or disability from an occupational disease: 
(a) The wages were fixed by the week, the amount so fixed shall be the average weekly 
wage; 
(b) The wages were fixed by the month, the average weekly wage shall be the monthly 
wage so fixed multiplied by twelve (12) and divided by fifty-two (52); 
(c) The wages were fixed by the year, the average weekly wage shall be the yearly 
wage so fixed divided by fifty-two (52); 
(d) The wages were fixed by the day, hour, or by the output of the employee, the aver-
age weekly wage shall be the wage most favorable to the employee computed by 
dividing by thirteen (13) the ages (not including overtime or premium pay) of said 
employee earned in the employ of the employer in the first, second, third, or fourth 
period of thirteen (13) consecutive calendar weeks in the fifty-two (52) weeks im-
mediately preceding the injury. 
(e) The employee had been in the employ of the employer less than thirteen (13) calen-
dar weeks immediately preceding the injury, his average weekly wage shall be 
computed under paragraph (d), taking the wages (not including overtime or pre-
mium pay) for that purpose to be the amount he would have earned had he been so 
employed by the employer the full thirteen (13) calendar weeks immediately pre-
ceding the injury and had worked, when work was available to other employees in 
a similar occupation. 
(f) The hourly wage has not been fixed or cannot be ascertained, the wage for the 
purpose of calculating compensation shall be taken to be the usual wage for similar 
services where the services are rendered by paid employees. 
(2) In occupations which are exclusively seasonal and therefore cannot be carried on 
throughout the year, the average weekly wage shall be taken to be one-fiftieth (1/50) of 
the total wages which the employee has earned from all occupations during the twelve 
(12) calendar months immediately preceding the injury. 
(3) In the case of volunteer firemen, police, and civil defense members or trainees, the 
income benefits shall be based on the average weekly wage in their regular employ-
ment. 
(4) If the employee was a minor, apprentice, or trainee when injured, and it is established 
that under normal conditions his wages should be expected to increase during the pe-
riod of disability, that fact may be considered in computing his average weekly wage. 
(5) When the employee is working under concurrent contracts with two (2) or more em-
ployers and the defendant employer has knowledge of the employment prior to the 
injury, his wages from all the employers shall be considered as if earned from the em-
ployer liable for compensation. 
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(6) The term "wages" as used in this section and KRS 342.143 means, in addition to money 
payments for services rendered, the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodging, 
and fuel or similar advantage received from the employer, and gratuities received in 
the course of employment from other than the employer to the extent the gratuities are 
reported for income tax purposes. 
(7) The commissioner shall, from time to time, based upon the best available information, 
determine by administrative regulation industries which ordinarily do not have a full 
working day for five 95) days in every week. In those industries, compensation shall be 
computed at the average weekly wage earned by the employee at the time of injury 
reckoning wages as earned while working full time. "AT full time" as used in this sub-
section means a full working day for five 95) working days in every week regardless of 
whether the injured employee actually worked all or part of the time. 
B. Obtaining Wage Information 
Determining the employee's AWW is the first step in calculating the dollar value of a given percentage 
of occupational disability. How do you obtain wage information? The Employer's First Report of Injury Form 
SFI contains information as to the employee's wage rate on the date of injury, and the number of hours per week 
the employee was regularly scheduled to work. A copy of that form may be obtained from the employer, carrier 
or Department of Workers' Compensation (DWC). This is the information that is often used by the employer or 
carrier in calculating the rate of voluntary Temporary Total Disability (TTO) payments. 
The best information is the actual record maintained by the employer of wages earned by the employee. 
That may be obtained from the employer or carrier. The actual wage records often show that the AWW is lower 
than the estimate made from the information contained in SFl. Once the claim has been filed, the employee may 
serve a request for verification of earnings, and the employer must respond with a completed Form AWW-l. 
C. The Average Claim 
Most claims fall within KRS 340.140 (1) (d), the employee is paid by the hour, and has worked 13 weeks 
or more for the employer. Begin with the date of injury, and count back in time to determine the 52 week period 
prior to the date of injury. While there is no Kentucky court opinion on point, most employers or carriers agree 
that the 52 weeks begins with the first full week of a regular pay period. If the employee was injured on the third 
day after the end of a pay period, that should not count as a full week when determining the 52 week period . 
The relevant information for each of the 52 weeks is the total number of hours worked multiplied by the 
regular rate. The 52 weeks are then divided into four 13 week periods, again counting back from the date of 
injury. The 13 week period is not a sliding period; i.e. not the best individual weeks out of 52, or the best 13 
consecutive weeks anywhere in the 52. The total dollar amount for each 13 week period is then divided by 13. 
The highest dollar figure from the four quarters is deemed to be the employee's AWW. 
D. Overtime and Premium 
Overtime and premium pay are not included. Overtime hours are included, but at the regular hourly rate. 
R.c. Durr Co .. Inc v. Chapman. Ky. App., 563 SW. 2d 743 (1978). There are no Kentucky court decisions defining 
"premium pay". We do know that "premium pay" is distinguished from "out-put" pay, which ~ included in the 
calculation of AWW. Denim Finishers. Inc. v, Baker, Ky. App., 757 S.w. 2d 215 (1988); also see Keathley v. U.S. Shoe 
Company. Ky., 585 S.w. 2d 386 (1979). Some employees are paid a shift differential, which is an additional hourly 
rate for working a less desirable shift. Employers usually take the position that this is premium pay. Employers also 
consider a bonus, such as a Christmas bonus or production bonus, to be premium pay. 
E. SporadiC Work 
Practitioners frequently encounter the employee who has worked less than 13 weeks for the employer, 
yet there is only one published Kentucky opinion on point, C & 0 Bulldozing v. Brock. Ky., 820 S.W. 2d 482 
(1991). Brock worked sporadically for C & 0 when work was available for a 15 week period from early August 
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to 11/15/85. He received no wages for the weeks ending 8/23,8/30,9/6,9/13 and 9/20. The Court held that the 
statutory scheme does not tum upon the time period from an original date of hire to the date of injury, but turns 
upon the actual period of employment. Where the work is sporadic, a determination must be made on a case-
by-case basis. The records showed that Brock worked nine weeks out of the 15 week period. The owner of C & 
D stated that Brock was not employed during the weeks he received no wages. The Court discussed examples of 
indicia of employment during the 6 weeks Brock did no work, including whether Brock had any rights he could 
assert against the employer during the dead times (e.g . unemployment benefits), whether any benefits were 
provided by the employer during those periods (e.g. health insurance), or whether Brock had priority with 
respect to re-employment. The Court concluded that Brock worked less than 13 weeks for C & D, and that this 
AWW was properly calculated by dividing by 13 the 7 weeks he worked in the 13 week period prior to the 
injury, and not by dividing by 13 the 9 weeks he worked in the 15 week period prior to the injury. 
It is rare that the hourly wage has not been fixed or cannot be ascertained, but Uninsured Employers' 
Fund v. Poyner, Ky. App., 829 S.w. 2d 430 (1992) is proof that it can happen. Stahl, who was in the logging 
business, employed Poyner to cut down trees. The primary issue was whether Poyner was an employee or an 
independent contractor. There was evidence that the usual rate of pay was $50.00 per day, or $250.00 per a five-
day work week. The Court held that the Administrative Law Judge (ALI's) finding was not clearly erroneous. 
F. Seasonal Employment 
There are only four published Kentucky court opinions on the topic of seasonal employment. In Depart-
ment of Parks v. Kinslow, Ky., 481 S.w. 2d 686 (1972), the claimant was employed to pick up garbage and do 
general maintenance work at Barren River State Park. He worked from 4/16/69 to 9/30/69 and again from 4/ 
1/70 to 6/29/70 when he was injured. The park was open year around, but from October until April the services 
were drastically curtailed. Kinslow knew he was being employed only from April to October, and was classified 
as a seasonal employee. The Court noted that the apparent intent of the legislature was to reduce the amount of 
the recovery if the employment was with a business carried on naturally only for a particular season of the year. 
The seasonal worker should not receive the same compensation as that of a nonseasonal worker. The Court 
noted that a classic example of a seasonal occupation is that of fruit picking in California, even though fruit 
picking is being carried on somewhere in the United States every day throughout the year. The very existence of 
the Barren River State Park depends upon the patronage of tourists during the period from late spring to early 
fall. In the popular sense, this is seasonal. 
In May v. lames H. Drew Shows, Inc .. Ky. App., 576 S.w. 2d 524 (1979), the claimant began working for 
the employer, a traveling carnival, when it came to his home town of Louisa on July 4. He worked as a truck 
driver and roustabout, more or less doing anything requested of him, at the carnival while it was in Louisa, then 
left with the carnival on its road tour. May was in his summer vacation between his junior and senior year of 
high school. This was a summer job, and he intended to return to school in September. The Court of Appeals 
held that May was not a seasonal employee. The test in determining whether an occupation is seasonal is not 
what the plaintiff intended, but what the job itself was, seasonal or permanent. A summer job for a student is not 
seasonal merely because the student is only planning to work during the summer. Rather, an occupation is 
seasonal because of what the job itself entails. May's uncontradicted testimony was that he could have contin-
ued working for the carnival if he did not return to school. The Court did not find it relevant that carnivals can 
only play in Kentucky during the summer, because he could have continued to work with the carnival in other 
parts of the country for a year. The Court identified as a classic example of a seasonal employee, a lifeguard at an 
outdoor pool. since such pools are only open for swimming during the summer. 
In Heckel v. Singleton, Ky. App., 627 S.w. 2d 279 (1982), the claimant was 16 years of age and was 
employed to drive an ice cream truck. The old Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) had found that Singleton 
was not a seasonal employee in that ice cream can be sold at any time of the year. The circuit court reversed, 
specifically finding that the employment was seasonal. This issue was not raised on appeal to the Court of 
Appeals, which leaves this decision with little value in terms of precedent. The same is true of Holman Enter-
prise Tobacco Warehouse v. Carter, Ky., 536 S.W. 2d 461 (1976), in which Carter, a full-time farmer and sharecrop-
per, for many years had worked in a warehouse during the tobacco season, which normally extends from mid-
November to late January or early February. The Court noted that this was an occupation that was exclusively 
seasonal, and that was apparently not a disputed issue on appeal. 
C-27 
The issue in Holman was whether Carter's farm income was properly included as part of his "total 
wages" when calculating the AWW for a seasonal employee. The Court noted that the statute does not use the 
words "salary" or "income", but limits the formula to wages, and ruled that farm income cannot be considered 
wages within the provision of 342.140 (2). 
There are many situations in which the seasonal employee issue may arise. Some of these include high-
way construction laborer, amusement park employees, school teachers, janitors, cafeteria workers, etc., and 
home building. The "season" at issue may not always be summer or climate-related, but may be business sea-
sons, i.e. Christmas season, tax season, racing dates, baseball, basketball, football or hockey season, a school year 
or Girl Scout cookie season. 
G. Volunteer Workers 
There are no published court opinions in Kentucky concerning the provision for volunteer firemen, 
police and civil defense members. 
H. Miners 
The issue of AWW for minors arose in City of Paintsville v. Ratliff. Ky., 889 S.w. 2d 784 (1994). Ratliff was 
17 and working as a volw1teer fire fighter. He was still a student and was employed on a part-time basis at 
McDonalds. He testified that he expected to go into firefighting which would pay $7.76 to $15.00 per hour, or 
welding, which would pay $10.00 to $17.00 per hour. These rates would result in an AWW of $310.40 to $680.00. 
The ALJ found that Ratliff's wages should be expected to increase during the period of disability. Instead of 
using the AWW based upon the part-time job at McDonalds, the ALJ found an AWW of $310.40. The WCB, 
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed. 
The Court discussed that a great amount of discretion has been placed with the ALJ in determining 
whether it could be expected that a minor's wages would increase during disability, and that during disability 
meant his lifetime, not 425 weeks. There was no proof that under normal conditions Ratliff could not have 
worked as a regular fire fighter. This applies only to permanent occupational disability, and not to ITO which 
must be based upon actual wages. 
1. Burden of Proof and Exemptions 
With concurrent employment, keep in mind that it is the plaintiff's burden to prove AWW. The plaintiff 
must prove that the employer had knowledge prior to the injury of the employee's concurrent employment. 
What income is not included? The courts have held that employment that is exempt from coverage under the 
Act, here work as a railroad employee, is not to be included as concurrent wages. Wright v. Fardo. Ky. App., 587 
S.W. 2d 269 (1979) . Other exempt employees include some domestic servants in a private home, some employ-
ees performing temporary maintenance, repair or remodeling on a private home, some religious or charitable 
employees, agricultural employees, and federal employees, Longshoremen, and railroad employees. 
J. Wages Defined 
"Wages" includes the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodging, and fuel or similar advantage 
received from the employer. The only Kentucky decision on this issue is Rainey v. Mills. Ky. App., 733 S.W. 2d 
756 (1987). The claimant argued that wages must necessarily include fringe benefits, specifically employer pen-
sion plan contributions, health insurance benefits, and life insurance premiums. The Court held that the "simi-
lar advantage received" must be of the same class as those specifically delineated. The express language of the 
statute and the failure of the legislature to include fringe benefits in any of the Act's amendments compelled a 
conclusion that they were not intended to be encompassed within the workers' compensation scheme. 
Does "wages" include holiday, vacation, sick, or personal leave pay? The question is probably whether 
these are "money payments for service rendered". There are no published Kentucky court decisions on this 
issue, and that usually means that the practitioner should refer to Larson's The Law of Workers' Compensation. 
The correct result is probably that these types of payments should count toward AWW to the extent that they are 
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used for actual time off from work. Those payments are probably not includable to the extent that they can be 
accumulated and exchanged for money as a form of bonus. 
XIV. Miscellaneous Requirements of Employers 
A. KRS 342.038(1) 
Every employer shall keep a record of all injuries, fatal or otherwise, received by his employees in the 
course of their employment. 
B. KRS 342.038(3) 
Every employer shall report to his workers' compensation insurance carrier or the party responsible for 
the payment of workers' compensation benefits any work-related injury or disease or alleged work-related 
injury or disease within three working days of receiving notification of the incident or alleged incident. Poten-
tial fine for violation of this section of the Act is $100.00 to $1,000.00 per occurrence. The alleged incident must be 
reported even when the employer believes that the incident did not occur. 
XV. Insurance Issues 
A. Coverage of Business Owner 
When an owner of a business, a qualified partner of a partnership, or a qualified member of a limited 
liability company have elected to be included as employees, this inclusion shall be accomplished by the issuance 
of an appropriate endorsement in a workers' compensation policy. 
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APPENDIX 
A SUMMARY OF HOUSE BILL 992 
This bill makes significant changes in the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Act. Most 
of the changes will affect injuries on and after the effective date of the amendments, which is 
. July 15, 2000, but some are remedial and will apply to pending claims. There was no change in 
the definition of injury (or any other definition), in black lung benefits, or in the unfair claims 
settlement practices provisions. 
ADJUDICATION OF CLAIMS 
The terms of all Arbitrators will expire on the effective date of this amendment, which 
will be mid-July. We will revert to the prior system of adjudicating claims before Administrative 
Law Judges. There is a provision for a Benefit Review Conference before the ALJ, but we do 
not yet know when the BRC will occur. It could occur early in the litigation, or could simply 
replace the old Pre-Hearing Conference. The Commissioner will promulgate new Regulations in 
this regard. We also do not know what happens with claims that were previously assigned to 
Arbitrators, but which will not result in final opinions prior to the effective date of the 
amendment. Those claims will obviously be re-assigned to ALJ's, but the details of the proof 
schedule will have to be addressed by Regulation. Those regulations will take effect on an 
emergency basis. 
The number of ALJ' s currently allowed is 16, although the Commissioner is only using 
13 of the available 16 positions. The amendment raises the number of ALJ positions to 19, but 
the Commissioner apparently plans to increase the number of active ALJ's to 17. He could 
request the appointment of up to an additiona12 ALJ's in the future, in the event that the claims 
work load requires that action. 
The 1996 amendments to the Act had terminated the existence of the Workers' 
Compensation Board. The 2000 amendments bring the Board back into existence. There will 
apparently be a gap from June 30, 2000 until the effective date of this amendment in mid-July 
when the Board will not exist. There is a serious question as to where to file an appeal, if an 
appeal is filed during that two week period from June 30 to July 13, 2000? 
ATTORNEY FEE 
The attorney fee for plaintiffs and defendants is capped at $12,000.00. The amendment 
specifically provides that this change will apply to claims in which the employment contract is 
entered into and signed after the effective date of the amendment. In an original claim (as 
opposed to a reopening?), the formula for the plaintiffs attorney fee will be 20% of the first 
$25,000.00, 15% of the next $10,000.00, and 5% ofthe remainder of the award, up to a 
maximum of$12,000.00. 
The amendments to KRS 3432.320 are listed as being among those that are remedial. 
The amendment repeals the penalty of up to $5,000.00 per level of appeal on an employer 
who does not "prevail" on appeal. 
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SETTLEMENT 
KRS 342.265 (2) was amended in 1996 to require that settlement agreements concluded 
after March 31, 1997 providing for commuted lump sum payment of future income benefits 
which would otherwise be payable in amounts greater than ten dollars per week shall not be 
approved unless there is a reasonable assurance that the worker will have an adequate source of 
income during disability. The 2000 amendment changes the dollar amount to weekly benefits 
greater than one hundred dollars, and makes this change effective for settlement agreements 
concluded after the effective date of this amendment. 
The Special Fund is apparently re-considering its position regarding settlement of awards 
in light of this amendment. The Special Fund may be contacting insurers and/or claimants to 
discuss lump sum settlement of old awards. 
REOPENING 
KRS 342.125 was amended in 1996 to provide three time limitations: 
(1) no claim could be reopened more than four years following the date of the 
original award or order granting or denying benefits; 
(2) no claim could be reopened within two years of the award or order granting or 
denying benefits; 
(3) no party may file a motion to reopen within two years of any previous motion to 
reopen by the same party. 
The exceptions to these time requirements were: 
(1) reopening to resolve medical fee dispute; 
(2) reopening on the grounds of fraud; 
(3) reopening to conform the award as set forth in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2, (50% 
reduction for weeks when claimant has returned to work at equal or greater 
wages) or 
(4) for reducing a permanent total disability award when an employee returns to 
work. 
The 2000 amendments leave in place the four year limitation on reopening, but eliminate 
the two-year waiting period following an award or order granting or denying benefits. The two-
year period following a previous motion to reopen by the same party was reduced to one year. 
Finally, added to the list of exceptions to the time limitations is "or seeking temporary total 
disability benefits during the period of an award." 
PENALTY FOR SAFETY VIOLATION BY THE EMPLOYER 
KRS 342.165 provides that if an accident is caused in any degree by the intentional 
failure of the employer to comply with any specific statute or lawful administrative regulation 
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made thereunder, communicated to the employer and relative to installation or maintenance of 
safety appliances or methods, the compensation for which the employer would otherwise have 
been liable under this chapter shall be increased fifteen percent in the amount of each payment. 
The amendment would increase that penalty to thirty percent of each payment. 
In the past, this has been an issue that was rarely raised by plaintiffs as a whole. The 
increase to thirty percent, in conjunction with recent court decisions on this issue, will likely 
result in this issue being involved in more claims. If that occurs, there will be more litigated 
claims, and the litigation of those claims will be more expensive. 
It is obvious that the safety penalty against the employer will apply to PPD and PTD 
income benefits. The penalty will also likely apply to TTD benefits, survivors' benefits, and to 
the lump ~um payment to the estate in the event of a work-related death. 
There are issues as to whether the insurer is liable for this penalty, or whether it is 
excluded under the insurance policy as an intentional act by the insured. There is a companion 
issue as to whether the insurer must offer a defense of the issue of whether the penalty applies. 
That discussion needs to be revisited by insurers to make certain that its position on this issue is 
on solid ground. 
PPD BENEFITS 
The PPD grid was changed to provide as follows: 
AMA IMPAIRMENT NEW FACTOR OLD FACTOR 
o to 5% 0.65 0.75 
6 to 10% 0.85 1.00 
11 to 15% 1.00 1.25 
16 to 20% 1.00 1.50 
21 to 25% 1.15 1.75 
26 to 30% 1.35 2.00 
31 to 35% 1.50 2.25 
36% and above 1.70 2.50 
If due to an injury, an employee does not retain the physical capacity to return to the 
type of work that the employee performed at the time of injury, the benefit for PPD shall be 
multiplied by three times the amount determined in the grid set forth above. Only for the 
employee who has lost this physical capacity, there is an additional potential add on: 
EDUCATION 
less than 8 years 
less than 12 years 
orGED 
ADD ON 
0.4 
0.2 
C-33 
AGE 
60 or older 
55 or older 
50 or older 
ADD ON 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
This means that if the employee has lost the physical capacity to return to the type of 
work he performed at the time of the injury, was 60 years of age, and had less than 8 years of 
formal education, the multiplier would be 3.0 + 0.6 + 0.4 = 4.0. What is the answer to the 
question of whether a claimant who is 60 years old on the date of injury, and who alleges that he 
is entitled to the add on for being fifty or over, for being 55 or older, and for being 60 or older? 
Also consider the claimant who does not have 8 years of formal education, who asks for the add 
on for less than 8 years and less than 12 years of formal education. A strategically placed "or" 
near the end of this provision apparently provides that there is no stacking of the add on for 8 
years and 12 years, or for age 50, age 55, and age 60, but that same "or" could possibly provide 
that there"is only one add on, and that the claimant does not receive an add on for both education 
and age. 
If the employee returns to work at a weekly wage equal to or greater than the average 
weekly wage at the time of injury, the weekly benefit for PPD shall be determined per the grid 
set forth above. During any period of cessation of that employment, temporary or permanent, 
for any reason, with or without cause, payment of weekly benefits for PPD during the period of 
cessation shall be two times the amount otherwise payable under the grid set forth above. 
The legislature added the work "or" between the multiplier for loss of physical capacity 
and the multiplier for no return to work at equal or greater wages. 
BENEFITS FOR WORK-RELATED DEATH 
KRS 342.750 provides for a $25,000.00 lump sum payment to the estate in the evertt ofa 
work-related death within four years of the date of injury. This amendment increases that lump 
sum payment to $50,000.00. Further, as there are changes in the state average weekly wage in 
future years, the Commissioner is directed to "adjust" the amount of this lump sum payment. The 
legislature did not specify a formula to be utilized by the Commissioner in making this 
adjustment" 
As an example, the state average weekly wage increased by 4.48 percent from the benefit 
rate in 1999 to the benefit rate in 2000. As an example, a 4.48% increase in the $50,000.00 lump 
sum payment would be an increase of $2,240.00 in the lump sum payment. Of course, the 
Commissioner may devise a different formula for calculating the annual adjustment. This 
adjustment would apply to injuries occurring in 2001, and subsequent years. 
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HOUSE BILL 992 CHANGES FOR CLAIMANTS 
Benefit Review Conferences - BRC 
• A BRC is still allowed under KRS 342.270. 
• However, there are no longer Arbitrators, so Administrative Law Judges will perform the 
BRC. 
• The Administrative Law Judge may grant or deny benefits at the BRC including 
interlocutory relief. 
• The purpose of the BRC is now to allow the parties to confer with the Administrative Law 
Judge informally with the parties to define and narrow the issues and discuss settlement and 
consider other matters that may aid in the resolution of the claim. 
• If any agreement is entered at the BRC on any matter, the ALJ will write a memorandum 
setting forth the matter agreed upon. The memorandum shall be signed by all of the parties, 
and the ALJ shall file it with the Commissioner and it will become part of the record. 
Benefits 
• The AMA impairment factors for PPD awards in KRS 342.730(1)(b) have been modified as 
follows: 
IMPAIRMENT FACTOR DECE:MBER 12, 1996 JULY, 2000 
0-5% .75 .65 
6-10% 1.00 .85 
11 ~15% 1.25 1.00 
16 - 20% 1.50 · 1.00 
21 - 25% 1.75 1.15 
26 - 30% 2.00 1.35 
31 - 35% 2.25 1.50 
36% and above 2.50 1.70 
• If an employee does not retain the physical capacity to return to the type of work that the 
employee perform at the time of injury, the factor is multiplied by 3.0 rather than 1.5 under 
KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1). 
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• KRS 342.730 no longer contains the .5 reduction factor for returning to work at a weekly 
wage that is greater than the average weekly wage (A WW) at the time of the injury. 
• Also, during any period of cessation of that employment for any reason, the PPD benefit 
shall be twice the amount otherwise payable under paragraph (b). However, this does not 
extend the period of payments. 
• KRS 342.730(1)(c)(3) allows the multiplier to be increased by increments by employee's 
educational and age status as follows: 
EMPLOYEE'S STATUS AT 
TIME OF INJURY 
FACTOR UNDER 342.730(l)(c)(3) 
Less than 8 years of formal education 
Less than 12 years of formal education or a 
GED 
Age 60 or older 
Age 55 or older 
Age 50 or older 
Settlements 
0.40 
0.20 
0.60 
0.40 
0.20 
• KRS 342.265(2) Lump sum settlements agreements for over $100.00 (raised from $10.00) 
per week require a reasonable assurance that the worker will have an adequate source of 
income. 
• This makes lump sum settlements more available for claimants. 
Safety Violations by Employers 
• KRS 342.165(1) states that compensation for which an employer would have been liable is 
increased by 30% if an employee can prove a safety violation. This is raised from 15% under 
the prior law. 
Death Benefits 
• The lump sum death benefit allowed in KRS 342.750 is raised from $25,000.00 to 
$50,000.00. Also, the statute now allows the Commissioner to adjust the death benefit based 
on increase or decrease in state average weekly wages. 
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Attorney's Fee 
• The $2000.00 cap on attorney's fee for services performed before an Arbitrator is no longer 
applicable since there are no longer any Arbitrators. 
• Attorney's fee for claimant's attorney is now calculated as follows: 
o 20% of the first $25,000.00. 
o 15% of the next $10,000.00. 
o 5% of the remainder of the award. 
o Maximum fee is now $12,000.00. 
Reopenim~ 
KRS 342.125 now has an additional ground for reopening for seeking Temporary Total 
Disability Benefits. 
Also, the two year waiting period is no longer in effect. However, no party may file a motion to 
reopen within one year of any previous motion to reopen by the same party. . 
The limitation of four years to file a motion to reopen is still in effect. 
Board 
KRS 342.215 is amended to no longer abolish the Workers' Compensation Board July 1,2000. 
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SECTION E 
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY 
EMPLOYMENT LAW INSTITUTE 
JUNE 10,2000 
DONNA H. TERRY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM AFTER THE 2000 REFORM: 
Changes In Administration And New Emergency Practice Regulations 
1. . ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES PROMULGATED BY HB 992 
A. Administrative structure unchanged. 
B. Functions of some administrative divisions may change. 
II. LITIGATION STRUCTURAL CHANGES PROMULGATED BY HB 992 
A. Arbitration level abolished. 
B. Workers' Compensation Board reinstated. 
C. Administrative Law Judge level retained 
III. EMERGENCY PRACTICE REGULATIONS UNDER HB 992 
A. The attached regulations will become effective on an emergency basis on 
the date of filing and will remain in effect until permanent regulations are 
adopted. 
B. Amended forms, including Form 101 and Form 107, are being drafted and 
will replace current versions. 
C. Public hearing and opportunity for comment and suggestions will be 
scheduled before regulation becomes final. 
IV. SECTION 1: DEFINITIONS 
A. All references to Arbitrators and the arbitration stage have been deleted 
from definitions. 
B. Aside from renumbering the definitions, all previous definitions were 
unchanged by HB 992. 
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V. SECTION 2: PARTIES 
A. The section on Parties remams the same aside from deletion of all 
references to Arbitrators. 
VI. SECTON 3: PLEADINGS 
A. Section 3(4) has been amended to delete references to "Arbitrators" and 
"Administrative Law Judge/Acting Arbitrator." 
B. The requirement that the name of the ALJ be designated in the caption of 
each claim has been retained. 
VII. SECTION 4: MOTIONS 
A. Section 4(8) has been amended to comply with the new provisions of KRS 
342.320(8). 
B. The amended regulation provides that motions for attorney fees filed by 
the defendant-employer shall be filed "within thirty (30) days following the 
finality of the decision." Therefore, it is no longer necessary for defense counsel 
to file piece-meal motions throughout claim, and ALJ's will probably only issue 
one defense attorney fee order. 
C. The maximum attorney fee for both plaintiffs and defendants attorneys in 
an original claim is $12,000.00 
D. The motion must contain an affidavit detailing the services rendered and 
time expended and the total charged as well as the date upon which the agreement 
for legal services was reached. 
E. Now that defense counsel has been relieved of the obligation to file 
periodic motions, it can be expected that ALJ's will require full compliance with 
the requirements of Section 4(8). 
VIII. SECTION 5: APPLICATION FOR RESOLUTION OF INJURY CLAIMS 
A. Section 5(d) deletes the reference to medical reports filed with the 
application before an Arbitrator. 
B. Reports filed with the application will not be considered evidence before 
the ALJ. All evidence must be submitted pursuant to notice or motion. 
C. Proof before the ALJ shall be on a 45-30-15 day basis, commencing on the 
date of the Commissioner's assignment order. The assignment order will contain 
the date and time of the Benefit Review Conference. 
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D. Notice of Claim Denial of Acceptance (Fonn 111) must still be filed 
within 45 days after notice of claim filing or order sustaining motion to reopen. 
IX. SECTION 6: APPLICATION FOR RESOLUTION OF OCCUPATIONAL 
DISEASE CLAIMS 
A. Section 6(b) requires the filing of a Fonn 105 (Medical History) but 
deletes prior language regarding the requirement to list all doctors and medical 
facilities within the past fifteen years. However, the Fonn 105 still mandates that 
infonnation. 
B. Proof in an occupational disease claim shall be presented pursuant to 
Section 5(3), on a 45-30-15 basis. 
C. Medical and vocational reports shall be exchanged by parties in 
accordance with Section 5(4) within ten days following receipt. These reports 
shall not be filed with ALJ unless they are intended as evidence. 
D. Notice of Claim Denial or Acceptance (Fonn 111) must still be filed 
within 45 days pursuant to Section 5(2). 
X. SECTION 7: HEARING LOSS 
A. The amendments are essentially the same as those related to the 
Occupational Disease Claims (Section 6). 
XI. SECTION 8: MEDICAL EV ALUA TIONS PURSUANT TO KRS 342.315 
A. Section 8(2) contains several minor changes in its language, none of which 
cause any change in current procedure. It remains within the discretion of the 
ALJ to appoint a medical school evaluator in injury claims or medical fee 
disputes. 
B. All claims for coal workers' pneumoconiosis, occupational disease, and 
hearing loss will continue to have automatic referrals to universities. 
XII. SECTION 9: MEDICAL REPORTS 
A. Unchanged other than deletion of reference to Arbitrator. 
XIII. SECTION 10: INTERLOCUTORY RELIEF 
A. No substantive changes. 
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I. 
XIV. SECTION 11: BENEFIT REVIEW CONFERENCES (previously known as Pre-
hearing Conference or Infonnal Conference 
A. Purpose: Expedite the proceeding and avoid need for fonnal hearing. 
B. Parties shall resolve controversies, narrow and define issues and facilitate 
prompt settlement. 
C. Benefit Review Conference will be infonnal and no transcript will be 
made. 
D. Witness List must be filed 10 days prior to BRC. Because ALl needs the 
list prior to the BRC, it is advisable to mail a courtesy copy to ALl to assure 
receipt 
E. The Witness List must contain a list of witnesses as well as a summary of 
anticipated testimony. For medical witnesses this includes at minimum (1) a 
description of the diagnosis, (2) physical findings and diagnostic studies, (3) 
functional impainnent rating, and (4) work restrictions. A mere listing of 
witnesses names is insufficient. 
F. At the BRC, the ALl may limit witnesses "for good cause shown." ALl 
may also require testimony of lay witnesses by deposition in order to expedite 
hearing docket. 
G. The parties' appearance at the BRC is mandatory, except that plaintiff's 
attendance which may be excused for good cause shown upon prior motion and 
approval by ALl. 
H. Representatives shall have full settlement authority at BRC. 
I. Any request for postponement must be made at least 15 days prior to 
BRC. Last minute telephone calls or motions to reschedule are not "substantial 
compliance." 
l. Only issues listed as contested on the BRC order shall be subject to further 
proceedings. 
K. Upon motion and good cause shown, ALl may allow additional proof 
between BRC and fonnal hearing. However, since the hearing is typically 
scheduled within two weeks following the BRC, this additional period may be 
rarely used for expert witnesses. 
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XV. SECTION 12: EVIDENCE 
A. Kentucky Rules of Evidence are still applicable in ALl proceedings. 
B. Affidavits are no longer evidence. 
C. ONLY RELEVANT PORTIONS of hospital, educational, Bureau of Vital 
Statistics, Armed Forces, Social Security and other public records may be filed 
but not for the purpose of the opinion of any physician contained therein. 
D. FILING OF MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL RECORDS IN BULK WILL 
NO LONGER BE PREMISSABLE. ALl'S WILL STRIKE ANY MEDICAL 
RECORDS WHICH ARE NOT RELEVANT TO THE CONTESTED ISSUES. 
CONTINUED VIOLATION OF THIS RULE WILL RESULT IN SANCTIONS 
AGAINST COUNSEL. 
XVI. SECTIONS 13 TO 19 
The Sections on Extensions of Time, StipUlation of Facts, Discovery and 
Depositions, Wage Certification, Hearings, Petitions for Reconsideration, Benefit 
Calculations for Settlements, and remaining sections are essentially unchanged. 
XVII. SECTIONS 21 TO 26 
The Sections on Coverage, Withdrawal of Records, Sanctions, Payment of 
Compensation from the UEF, use of the AMA Guidelines in Coal Workers' 
Pneumoconiosis Cases, and Request for Participation by the Kentucky Coal 
Workers' Pneumoconiosis Fund remain essentially unchanged. 
XVIII. SECTION 27: FORMS 
Amendments to several forms are being considered, especially Forms No. 101 
and 107. 
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803 KAR 25:010. Procedure for adjustments of claims. 
RELATES TO: KRS 342.125,342.260,342.265,342.270(7),342.710, 342.715, 342.760 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 342.260, 342.270(7) 
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS 342.260 requires the commissioner 
to promulgate administrative regulations necessary to implement the provisions of KRS 
Chapter 342. KRS 342.270(7) requires the commissioner to promulgate an administrative 
regulation establishing procedures for the resolution of claims, including benefit review. This 
administrative regulation establishes the procedure for the resolution of claims before an 
arbitrator, administrative law judge, or Workers' Compensation Board. 
Section 1. Definitions. (1) 'Administrative law judge' means an individual appointed pursu· 
ant to KRS 342.230(3). 
[(2) 'AFbilFaler' meaRS aR iRdividual appeiRled pursuaRlle KRS 342.230(9).) 
a!(3)) 'Board" is defined by KaS 342.0011 (1 0). 
(,U(4)]'Civil rule' means the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 
m(e)]'Commissioner" is defined by KRS 342.0011 (9). 
ru(e)) 'Date of filing' means the date a pleading, motion, or other document is received 
by the Commissioner at the Department of Workers' Claims in Frankfort, Kentucky, except 
final orders and opinions of (aFbilFalers,) administrative law judges, and the board, which shall 
be deemed 'filed" three (3) days after the date set forth on the final order or opinion. 
[§!(7)) 'Employer" means and includes individuals, partnerships, voluntary associations 
and corporations. 
llJ((8)) 'An employer who has not secured payment of compensation" means any em-
ployer who employs an employee as defined by KRS 342.640 but has not complied with KRS 
3.12340. 
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.&A{9}]·Special defenses' means defenses that shall be raised by ·special answer" filed 
within forty-five (45) days of the notice of filing an application for resolution of claim, or within 
ten (10) days after discovery of facts supporting the defense if discovery could not have been 
had earlier in the exercise of due diligence. Special defenses shall be waived if not timely 
raised. Special defenses which shall be pleaded are defenses arising under: 
(a) KRS 342.035(3) unreasonable failure to follow medical advice; 
(b) KRS 342.165 failure to comply with safety administrative regulation; 
(c) KRS 342.316(6) and 342.335 false statement on employment application; 
(d) KRS 342.395 voluntary rejection of KRS Chapter 342; 
(e) KRS 342.610(3) voluntary intoxication and self-infliction of injury; 
(I) KRS 342.710(5) refusal to accept rehabilitation services; and 
(g) Running of periods of limitations or repose under KRS 342.185, 342.270, 342.316, or 
other applicable statute. 
Section 2. Parties. (1) The party making the original application for resolution of claim 
pursuant to KRS 342.270 and 342.316 shaH be designated as ·plaintiff" and adverse parties 
as ·defendants·. 
(2) All persons shall be joined as plaintiffs in whom any right to any relief pursuant to KRS 
Chapter 342, arising out of the same transaction and occurrence, is alleged to exist. If any 
person should refuse to join as a plaintiff, that person shall be joined as a defendant, and the 
fact of refusal to join as a plaintiff shall be pleaded. 
(3)(a) All persons shall be joined as defendants against whom the ultimate right to any 
relief pursuant to KRS Chapter 342 may exist, whether joinlly, severally, or in the alternative. 
An [albitra~] administrative law judge may order, upon a proper showing, that a party be 
joined or dismissed. 
(b) The Special Fund may be joined as a defendant in accordance with the appropriate 
statutory provisions for claims in which the injury date or date of last exposure occurred 
before December 12, 1996. 
(c) Joinder shall be sought by motion as soon as practicable after legal grounds for joinder 
are known. Notice of joinder and a copy of the claim file shall be served in the manner or-
dered by the arbitrator or administrative law judge. 
Section 3. Pleadings. (1) An application for resolution of claim and all other pleadings shall 
be typewritten andbe submitted upon forms prescribed by the commissioner. 
(2) An application for resolution of claim shall be filed with sufficient copies for service on 
all parties. The commissioner shall make service by first class mail. Incomplete applications 
may be rejected and returned to the applicant. If the application is resubmitted in proper form 
within twenty (20) days of the date it was returned, the filing shall relate back to the date the 
application was first received by the commissioner. Otherwise, the date of second receipt 
shall be the filing date. 
(3) All pleadings shall be served upon the commissioner and shall be served upon all other 
parties by mailing a copy to the other parties or, if represented, to that representative, at the 
parties' or representatives' last known address. A certificate of service indicating the method 
and date of service and signed by the party shall appear on the face of the pleading. Notices 
of deposition and physical examination shall be served upon the parties and shall not be filed 
with the commissioner. 
(4) After the application for resolution has been assigned to an [artJitFaleF or] administralive 
law judge, subsequent pleadings shall include, within the style of the claim and immediately 
before the claim number, ["Befere artJllJalGf.{Aamah] "Before administrative law judge 
(name)". or [!SeIer" admini<;traliV'3-law-jOOgefact~lr~me)!]. Upon consolidation 
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of claims, the most recent claim number shall be listed first. 
Section 4. Motions. (1) The party filing a motion shall tender a proposed order granting the 
relief requested. 
(2) The party filing a motion may file a brief memorandum supporting the motion and 
opposing parties may file brief memoranda in reply. Further memoranda (for example, reply 
to response) shall not be filed. 
(3) Every motion and response, the grounds of which depend upon the existence of facts 
not in evidence, shall be supported by affidavits demonstrating such facts. 
(4) Every motion, the grounds of which depend upon the existence of facts which the 
moving party believes are shown in the evidence or are admitted by the pleadings, shall 
make reference to the place in the record where that evidence or admission is found. 
(5) A motion, other than to reopen pursuant to KRS 342.125 or for interlocutory relief, may 
be considered ten (10) days after tl)e date of filing. A response shall be considered if filed on 
or before the tenth day after the filing of the motion. 
(6)(a) A motion to reopen shall be accompanied by as many of the following items as may 
be applicable: 
1. A current medical release Form 106 executed by the plaintiff; 
2. An affidavit evidencing the grounds to support reopening; 
3. A current medical report showing a change in disability established by objectil'e medical 
findings; 
4. A copy of the opinion and award, settlement, voluntary agreed order or agreed resolu-
tion sought to be reopened; 
5. An affidavit certifying that a previous motion to reopen has not been made by the 
moving party, or if ont1 (1) hd5 previously !Jeen made, the date on which the previous motion 
was filed. 
(b) A motion to reopen shall not be considered until twenty-five (25) days after the date 
of filing. A response shall be serVed within twenty (20) days of filing the motion to reopen. 
(c) Any party may use the following forms provided by the department for motions to 
reopen: 
1. Motion to reopen by employee; 
2. Motion to reopen by def"nt:!ant; and 
3. Motion to reopen KRS 342.732 benefits. 
(7) Motion for allowance of a plaintiff's attomey fee shall be made within thirty (30) days 
following the finality of the award, settlement or agreed resolution upon which the fee request 
is based and be served upon the adverse parties and the attomey's client. The motion shall 
set forth the fee requested and mathematical computations establishing that the request is 
within the limits set forth in KRS 342.320. The motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit 
of counsel detailing the extent of the services rendered and the time expended, a signed and 
dated Form 109 as required by KRS 342.320(5), and a copy of the Signed and dated contin-
geney fee contract. 
(8) A motion for allowance of defendant's attomey's fee shall be filed withIn thIrty (30) 
days following the finality of the decIsIon [as re~Yired by KRS a42.a2Q). The motion shall 
be accompanied by an affidavit of counsel detailing the extent of the services rendered and 
the time expended, the hourly rate and total amount to be charged, and the date upon which 
agreement was reached for providing the legal services£, aAd a ooftifisatieA af aFW amauAts 
pre, .. iaysl~· paid aA tha claim iA ~uestiGA1. 
(9) The following motions relating to vocational rehabilitation training provided by the 
department may be used by all parties: 
(a) PeMion iOI vocational rehabilitation haining; and 
tT1 
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(b) Joint motion and agreement to waive vocational rehabilitation evaluation. 
Section 5. Application for Resolution of an Injury Claim. (1) To apply for resolution of an 
injury claim, the applicant shall file Form 101 with the following completed documents: 
(a) Work history (Form 104), to indude all past jobs performed on a full or part-time basis 
within twenty (20) years preceding the date of injury; 
(b) Medical history (Form 105), to include all physicians, chiropractors, osteopaths, psy-
chiatrists, psychologists, and medical facilities such as hospitals where the individual has 
been seen or admitted in the preceding fifteen (15) years and induding beyond that date any 
phYSicians or hospitals regarding treatment for the same body part claimed to have been 
injured; 
(c) Medical release (Form 106); 
(d) One (1) medical report describing the injury which is the basis of the daim and, if a 
psychological condition is alleged, an additional medical report establishing the presence of 
a mental impairment or disorder. Medical reports required under this paragraph may consist 
of legible, hand-written notes of a treating physician. rMooioal repOrts filed ' .... ilh an appliGalion 
shall be Gonsiaered as eyiaenGe belomlhe arbilratGf.) 
(2) Defendant shall file a notice of claim denial or acceptance (Form 111) within forty-five 
(45) days after the date of issuance of notice that an application for resolution of daim has 
been filed, or within forty-five (45) days following an order sustaining a motion tQ reopen a 
claim. If none is filed, all allegations of the application shall be deemed admitted. The notice 
of claim denial or acceptance shall set forth all pertinent matters which are admitted and 
those which are denied. If a claim is denied in whole or in part, a defendant shall set forth a 
detailed summary of the basis for denial, and the name of each witness whose testimony 
may be relevant to that dellial. This notice shail incluuti a description of li!c physilAii '''''-Iuka-
ments of plaintiffs job at the time of the alleged injury and the name, address and telephone 
number of the individual responsible for gathering this information for the employer and its 
insurer. This requirement of filing a notice of admission or denial shall be in addition to the 
requirement to file a special answer in accordance with Section 1 (9) of this administrative 
regulation although a denial may incorporate special defenses which have been timely 
raised. 
(3) Proof taking and discovery for all parties shall proceed for a period beginning with the 
date of issuance of an order of assignment by the commissioner. All parties may take 
proof for a period of forty-five (45) days from the date of the order; the defendants may 
take proof for an additional thirty (30) days; and, thereafter, the plaintiff may take 
rebuttal proof for an additional fifteen (15) days, [noliGe Ihal an appliGalion for resollliion 
has been filea to ana inGIYaing a Gale sil(!y (eO) G<¥l frem the Gate the Glaim is assigned to 
an arbitralor.) 
(4) During the pendency of a claim, any party obtaining a medical or vocational report or 
records shall serve a copy of the report or records upon all other parties within ten (10) days 
following receipt. 
Section 6. Application for Resolution of an Occupational Disease Claiin. (1) To apply for 
resolution of an occupational disease daim,4he applicant shall file Form 102 with the follow-
ing completed attachments: 
(a) Work history (Form 104), to indude all past jobs performed on a full or part-time basis 
within twenty (20) years preceding the date of last exposure and all jobs in which plaintiff 
alleges exposure to the hazards of the occupational disease; 
(b) Medical history (Form 1 05) [,10 inGlllde all flhysiGians, GhimpraGIOrS, osteoflalhs,psy-
Ghialfist&.·~syGheIe§i!:-I~ilsi~!ies-sooll-as-OOsflitalfrWRere-t~l-Ras 
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beeR seeR or admilted iR the flreGediRg fifteeR (16) years aRd-iRGkldiRg beyaRd that date aRY 
physiciaRs or hospitals regardiRg treatmeRt for the same body part claimed to have beeR 
iRjured); 
(c) Medical release (Form 106); 
(d) One (1) medical report supporting the existence of occupational disease. For coal 
related pneumoconiosis claims. the medical report shall include both a chest x-ray examina-
tion and spirometric tests if pulmonary dysfunction is alleged. [Medical repMs filed ..... iti=l-aR 
applicatioR shall be sORsidered as eYideRse before the arbitralor): 
(e) Social Security earnings record release form (Form 115). 
(2) Defendant shall file a notice of claim denial or acceptance (Form 111) within forty-five 
(45) days after the date of issuance of notice that an application for resolution has been filed 
In conformltv with Section 5(21 of this regulation. (or ..... ithiR forty five (46) days follewiRg 
aR order sustaiRiRa a metioR to roopeR a Glaim. If RaRe is filed. all alleaatiaRs of the appliGa-
tioR shall be deemed admitted. The Rotiso of slaim de Rial or aooeptaRse shall-6et-4Grtl=\.all 
pertiReRt matters whish are admilted aRd those whish are deRied. If a slaim is deRied iR 
whole or iR part. a deleRdaRl shall sel ferth a detailed summary of the basis for deRial. aRd 
the Rame ef eash witRess .,.A=lose testimoA)' may be rele'lORt to that deRia!. This Rotice shall 
IRGlude a desGAplioR of the physisal requiremeRls of plaiRtiff6 jab OR the alleged date of last 
el(posyre; the Rames of aRY ',wResses; aRd tho Rame. address. aRd telephoRe Rumber of 
the iRdividuai respeASibie fer gatheRRg this iAferFRatieR for the employer aRdit~ IRsurer. if 
00\'. This reooiremeRl 91 filiM a RetiGa el admissieR or deRiai shall be) in addition (IG-the 
~) a special answer In accordance with Seclion 1 (9) of this (adFRiRistrative) 
regulation (although a daRial may asseFt tho spellial defeRses sat aut abo",e). 
(3) For all occupational disease and (Gr) hearing loss claims. the commissioner shall 
prompily :;Ill .. dula an examinallon pursua'ii 10 KRS 342.315 and 342.316. 
(4) Proof laking and discovery for all parties shall proceed 8S set forth In SectIon 5(31 of 
this regulations ' (for a fleRad begiRRiRg • .... iltt the dale of issuaRce of Rotice that aR aeeliG3 
tielHef.resalutioR of slaim has beeR filad to aRd IRoodiRg a date sOOy (GO) days frem the date 
the claim is assigRed to aR arbitrator.] 
(5) During the pendency of a claim. medical and vocational reports shall be ex-
changed In accordance with Section 5(4/ of this regulation, [aRY party obtaiRiRg a medi 
Gal or 'l9catioRaI report or reGards shaR serve a copy of Itte repoFt aRd records UPOR all other 
parties withiR teR (10l dovs of the reseip!.) 
Section 7. Application for Resolution of a Hearing Loss Claim. (1) To apply for resolution 
of a hearing loss claim. the applicant shan file Form 103 with the following completed docu-
ments: 
(a) Work history (Form 104). to include all past jobs performed on a full or part-time basis 
within twenty (20) years preceding the last date of noise exposure; 
(b) Medical history (Form 105). to include all physicians. chiropractors. osteopaths. psy-
chiatrists. psychologists. and medical facilities such as hospitals where the individual has 
been seen or admittect in the preceding fifteen (15) years and including beyond that date any 
physicians or hospitals regarding treatment for hearing loss or ear complaints; 
(c) Medical release (Form 106); 
(d) One (1) med'resl report descnbing the hearing loss which Is the basis of th~ claim and. 
if a psychological condition is aReged. an additional mOOresl report establishing the presence 
of a mental impairment or disorder. Medical reports required under this paragraph may 
consist of legible. hand-written notes of a treating physician. (MediGaI reports filed wil-R-aR 
applicaticm shall be ceRsidered as eYideRce before the arbitrator): 
(e) Social Security earnings record reieas" form (FornI 115). 
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(2) Defendant shall file a notice of claim denial or acceptance (Form 111) within forty-five 
(45) days after the date of issuance of notice that an application for resolution of claim has 
been filed. In conformity with Section 5(2) of this regulation In addition to [Gl'-Wiltlffi 
fort\' fi'la (45) days followinG an order sllstaininG a motion to Feopen a slaim. If none is-fileG; 
all allegations of the applisation shall be deemed admitted. The notioo of slaim denial or 
aooeptanoe shall set forth all pertinent matters whish are admitted and those whish aFe 
denied. If a Glaim is denied in wholo or in paFt. a defendant shall set forth a detailed sllmmaF)' 
of the basis for denial, and the name of oaoh witness ..... hoso testimony may be relevant to 
that donial. This nolioe shall insillde a dessription of the physioal reltllirements of plaintifrs 
job at the time of tf:lo alloged injll!)' and the name. address and telephone nllmber of tf:le 
indil/idllal Fesponsible for !lathorino tf:lis information for tf:le employer and its insllFer. Tf:lis 
rOOllirement of filinG a nolioo of admission or denial shall be in addition 10 tf:le reqllirement 
t&-fiIe) a special answer in accordance with Section 1(9) of this [administrative) regulation 
[althoYgf:l a denial may inoorporate speoial defenses whiof:l have beon timely raised). 
(3) Proof taking and discovery for all parties shall proceed for a period beginning with the 
date of issuance of an order of assignment as set forth In Section 5(3) [of notioe If:lat-aA 
applioation for resoilltion has beon llIed 10 and inoillding a date si*'Y (GO) days frem the date 
Ihe Glaim is aSSigned 10 an arbilrator). 
(4) During the pendency of a claim. [any party obtaining) a medical and [or) vocational 
reports shall be exchanged In accordance with Section 5(4) of this regulation [0HeG-
• 
ords shall selVe a oop'/ of Ihe report or reoords Ilpon all other parties within len (10) days 
followin!:! reseiPt), 
[Seotiofl..&-Beoofit Revie ..... Before Arbitralor. (1) The arbitrator to ..... hom tf:le olairTHs-as-
sign~ha!;'disc~~la!Y-fCSC'~lio!l4.-t~aim-witMhc pafties-b~'-tclep~one-ronlef-
eAGe-OHn a benofit Fevie ..... GOnlerenoe and may FOqlllre tf:le parties to sllbmit ..... ritten slipllla-
tions 01 last 
(2) If a slaim is resol·Jed. the parties sf:lall oomplete an aoreement-as to oomoensation 
~m 110) or prepare for entPt' an aoreed reseMion 01 tf:le Glaim. The parties sf:lalf..teAdor 
tAe-aoreement as 10 Gompensation or aGreed resoMion 10 If:lo arbitrator lor appFOYal, 
(alA benelit re' .. ie ..... Gonlerense, if held, shall be attended bv the plaintiff and represenla-
tive. if any. and by the delendant or its representative. ilany. Tho benefit revim\' sonferenGO 
shall be an informal preseoding and a IranssApt or resording 01 tho oonferense shall not be 
made. The parties shall. at tf:le sonlerense. disposo of oontroversies if pessible and define 
displlted isslles. 
(4) Preof belore an arbitrator shall lJe sllbmitted by way of medisal or 'Iosational report 
and. for lay ..... itnesses. by ..... ay of affidavit. 
(al (>, reoort 01 a medioal evalllator Pllrsllant to KRS a42.a15 shall besome e'lidense 
before tf:le arbitrator withollt the liling 01 a notioe or motion. 
(b) Cress e*amination may OGollr at If:lo e*penso of tho party seeking that Gross 
e)(3mination and maol be had enl', IlElen metien te the arbitrator seltina forth aood Gallso-for 
tf:lo need of Gross el<amination. ,II, molion 10 permit Gress ol<amination shall be made ..... ithin 
ten (10) days fellOl""'ng filing of the medioal report or alfidaolil. or nolioe of assignment to an 
arbitrator. whishevor last OGGllrs. More than two (2) medioal reports shall not be plaGed in 
ovidonoe by any party IfJitholll prior apprQll3I of tho arbitrator. 
(5) Mditional proof may be sllbmilted in Ihe follo ..... ing forms: 
(a) Any party may take a deposition 01 another party if tho party agrees to be deposed. 
~Iotise of the depositien shall be gi ... en to all parties. 
Ibl ,II, deElosition shall be oonsidefee-as e\'idense onl'/ if it is filed prior to tf:le e*piratiGn.e! 
prc~f.time, 
---{G)-Paflies-may-pfeseRl-writtefI-questions to otf:ler paflies wf:lo f:lave net been deposed 00t 
ROt to witnesses ' .... ho are not paflles. QlIestlons sf:lall not be presenled after tf:lifly (3~) days 
from the date the Glaim Is assigned to an arbitrator. 
--(d) ,A.nswers to • .... ritten questions may be submitted as evideAse in aGsordaRGe-WitMho 
foIIewiR!f. 
1. A pafty may present a maJ<imum of fifteen (16) questions to eaGh pafly; 
2. EaGf:l poflion of a qllestion requiring a separate answer sf:lall be GOllnted as a separate 
question; 
3. Questions sf:lall be presented in nonteGf:lnisal terms and shall not request legal GonsllJ 
sions bo made by tf:le answering pafty. 
4. The fellowino ouestions sf:lall not GOllnt towards the maJ<imllm nllmber of qllestions 
allowed; 
tTl a. It, qllestion reqllesting th . e name of tf:le answering party; and 
Vol b. A Ollestion reElllestinEl wf:lether the pafty is willing to supplement ans ..... ers if pertiner\l 
iAformation later besomes available. 
6. Tf:le party on ','mem tho QlIestions ~'Ie been sel\'Od sf:lall seNe a sopy of tf:le answers 
'.vitf:lin fifteen (16) da'lS after tf:le seNiGe of the Questions. 
G. Answers to tho Elllestions sf:lall be signed by the responding pafty, wf:lese signa!lJre 
shall be notaFized and may be admitted inte evidenoe by any pafty by notiGe to all parties and 
the arbilrater. 
7. If tho defendant employer is net a nalllral person, the defendant employer shall desig 
Rate an individllal to answer tho QlIostions, and tho atWrooy-feHhe-SpeGla1 FIlRd sf:lall-be 
~nswering on bohalf of the SpeGial FilM, 
--(6)-tf a Glaim is net '1QIIJntarily-fOOOlvod, the arbitraleHhaU;-witllilHlinety..{9Q}-Gay!H)1 
assigMlent~hEH>laim;-roRder a-written benefi!~~elefmination·setling-fOOt>-ffiatters 
stif)UlalOO,-matters denied, findlnos of faGt;-and GonGllJslons-of..!aw, 
f7}-At..any time durin~ tf:le benefit review preooss,an arbitrator may determine that-the 
pendino Glaim presents fastual iss yes best resolYOO tf:lroll~f:l a f:learin!l belore an administra 
tlve-1aw III doe and enter an order transferrino tf:le Gla~n-administrati ... e law ;lIdae for 
11Iflf:ler proGeedinos.] 
Section 11[9]. Medical Evaluations Pursuant to KRS 342.315. (1) All persons claiming 
benefits for coal wor1<ers' pneumoconiosis pursuant to KRS 342.732. hearing loss. or occu-
pational disease shall be referred by the commissioner for a medical evaluation in accor-
dance with [the] contract~ entered into between the commissioner and the University of 
Kentucky and University of Louisville medical schools. 
(2) Upon [~] all other claims, the commissioner, [an arbitrator,] or an administrative law 
judge, [in tf:leir disGrotion, or upon motion by a party,] may direct appointment by the commis-
sioner of a unIversIty medical evC!.luator pn asserdanse with Gontrasts witf:l tf:le University of 
Kentllsky and University of bOllisville medisal ssf:lools]. 
(3) Upon referral for medical evaluation under this section. the parties may tender addi-
tional relevant medical information to the university medical school to whom the evaluation 
is assigned. This additional Information shall not be filed of record. The additional medical 
information shall be: 
(a) Submitted to the university within fourteen (14) days following an order (or medical 
evaluation pursuant to KRS 342.315; 
(b) Submitted by way of medical reports, notes, or depositions; 
(c) Clearly legible; 
(d) Indoxed; 
(e) Fllrrlished in chronological order; 
tTl 
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(f) Timely furnished to all other parties pursuant to Section 5(4) of this administrative 
regulation; 
(g) Accompanied by a summary that Is filed of record and served upon all parties. The 
summary shall: 
1. Identify the medical provider; 
2. Include the date of medical services; 
3. Include the nature of medical services provided. 
(4) Upon the scheduling of an evaluation, the commissioner shall provide notice to all 
parties and the employer shall forward to the plaintiff necessary travel expenses. Upon 
completion of the evaluation the commissioner shall provide copies of the report to all parties 
and shall file the original report in the claim record to be considered as evidence. 
(5) The administrative law judge shall allow timely cross-examination of a medical evalua-
tor appointed by the commissioner at the expense of the moving party. 
(6) Unjustified failure by the plaintiff to attend the scheduled medical evaluation may be 
grounds for dismissal, payment of a no-show fee, sanctions, or all of the above. 
(7) Failure by the employer or its insurance carrier to pay travel expenses within seven (7) 
days of notification of a scheduled medical evaluation may be grounds for imposition of 
sanctions. 
Section m~l. Medical Reports. (1) A party shall not introduce direct testimony' from more 
than two (2) physicians by medical report except upon a showing of good cause and prior 
approval by an [aFbitr-ater or] administrative law judge. 
(2) Medical reports shall be submitted on Fonn 107-1 (injury), Fonn 107-P (psychological) 
or Form 108-00 (occupational disease), Form 108-CWP (coal workers' pneumoconiosis), 
vr FO;'11 iOa-HL (hcariroylu$::.i, as appropriate., except that an [arbitr-atGf-'*] ~dmir):'~ ; rative 
law judge may pennit the introduction of other reports. 
(3) Medical reports shall be signed by the physician making the report, or be accompanied 
by an affidavit from the physician or submitting party or representative verifying the authentic-
ity of the report. 
(4) Medical reports shall include within the body of the report or as an attachment, a 
statement of qualifications of the person making the report. If the qualifications of the physi-
cian who prepared the written medical report have been filed with the commissioner and the 
physician has been assigned a medical qualifications Index number, reference may be made 
to the physicians index number in lieu of attaching qualifications. 
(5) Narratives in medical reports shall be typewritten. Other portions, including spirometric 
tracings, shall.be clearly legible. 
(6) Upon notice, a party may file the testimony of two (2) physicians, either by deposition 
or medical report, which shall be admitted into evidence without further order if an objection 
(7) [IA prooeediAgs befere aA admiAistr-ative 18' .... jydge,] {I]f a medical report is admitted 
as direct testimony, any adverse party may depose the reporting physician in a timely man-
ner as if on cross-examination at its own expense. 
Section ,1g-H]. Interlocutory Relief. (1) At any time during a claim, a party may seek any 
or all of three (3) fonns of interlocutory relief: 
(a) Interim payment of income benefits for total disability pursuant to KRS 342.730(1 )(b); 
(bj Medical benefits J)ursuan: to KRS 342.020; 
""'" 
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(c) Rehabilitation services pursuant to KRS 342.710; 
(2) Any response to a request for interlocutory relief shall be served within twenty (20) 
days from the date of the request and thereafter, the request shall be ripe for a decision. 
(3) Entitlement to interlocutory relief shall be shown by means of affidavit, deposition, or 
other evidence of record demonstrating the requesting party Is eligible under KRS Chapter 
342 and will suffer irreparable injury, loss or damage pending a final decision on the applica-
tion. Rehabilitation services may be ordered while the claim Is pending upon showing that 
immediate provision of services will substantially increase the probability that the plaintiff will 
return to work. 
(4) If interlocutory relief is awarded in the form of income benefits, the application shall be 
placed in abeyance unless a party shows irreparable harm will result. The [amitrator or) 
administrative law judge may require periodic reports as to the physical condition of the 
plaintiff. Upon motion and a showing of cause, or upon the [amitFator or) administrative law 
judge's own motion, interlocutory relief shall be terminated and the claim removed from 
abeyance. 
(5) An attorney's fee in the amounts authorized by KRS 342.320 that does not exceed 
twenty (20) percent of the weekly income benefits awarded pursuant to a request for inter-
locutory relief may be granted. The approved fee shall be deducted in equal amounts from 
the weekly income benefits awarded and shall be paid directly to the attomey. 
(6) ~ [An aflflrepriale] party seeking Interlocutorv relief may uso the follo)Ning forms 
[orovided evlhe deaarlmeAt \VilA re!!ard 10 iAlerloouloFY relief]: 
(a) Motion for interlocutory relief; 
(b) Affidavit for payment of medical expenses; 
(c) Affidavit for payment of temporary total disability; and 
(d) Affidavit regarding rollaiJililalion services. 
Section 11. Benefit Review Conferences. 
(1) The purpose of the benefit review conference Is to expedite the processing of the 
claim and to avoid whenever possible the need for a formal hearing. The conference 
Is an Informal procedure, presided over by the administrative law fudge. No transcript 
of the proceedings shall be made. At the benefit review conference, the parties shall 
attempt to resolve controversies, narrow and define Issues. and facilitate prompt 
settlement. The parties shall exchange lists of known witnesses ten (10) days before 
the benefit review conference. The witness list shalf give the name of each proposed 
witness together with a summary of the anticipated testimony of the witness. For 
medical witnesses, this summarY shall Include at a minimum a description of the 
diagnosis made, the physical findings and diagnostic studies upon which the diagno-
sis Is based. snd the functlonallmpslrment rstlng sssessed by the witness and sny 
work-related restrictions Imposed. 
(2) At the benefIt review conference, the administrative law fudge may limit 
witnesses for QOod CBIISe shown 
(3) The plaIntiff snd his representative, the defendants or their representatives 
shall attend the benefit review conference. Representa"ves of parties must have 
authorltv to resolve disputed Issues snd settle the claim at the conference. The 
administrative law fudge may upon motion lind good cause shown waive the 
requIrement that the plaIn"" sttend the conference. 
(4) A party may seek postponement of a benefit review conference by motion and 
good shown filed at least fifteen (15) days prior to the date of the conference. 
(5) If at the conclusion of the benefit review conference the parties have not 
rp.ached agreement on all the issues the ~dmlnlstrative law.l!!..c!ge shaft prepare a 
i, 
summary stipulation of all contested and uncontested Issues which shall be ~ays for a party designated as defendant in the proGeeding before the arbitfalof,and 
signed by representatives of the parties and bv the administrative law fudge. Onlv fifteen (161 days ler rebllttal for a BaRY desiGnated as Dlalnmf in the BreGeedinG befGfe-lhe 
contested Issues shall be the sublect of further proceedings. af9itmlOFr 
(6) The administrative law fudge upon motion with good cause shown may order (4) Within fifteen (16) days lellowing assiGnment to an administrative law jlldae. the Bames 
that additional discovery or proof be taken between the benefit review conference shall file a statoment of proposod stiplliations, notiGo of GOntested issues, and designation 
and the date of the hearing. of anv admissible eYidenGe in the benefit reYiew reGord IIBen whish the ... intend to rei ... on 
(71 If a claim Is not settled, the administrative law fudge shall schedule a date for aBBeal before the administrat;'re 18\\' jlldee. Any BaRY \'Iho fails to filo a timel', statoment of 
the hearing on the claim at the benefit review conference. proposed stiplliations shall be bOllnd by stiplliations made before the arbitrater, sllbjeGt to 
relief under SeGtion 17(2) of this administrative reglliation. Mmissible eYidenGe in the benefit 
[Sootion 12. Appeals to Administrative Law Judges frem Benefit Review Determinations. 
re'liew reGerd that is preperly designated by a party shall be sons ide red as filed in the reGord 
(11 Within thiRY (agl days after the date of the "Iina of a written benefit review determination 
before the administrative law jlldge and shall not be resllbmitted. 
or rlliing on petition for resonsideration from that benefit re'liew determination by an arbitra 
(5) The administrative 18\\' jlldge may order an informal GonferenGe for the pllrpose of 
tor, any party aggrieved by the determinati • on may appeal to an administrative 18\'1 jlldge. No 
defining and narrewing tho issues, disGllssing settlement. aRd Gonsidering other rele'lant 
aeeeal shall be taken frem a written benefit review determinaliOA-that does not arant or den', 
matters that may aid In the disposition of the Gase. 
the ultimate relief seuaht as to all parties' without the need for further sleps to be tal~en. 
(6) At least fifteen (1Ii) days prior to tho sGheduled hearing, oaGh party shall sOI\'e a 
(21 Tho aBBeal shall Be initiated b ... filin<l a "Reellest for Hearina before an Administrative 
witness list and Gopies of kne'lIA ellhibits {In all other parties and IIPon tho Gommissioner. 
Law Jlldge". The pF9GOedings bolere the administrative laoA' jlldge shall bQ de noo.'9 and Gress 
ElOOOPt for good Gallse shown, any person not listed as a witness shall not present testimony. 
sBPeals shall not be pelmitted. The appealin!,! party shall be designated as petitioner and all 
EaGh witness list shall state Ihe name of eaGh prepesed witness and sllmmarize the testi 
parties aaainst wttom the appeal is taken as respondents. In the event that more than one 
mony of the witness, and shall identi!)' matters in oontF9'lersy. Fer oaGh meEfiGaI witness, the 
(HoaRY aBeeals, the first DaRY Ie file shall bo desianated eetitioner and all other parties shall 
sllmmary shall inGllide a diagnosis, the physiGal findings, the resllits of diagnostis stlldies 
be desianateEI reseenElenl. The petitiener shall sertify oopies hao.re been serveElllpon all other 
sllpporting tho diagnosis, and an assessment of fllnGtional impallment in assordanse with 
pames, 
the most resent edition of the AMA Gllides to Evaillation of Pelmanent Impailment. 
cal The Gommissioner shall assian the Glaim to an administrati'lO law jlldge and shal4lolify 
(7) E)(Gept for evidense timely designated by the parties. infolmation submitted te the 
Itle-parties of the sGhedllle for presentation of preof and the time and plase of the heafi~ 
af9itrator shall not be sonsidered evidenGe before the administrative law jlld!'!e. Proof..;lnEI 
~II-pr(}vide forty Ii'le (45}4ays-fof-all-palties-to-presenl-proof,-tRmy 
elisGovept bcler:H!>e-.v!ministratWe-law illdae shal' be b.,. wa ... of notioo-Gf-.intredu~ 
mediGal-feoorts and deDositions of la ... witnesses. Hawe ... er. a rellort of a medisal evawalef response was duo. 
J*lfSU3f\tto KRS 342.:mi shall beoome eYidenGe before the administrative la ..... jud€!e wilhool 
the filine of a natiGo or motioR. --SeGtion 14. Transfer to Administrative La ..... Jud€!e. (1) If an arbitrator determines the Glaim 
IS) If. durina the eendonG'1 of a alaim before an administrative law illdQe, the Ilarlies presents fastual issues best resol\'Od throu€!h a hearin€! before an administrati\'e law judge, 
\'()Iuntarily resol.1O a Glaim, an A€!reement as to Compensation (f=(Jfm 110) or a€!reed opinion an order shall be entered by the arbitrator and shall ba selVed upon all parties and-the 
~rd shall ba submitted for tho aeere'l3l of the administrati ... e law iudao. Gammissioner. 
(2) The sammissianer shall upon reseipt of a transfor order issue an order ssheduling 
SeGlion 13. Appeals to Administrative Law Jllti€!es frem Final Orders. (1) 'Nithin thirw (30) proof time, assi€!nin€! te an administrative law jud€!o, and sshedulin€! the time and plase of 
days after the date of filin€! of a final order of an arbitrater other than a benefit review deter hearing, 
mination or rulin€! on a petition for resonsideration frem that benefit re·liew determination, any (3) Upon transfer to an administrative 13\\' jud€!e, the Glaim shall proGeed in the manner 
party a€!€!ria'iad by tha order may fila a "Re€Juast far De ~Iovo Re ... iow by an Administrati ... o established in SeGtien 12(3) throulJh (S) ef this administrative relJulalion. The parties shall 
Law Judge". As used in this seGlien "final order" means one that €!rants er denies the ultimate Gontinue te be desienatod as elaintiff and dofendant after transfer.) . 
tTl relief sought as to all parties ..... ithout tho need for further stops to be takon. 
-..J 121 The aeDealinG eam· shall be desiGnated as eetitioner and all other Darties shall-be Section .12[-te). Evidence· Rule_s Applicable. (1) The Rules of Evidence prescribed by the 
desi€!nated as respendonts. The petitioner shall sertily sepies have been served upen all Kentucky Supreme Court shall apply in all proceedings before an administrative law judge 
ether parties, except as varied by specific statute and.thls administrative regulation. 
(a) The request for de n9V9 Fe'AO'II by an administratiw law jud€!e shall net el<seed fi'lO (Ii) [(2) ,A.ffida>/its submittod with an aeelisation for resolution ef slaim and in ereseedinas 
pa€!es, and shall oentain a Glear and GonGise statement of the material fasts, tho €Juestiens before an arbitrator shall oonstituto oYidanse bofore tha arbitrator. Affida>/its of parties and 
ef law inyolwd and the speGms reasons for whish the request .... 'as filed. The request shall lay witnesses shall be permitted and ensoura€!ed in preseedings before an arbitrator.) 
site any authority for potitioner's positien. [g!(3)JAny party may file as evidence before the [arbitrator or) administrativ~ law judge 
(4) The respondents shall ha>Je fifteen (1 Ii) days after the request for de no\'() review is pertinent material, and only relevant portions of hospital, educational, Bureau of Vital 
lIIed in whish to file reseonses whish shall not el<GOed fi'lO lIil eaaes. settina forth the basis Statistics, Armed Forces, [91') Social Security and other public records. An opinion of a 
of their opposition to the request. physiCian which is expressed in these records shall not be considered by an (arbitraleH}t"] 
(Ii) The Gommissioner shall refer the matter to an adminislrati ... e law iudee. who shall issue administrative law judge in violation of the limitation on the number of physician's opinions 
~~ys.after the date oHhe-lasl-feseoAse or iite4at.Hffi...whiGh-the established in KRS 342.033. 
m 
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Section ~~). Extensions of Proof Time. (1) Extensions of time for producing evidence 
may be granted upon [a) showing of [a) c1rcumstance§ that prevent[s the party from) timely 
IntroductIon [introduoing pwol). Motions for extension of time shall IRGI) be filed no later 
than five (5) days before the deadline sought to be extended. The motion or supporting 
affidavits shall set forth: 
(a) The efforts to produce the evidence in a timely manner; 
(b) Facts which prevented timely production; and 
(c) The date of availability of the evidence, the probability of its production, and the materi-
ality of the evidence. 
(2) In the absence of compelling circumstances, only one (1) extension of thirty (30) days 
shall be granted to each side for completion of discovery or proof by deposition. 
(3) The granting of an extension of time for completion of discovery or proof shall enlarge 
the time to all plaintiffs if the extension is granted to a plaintiff and to all defendants if an 
extension is granted to a defendant, and shall extend the time of the adverse party automati-
cally except if the extension is for rebuttal-proof. 
Section 14[~. Stipulation of Facts. (1) Refusal to stipulate facts which are not genuinely 
in issue shall warrant imposition of sanctions as established in Section 26 of this administra-
tive regulation. Assertion that a party has not had sufficient opportunity to ascertain relevant 
facts shall not be considered "good cause" in the absence of due diligence. 
(2) Upon cause shown, a party may be relieved of a stipulation if the motion for relief is 
filed at least ten (10) days prior to the date of the hearing, or as soon as practicable after 
discovery that the stipulation was erroneous. Upon granting relief from a stipulation, the 
administrative law judge may grant a conlinua!1co of the hearing and additional proof limp. 
Section 1Q{~). Discovery and Depositions. (1) Discovery and the taking of depositions 
shall be in accordance with the provisions of Civil Rules 26 to 37, inclusive, except for Civil 
Rules 27, 33, and 36 which shall not apply to practice before the administrative law judges 
or the board. [In pFOOeedings before arbitrators, depositions and questions shall be pro 
pounded in aooordanoe with Seotion 8 ef this administf8ti ... e regulation.] 
(2) Depositions may be taken by telephone if the reporter administering the oath to the 
witness and reporting the deposition is physically present with the witness at the time the 
deposition is given. Notice of a telephonic deposition shall relate the following information: 
(a) That the deposition is to be taken by telephone; 
(b) The address and telephone number from which the call will be placed to the witness; 
(c) The address and telephone number of the place where the witness will answer the 
deposition call; and 
(d) [Thak!II).Q[e]pposing partLes may participate in the deposition either at the place 
where the deposition is being given, at the place the telephone call is placed to the witness, 
or by conference call. If a party elects to participate by conference call, that party shall con-
tribute proportionate costs of the conference call. 
(3) The commissioner shall establish a medical qualifications index. An index number shall 
be aSSigned to a physician upon the filing of the physician's qualifications. Any physician who 
has been assigned an index number may offer the aSSigned number in lieu of st~ting qualifi-
cations. Qualifications shall be revised or updated by submitting revisions to the commis-
sioner. Nothing in this rule shall preclude any party from inquiring further into the qualifica-
tions of a phYSician. 
Section 1f!!-t-9j. Wage Certificaiiun. If at an·, lime during the pendency of a c:air.1 wages 
m 
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are at issue, the employer shall promptly complete and serve a completed form AWW-1 on 
all other parties. 
Section 1Z[2()). Hearings. (1) At hearing, the parties shall present proof concerning con-
tested issues. If plaintiff fails to appear, the administrative law judge may dismiss the case 
for want of prosecution, or if good cause is shown, the hearing may be continued. 
(2) At the conclusion of the hearing, the claim shall be taken under submission immedi-
ately or briefs may be ordered. Briefs shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages in length. Reply 
briefs shall be limited to five (5) pages. Permission to increase the length of a brief shall be 
sought by motion. The administrative law judge may announce his decision at the conclusion 
of the hearing or shall defer decision until rendering a written opinion. A decision shall be 
rendered no later than sixty (60) days following hearing. The time of filing a petition for 
reconsideration or notice of appeal shall not begin to run until after the "date of filing" of the 
written opinion as established by Section 1 of this administrative regulation. 
(3) The parties with approval of the administrative law judge may waive a final hearing. 
Waiver of a final hearing shall require aQreement of all parties and the administrative law 
judge. The claim shall be taken under submission as of the date of the order allowing the 
waiver of hearing and briefs may be ordered. A decision shall be rendered no later than sixty 
(50) days following the date of the order allowing the waiver of hearing. 
Section 1§[at). Petitions for Reconsideration. (1) If applicable, a party shall file a petition 
for reconsideration within fourteen (14) days of the filing of a lbeAefil review aelermiAatioo 
er-a) final order or award of an [amilraler Elr) administrative law judge, clearly stating the 
patent error which 1he petitioner seeks to have corrected and setting forth the authorities 
upon which patitioner relie!>. Tna party filing the petiiion for reconsideiaiion shall tender a 
proposed order granting the relief requested. 
(2) A response shall be served within ten (10) days after the date of filing of the petition. 
(3) The [amilraler or) administrative law judge shall act upon the petition within ten (10) 
days after the response Is due. 
Section .tgaa). Benefit Calculations for Settlements. (1) For computing lump sum settle-
ments, the employer shall utilize the prescribed discount rate for its weeks of liability only, not 
for the entire award period. A discount shall not be taken on past due benefits by the em-
ployer or Special Fund. llimp sum settlements shall be calculated as follows: 
(a) Determine the entire lump sum liability: 
1. Compute the remaining weeks of liability in the award by subtracting the number of 
weeks past due from the entire number of weeks in the award. 
2. Discount the number of weeks remaining in the award at the prescribed discount rate. 
3. Multiply the weekly benefit rate by the discounted number of weeks remaining (sub-
paragraph 2 of this paragraph) In award. This product equals the entire future lump sum 
liability for the award. 
4. Add the amount of past due benefits to the future lump sum liability award (subpara-
graph 3 of this paragraph). The sum represents the entire lump sum value of the award. 
(b) Determine the employer's lump sum liability as follows: 
1. The employer's future liability shall be computed by determining its tot,,1 weeks of 
liability less the number of weeks of liability past due. 
2. The number of weeks remaining shall be discounted at the prescribed discount rate and 
multiplied by the amount of the weekly benefit. 
3. Multiply the number of past due weeks by the amount of the weekly benefit. 
4. The employer's entire liability for lump sum payment shali 00 dett!(mined by adding ti,e 
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results of paragraph (b)2 and 3 of this subsection. 
(c) Determine the Special Fund's portion of the lump sum liabilily by subtracting the value 
of the employer's fiabilily in lump sum (paragraph (b) of this subsection) from the entire value 
of the lump sum settlement (paragraph (a) of this subsection). The remainder shall be the 
Special Fund's lump sum liabilily. 
(2) If the employer settles its liabilily for Income benefits with the employee for a lump sum 
payment and a determination Is made of the Special Fund's liabilily, the Special Fund's 
portion of income benefits shall be paid commencing with the. date of approval of the em-
ployer's settlement and continuing for (he balance of the compensable period. 
(3) In computing settlements involving periodic payments, the employer shall pay its 
liabilily over the initial portion of the award, based on the number of weeks its liabilily bears 
to the entire liabilily for the claim. The Special Fund shall make all remaining payments for 
the balance of the compensable period. 
(4) Pursuant to KRS 342.265, election by the Special Fund to settle on the ·same terms· 
as the employer shall mean the Special Fund agrees to settle in the same manner as the 
employer in either a discounted lump sum IJr in periodic payments based upon its proportion-
ate share of the permanent disabilily percentage paid by the employer. ·Same terms· shall 
not include any additional payments the employer Included for buy out of medical expenses, 
temporary total disabilily, rehabilitation, or other benefits for which the Special Fund is not 
liable. 
(5) Parties involved In a lump-sum settlement of future periodic payments shall use the 
discount factor computed in accordance with KRS 342.265(3). 
Section 2(!23J. Appeals to Workers' Compensation Board. (1) Within thirty (30) days after 
the date o( filing 01 a final award or o,der of an administrative iaw judg,:: allY par:y aggrie\led 
by the order may appeal to the board. As used in this section ·final order" shall be deter-
mined In accordance with Civil Rule 54.02(1) and (2). 
(2) An appeal shall be initiated by the filing of a notice of appeal denoting the appealing 
party as the petitioner and all parties against whom the appeal is taken as respondents. The 
administrative law judge who rendered the order appealed from shall be named as a respon-
dent. If appropriate, the Director of the Special Fund or the Director of the Coal Workers' 
Pneumoconiosis Fund shall · be named as a respondent pursuant to KRS 342.120 or 
342.1242. The workers' compensation daim number shall be set forth in all pleadings before 
the board. 
(3) Any party other than the petitioner may file a cross-appeal through notice of cross-
appeal filed within ten (10) days after notice of appeal is served. The cross-appeal shall 
designate the parties as appropriate Q.e., petitioner-cross-respondent). 
(4) Notice of appeal, cross-appeal and all other pleadings before the board shall be served 
as established by Section 3 of this administrative regulation. The commissioner shall issue 
an acknowledgement to all parties of the filing of a direct appeal. 
(5) If a ground for the appeal is fraud Dr misconduct pursuant to KRS 342.285(2), the 
board shall immediately schedule a hearing on that issue. All subsequent appeal time in the 
case shall be calculated from the date the transcript of hearing is filed instead of the date of 
filing of notice of appeal. 
(6) Petitioner's brief shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the filing of the notice of appeal. 
The organization and contents of petitioner's brief shall be as provided in Civil Rule 
76.12(4)(c) except an index shall not be required and the appendix shall include copies of 
decision appealed, petitions for reconsideration, rulings on petitions, and cases cited from 
federal courts and foreign jurisdictions. 
(7) Respondent's brief sha!1 be filild within thirty (30) da~'5 01 the date petitioner's brief was 
l"t1 
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served. Organization and contents shall be provided in Civil Rule 76. 12(4)(d) except an index 
shall not be required and the appendix shall include copies of cases cited from federal courts 
and foreign jurisdictions. If the respondent is also a cross-petitioner, a combined brief shall 
address issues raised by the cross-appeal. 
(8) Failure of a party to timely file a brief may be grounds for imposition of one (1) or more 
of the following sanctions: 
(a) Affirmation or reversal of the final order; 
(b) Striking of an untimely brief; . 
(c) A fine of not more than $500; or 
(d) Dismissal of appeal of petitioner's original brief. 
(9) If applicable, the petitioner's reply brief shall be served within fifteen (15) days after the 
date on which the last respondent's brief was served or due, whichever is earlier. The organi-
zation and contents of the petitioner's reply brief shall be as provided in Civil Rule 
76.12(4)(e), except that an appendix, index, or contents page shall not be required. If the 
petitioner is also a cross-respondent, a combined brief shall address issues raised by the 
cross-petitioner's brief. 
(10) If a cross-appeal has been filed, the cross-petitioner's reply brief may be served within 
fifteen (15) days after the date on which the last cross-respondent's brief was served or due, 
whichever Is earlier. The organization and contents of the cross-petitioner's reply brief shall 
be as provided in Civil Rule 76.12(4)(e) except that an appendix, index, or contents page 
shall not be required. 
(11) Petitioner's brief and the respondent's brief shall be limited to fifteen (15) pages each, 
reply briefs to five (5) pages, and combined briefs to twenty (20) pages. Permission to in-
crease the length of a brief shall be sought by motion. 
(12) A!! pleadings shall conform to the requirements sel lorth in Cillil Rule 7.02(4) ami sl.ail 
be filed without covers. The style of the case, lricluding the claim number and title of the 
pleading, shall appear on the first page of the pleading. 
(13) The board shall enter its decision affirming, modifying, or setting aside the order 
appealed from, or may remand the claim to an administrative law judge for further proceed-
ings. Motions for reconsideration shall not be permitted. 
(14) Although the Workers Compensation Board wffl be non-existent for the interim 
between July 1, 2000 and July 14, 2000, appeals from final awards or orders of 
admlnlstratfve law fudges shall nonetheless be filed as prescribed by this section 
and the Commissioner shalf Issue an acknowledgement of appeal pursuant to 
subsectfon 4. 
llMft4l]1f applicable, the decision of the board shall be appealed to the Kentucky Court 
of Appeals as provided in Civil Rule 76.25. 
[1§!ftS)) Except for motions that call for final disposition of an appeal, any board member 
designated by the chairman may dispose of any motion; and, any intermediate order may be 
issued on the signature of any board member. 
Section gt[24). Coverage - Insured Status. Upon the filing of an application for resolution 
of claim, the commissioner shall ascertain whether the employer or any other person against 
whom a claim is filed and who is not exempted by KRS 342.650 has secured payment of 
compensation by oblaining insurance coverage or qualifying as a self-insurer pursuant to 
KRS 342.340. If an employer does not have insurance coverage or qualify as a self-insurer, 
the commissioner shall notify the arbitrator or administrative law judge and all parties by 
service of a certification of no coverage. 
Section 22(26). Withdrawal of Reoor<ls. (1) A portion of any original record of the depart-
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ment shall not be withdrawn except upon an order of the commissioner, an administrative 
law judge, or a member of the board. 
(2) All physical exhibits, including x-rays, shall be disposed of sixty (60) days after the 
order resolving the claim has become final. A party filing an exhibit may make arrangements 
to claim an exhibit prior to that time. If an unclaimed exhibit has no money value, it shall be 
destroyed; if an unclaimed exhibit has a value of more than $100, it shall be sold as surplus 
property; if an unclaimed exhibit has a value of less than $100, it shall be donated to the 
appropriate state agency; and, if an unclaimed exhibit has historic value, it shall be sent to 
the state archives. 
Section 2~26]. Sanctions. Pursuant to KRS 342.310, [an amitrater,] an administrative law 
judge, and the board may assess costs upon determination that proceedings have been 
brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable grounds. A sanction may be assessed 
against an offending attorney or representative rather than against the party. If a party is a 
governmental agency and attomey's fees are assessed, the fees shall include fees for the 
services of an attomey in public employment, measured by the reasonable cost of similar 
services had a private attomey been retained. Failure of a party to timely file any pleading' 
required by this administrative regulation may be treated by [an amitr-ator,) an administrative 
law judge, or the board as prosecuting or defending without reasonable grounds. 
Section 2~~. Payment of Compensation from Uninsured Employers' Fund. (1) Payment 
from the Uninsured Employers' Fund of compensation shall be made upon the determination 
by an [al'bitFatef.ef] administrative law judge that the responsible employer failed to secure 
payment of compensation as provided by KRS 342.340 and: 
(ai Thirty (30) days huve expired since the finality 01 an ~ward and a party in ir,teres! 
certifies the responsible employer has failed to initiate payments in accordance with that 
award; 
(b) Upon showing that the responsible employer has filed a petition under any section of 
the Federal Bankruptcy code; or 
(c) The plaintiff or any other party in interest has filed in the circuit court of the county 
where the injury occurred an action pursuant to KRS 342.305 to enforce payment of the 
award against the uninsured employer, and there has been default in payment of the judg-
ment by the employer. 
(2) The plaintiff may by motion and affidavit demonstrate compliance with this section and 
request an [amitr-ater or) administrative law judge to order payment from the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund in accordance with KRS 342.760. 
(3) This section shall not be construed to prohibit the voluntary payment of compensation 
by an employer, or any other person liable for the payment, who has failed to secure pay-
ment of compensation as provided by KRS Chapter 342, the compromise and settlement of 
a claim, or the payment of benefits by the Special Fund. 
(4) The form, Motion for Payment frOfn Uninsured Employers' Fund, provided by the 
department may be used by the employee. 
Section ~28). Use of American Medical Association Guidelines in Coal Workers' Pneu-
moconiosis Cases. (1) Predicted normal values for FVC and FEV1 shall be determined in 
accordance with the latest ed,ition of the American Medical Association Guideline. Age shall 
be determined as of the date of the evaluation. Height shall be measured while the plaintiff 
stands in his stocking feet and shall be rounded to the nearest centimeter. If the plaintiffs 
height is an odd number of centimeters, the next highest even height in centimeters shall be 
u5cd. 
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(2) Formulas established by the guidelines for predicted normal FVC and FEV1 shall be 
applied and predicted values computed. 
Section l§{29). Request for Participation by the Kentucky Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis 
~ (1) Following a final award or order approving settlement of a claim for coal workers' 
pneumoconiosis benefits pursuant to KRS 342.732, the employer shall tender a written 
request for participation to the Kentucky coal workers' pneumoconiosis fund within thirty (30) 
days. This request shall be in writing and upon a form supplied by the Director of the Ken-
tucky Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis fund and shall be accompanied by the following docu-
ments: 
(a) Plaintiffs application for resolution of claim; 
(b) Defendant's notice of resistance, notice of claim denial or acceptance, and any special 
answer; 
(c) All medical evidence upon which the award or settlement was based; 
(d) Final [beRelit revie ..... eeteR'RiAatioA,) opinion, or order of an [amilrator or) administrative 
law judge determining liability for benefits, or order approving settlement agreement. If an 
administrative law judge's award was appealed, appellate opinions shall be attached; 
(e) If the request for participation includes retraining incentive benefits under KRS 
342.732, the employer shall certify that the plaintiff meets the relevant statutory criteria; 
(I) If the request for participation is for settlement of a claim, the employer shall certify that 
the settlement agreement represents liability for benefits in the claim, and does not include 
any sums for other claims which the plaintiff may have against the employer. 
(2) Within thirty (30) days following receipt of a completed request for partiCipation, the 
director shall notify the employer and all other parties of acceptance or denial of the request. 
(3) A denial shall bfl marie upon a finding by the director that the employer failed to defend 
the claim or entered Into a settlement agreement not supported by the medical evidence or 
which was procured by fraud or mistake. Denial shall be In writing and shall state the specific 
reasons· for the director's action. . 
(4) Denial of a request for participation may be appealed to an administrative law judge 
within thirty (30) days follOwing receipt. The administrative law judge shall determine if the 
denial was arbitrary, capricious, or in excess of the statutory authority of the director, and 
shall not reexamine the weight assigned to evidence by an [amilraler er) administrative law 
judge in a benefit review determination or award. 
(5) The employer shall promptly commence payment on all of the liability pursuant to the 
benefit review determination, award, or order and shall continue until the liability of the 
Kentucky Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis fund is established. This duty of prompt payment 
shall continue during pendency of an appeal from denial of a request for participation. 
(6) Upon an appeal from the denial of a request for participation, if the Kentucky Coal 
Workers' Pneumoconiosis fund does not prevail, it shall reimburse the employer for its 
proportionate share of the liability together with interest at the rate established in KRS 
342.040 . . 
[SeslioA a9 . • ~ssigAmeAt 10 Jl.milrators. (1) Tho assigAmeAI 01 appropriate slaims to arbi 
trators IlYrSyaAt to KRS a42.279(2) shall begiA Marsh 16, 1997. 
(2) ProvisioAs iA this aemiAistratjt,'e regYlatioA ..... hish allllly solely to praslis~ beloro aA 
amitrator shall allply 10 slaims ..... hish are assigAee te aA arbitralor pyrsyaAI to KRS 
a42.279(2) aAe SeslioA 29(1) ollhis aemiAistrali\'e re!JylalioA.] 
Section l§{61-). Forms. After March 15, 1997, the Department of Workers Claims shall not 
accept applica:ions or forms in use prior to the fOiffiS rcqt;ired by and incorporated by rE'fer-
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ence in this administrative regulation. Outdated applications or forms submitted after March 
15, 1997 shall be rejected and retumed to the applicant or person submitting the form. If the 
application or form is resubmitted on the proper form within twenty (20) days of the date it 
was returned, the filing shall date back to the date the application or form was first received 
by the commissioner. Otherwise, the date of the second receipt shall be the filing date. 
Section 2Z(32). Incorporation by Reference. (1) The following material is incorporated by 
reference: 
(a) Form 101, "Application for Resolution of Injury Claim", (January 1, 1997 Edition), 
Department of Workers Claims; 
(b) Form 102, "Application for Resolution of Occupational Disease Claim", (January 1, 
1997 Edition), Department of Workers Claims; 
(c) Form 103, "Application for Resolution of Hearing Loss Claim", (January 1, 1997 Edi-
tion), Department of Workers Claims; 
(d) Form 104, "Plaintiff's Employment History", (January 1, 1997 Edition), Department of 
Workers Claims; 
(e) Form 105, "Plaintiffs Chronological Medical History", (January 1, 1997 Edition), De-
partment of Workers Claims; 
(f) Form 106, "Medical Waiver and Consent", (January 1, 1997 Edition), Department of 
Workers Claims; 
(g) Form 107-1, "Me<f1Ca1 Report - Injury", (January 1, 1997 Edition), Department of Work-
ersClaims; 
(h) Form 107-P, "Medical Report - Psychological", (January 1, 1997 Edition), Department 
of Workers Claims; 
(i) Form 108-00, ·Medical Report - Occupational Disease, (January 1,1997 Edition), 
~ -"~----- - - --:1 
Department of Workers Claims; 
0) Form 1 08-CWP, "Medical Report - Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis", (January 1, 1997 
Edition), Department of Workers Claims; 
(k) Form 108-HL, "Medical Report - Hearing Loss", (January 1, 1997 Edition), Department 
of Workers Claims; 
(I) Form 109, "Attomey Fee Election", (March 15, 1995 Edition), Department of Workers 
Claims; 
(m) Form 110-1, "Agreement - Injury", (April 15, 1998 Edition), Department of Workers 
Claims; 
(n) Form 110-0, "Agreement - Occupational Disease", (April 15, 1998 Edition), Depart-
ment of Workers Claims; 
(0) Form l11-lnjury and Hearing Loss, "Notice of Claim Denial or Acceptance", (January 
1, 1997 Edition), Department of Workers Claims; 
(p) Form 111-00, "Notice of Claim Denial or Acceptance", (January 1, 1997 Edition), 
Department of Workers Claims; 
(q) Form 115, "Sodal Security Release Form", (January 1,1997 Edition); and Department 
of Workers Claims; 
(r) Form AWW - 1, "Average Weekly Wage Form", (January 1, 1997 Edition), Department 
of Workers Claims; 
(s) Lump Sum Settlement Tables, (April 15, 1997 Edition), Department of Workers Claims; 
(t) Six (6) Percent Present Value Table (May, 1997 Edition); 
(u) Form MIR-l, Motion for Interlocutory Relief (May 29, 1997 Edition); 
(v) Form MIR-2, Affidavit for Payment of Medical Expenses (May 29,1997 Edition); 
(w) Form MIR-3, Affidavit for Payment of Temporary Total Disability (May 29, 1997 Edi-
tion); 
t'Tj 
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(x) Form MIR-4, Affidavit Regarding Rehabilitation Services (May 29, 1997 Edition); 
(y) Form VRT, Petition for Vocational Rehabilitation Training (May 29, 1997 Edition); 
(z) Form MTR-1, Motion to Reopen by Employee (May 29, 1997 Edition); 
(aa) Form MTR-2, Motion to Reopen KRS 342.732 Benefits (May 29,1997 Edition); 
(bb) Form MTR-3, Motion to Reopen by Defendant (May 29, 1997 Edition); 
(ee) Form WVR, Joint Motion and Agreement to Waive Vocational Rehabilitation Evalua-
tion (May 29,1997 Edition); 
(dd) Form UEF-P, Motion for Payment from Uninsured Employers' Fund (May 29,1997 
Edition). 
(2) This material may be inspected copied or obtained at the Department of Workers' 
Claims Monday through Friday, 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. at the following locations: 
(a) Frankfort - Perimeter Pai1< West, Building C, 1270 louisville Road, Frankfort, Kentucky 
40601; 
(b) Paducah· 220B North 8th Street, Paducah, Kentucky 42001; and 
(c) Pikeville - 412 Second Street, Pikeville, Kentucky 41501. (21 Ky.R. 2576; Am. 3032; 
eft. 6-15-95; 22 Ky.R. 2071; eft. 7-5-96; 23 Ky.R. 3958; 24 Ky.R. 349; eft. 7-17-97; 2436; eft. 
7-13-98.) 
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ADJUSTMENTS IN PRACTICE METHODS 
AND ADVOCACY STRATEGIES 
FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION COUNSEL -
UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES 
DONNA H. TERRY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
I. UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES FOR GENERAL 
INSURANCE CLAIMS 
A. KRS 304.12-230 adopted 1984; amended 1998. 
B. Administrative regulations at 806 KAR 12:092 (health insurance) and 806 
KAR 12:095 (property/casualty insurance). . Specific exclusion for workers' 
compensation claims from these regulations. 
II. UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES IN WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION CLAIMS 
A. KRS 342.267 adopted December 12, 1996. 
1. Applicable to all insurance carriers, self-insurance groups, and 
self-insured employers. 
2. Commissioner is empowered to assess fines of $1,000 to $5,000 
for each violation. 
3. For a pattern of violations, Commissioner may revoke self-
insurance certificate or request that Insurance Commissioner revoke 
certificate of insurance carrier. 
B. KRS 342.267 incorporates by reference all provisions ofKRS 304.12-230. 
C. 803 KAR 25:240 establishes standards for conduct in workers' 
compensation claims by carriers in file and record documentation, notice of policy 
provisions, claims investigation, prompt notification and payment, equitable 
settlement provisions, and acknowledgement of communications. 
1. FILE AND RECORD DOCUMENTATION -
a. All claim files must be readily accessible and retrievable 
for examination by Commissioner. If carrier does not maintain 
F - 1 
c. An employee should not be forced to file a claim in order to 
recover benefits. 
d. Carrier should not offer settlement of "substantially less" 
than value of claim. 
e. Threat of appeal should not be used to compel settlement 
for less than value of ALJ award. 
£ Employee should not be required to obtain information 
which is readily accessible to carrier. 
6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF COMMINICATIONS 
a. Carrier must furnish full response within 15 days to 
inquiries from DWC. 
b. Carrier must make "prompt and appropriate" reply to 
employee communications. 
D. COMPLAINTS AND INVESTIGATION PROCESS 
1. Complaints received through several avenues. 
a. DWC Division of Workers' Compensation Specialists - 24 
employees, including 4 attorneys - receive telephone complaints. 
b. Letters to Governor, Specialists, legislators, etc. 
c. Attorneys file complaints. 
d. ALJ opinion and award may request UCP investigation. 
2. DWC Investigation 
a. Specialists and Ombudsmen attempt mediation in order to 
expedite benefits or resolve dispute. 
b. If mediation fails or is inappropriate, complaint is assigned 
to Workers' Compensation Specialist attorney for investigation. 
c. Attorney Specialist sends report to Division Director who is 
also an attorney. 
d. Director sends memorandum to Commissioner with 
recommendation. 
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hard copies, infonnation must be capable of ready duplication into 
legible hard copy. 
b. All claim files must contain documentation of the 
foundation for carrier's actions. 
c. Each document must contain notation re: date received, 
date processed, or date mailed. 
d. Claim file must be maintained for 5 years. 
2. NOTICE OF POLICY PROVISIONS AND COVERAGE. 
a. Affinnative duty to provide adequate notice of policy 
provisions, coverage, and benefits. 
b. Failure to po~t workplace notice required by KRS 
342.610(6) is UCSP. 
3. DUTY TO INVESTIGATE 
~. . Must diligently investigate facts of claim after notice or 
Injury. 
4. STANDARDS FOR PROMPT AND TIMELY ACTIONS 
a. Employee must be notified "as soon as practicable" 
whether claim will be accepted or denied. Specific reasons must 
be given in writing for denial of a claim. 
b. If a carrier needs additional infonnation, it shall infonn 
claimant ofthat addition infonnation. 
c. Indemnity benefits shall be paid within 15 days after award 
or order becomes final, or within 15 days after an 
acknowledgement of disability or death. KRS 342.040. 
5. STANDARDS OF FAIR AND EQlITT ABLE SETTLEMENTS 
a. Good faith requirement to promptly pay claim in which 
liability is clear. 
b. Carrier shall not misrepresent facts or law with regard to a 
claim. 
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e. Commissioner Turner may refer matter back to Division of 
OmbudsmenIW orkers' Compensation Specialists for more 
information or forward to Office of General Counsel for review. 
f. Show Cause Order issued, if appropriate. Commissioner 
determines whether good cause shown. 
3. Show Cause Hearing - 803 KAR 25:015 
a. Prior to issuance of citation for alleged violation of the 
Workers Compensation Act, Commissioner may issue show cause 
order. 
b. Show cause order shall contain detailed explanation of 
alleged violations, including statutory references, date, time, and 
location of show cause hearing, ~d identity of any hearing officer 
other than Commissioner. 
c. Show cause hearing is deemed "informal" although 
transcript is taken by court reporter. 
d. Attendance is mandatory. 
e. All show cause hearings thus far have resulted in an agreed 
order. 
f. If no agreement, hearing officer shall issue recommended 
findings of fact and conclusions of law to Commissioner who may 
issue citation, issue statement that no citation is warranted, or 
request additional evidence for review. 
E. ISSUANCE OF CITATION 
1. Notice of Citation of Penalty shall be hand-delivered or delivered 
by certified mail. 
2. Written Notice of Contest must be filed within 15 days thereafter. 
3. If Notice of Contest is not timely filed, citation is deemed final and 
penalty must be paid. 
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F. HEARING UPON NOTICE OF CONTEST 
1. Matter shall be assigned to an ALJ, who may require stipulations 
of uncontested facts and lists of witnesses and exhibits no later than 5 days 
prior to hearing. 
2. Prehearing orders may be issued. 
3. ALJ will conduct fonnal hearing under KRS Chapter 13B. 
4. Proof may be submitted at hearing or by deposition. 
5. ALJ will detennine whether Commissioner's citation was properly 
assessed and issue final order in accordance with KRS 342.990(5) and 
KRS 13B.120. 
G. APPEAL OF ALJ FINAL ORDER TO FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT 
OR PAYMENT OF PENALTY 
F - 5 
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SECTION G 
KENTUCKY WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
SUMMARY OF 1999 PUBLISHED COURT OPINIONS 
APPORTIONMENT 
Whittaker v. Perry, 
Ky., 988 S.W.2d 497 (1999) . 
Perry was injured on 9115/94 when he was struck on the chin by a bar while strapping down logs 
on the back of his truck. The only medical evidence with regard to the question of 
apportionment was given by Dr. Eggers, the treating neurosurgeon. He testified that an MRI 
scan revealed a large C6-C7 disc herniation. He indicated that the type of injury which Perry had 
received could cause a disc to rupture in the presence of degenerative disease, and that Perry' s 
injury had caused his disc to rupture. It was his opinion that Perry had pre-existing degenerative 
disc disease at the time of the injury, because a normal disc would not be expected to rupture 
under those circumstances. He concluded that one-half of Perry's 8% functional impairment was 
due to the injury, itself, and one-half was due to the arousal of the pre-existing condition. ALl 
found 20% PPD and apportioned equally between the employer and Special Fund. WCB, CA 
and SC affirmed. 
The Special Fund asserts that there was insufficient evidence of a prior, dormant condition such 
as would support apportionment of the award. Related arguments are that there was no evidence 
that degenerative disc disease constituted a departure from the nornlal state of health for a 42-
year-old laborer or that the condition would eventually become disabling of its own accord. 
Dr. Eggers' testimony makes it clear that degenerative disc disease is a departure from the 
normal state of health, that it is progressive in nature, that the condition existed but was 
dormant prior to Perry's injury, and that the condition was aroused into disability by the injury. 
It is apparent that degenerative disc disease is not a mere characteristic, but is the type of 
condition for which the Special Fund bears liability. 
COMMENT: This decision may provide some ammunition for the plaintiffs argument on the 
1996 amendments that degenerative disc disease is not part of the natural aging process. 
Whittaker v. Troutman, 
Ky. , 7 S.W.3d 363 (1999). 
Troutman was severely burned and also developed significant and disabling mental problems. 
The employer moved to join the Special Fund. ALJ denied the motion. WCB reversed. CA and 
SC affirmed. 
The Special Fund relies on Fisher Packing Co. V. Lanham, Ky., 804 S.W.2d 4, (1991), for the 
proposition that any mental disability caused by a compensable injury must be apportioned the 
same as the underlying physical disability; ergo, since there was no apportionment of 
Troutman's physical disability, there can be no apportionment of his mental disability and the 
employer is liable for the entire award. This argument ignores the factual and legal bases for our 
decision in Lanham. There was no separate apportionment in Lanham because there was no 
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evidence that Lanham's mental disability was caused by the arousal of a pre-existing dormant, 
mental condition into disabling reality. Thus, KRS 342.120 did not apply. Here, there is such 
evidence. Thus, KRS 342.120 does apply and the ALl should have joined the Special Fund as a 
party to these proceedings. 
ATTORNEY FEE 
Baker v. Shamrock Coal Company. Inc., 
Ky., 985 S.W.2d 755 (1999). 
Baker was a working miner who was not engaged in retraining and whose claim was pending on 
April 4, 1994. On 10/6/97, ALl entered a RIB award for the following 208 consecutive weeks. 
The award was entered in compliance with Meade v. Spud Mining, Ky., 949 S.W.2d 584 (1997), 
which meant that he could not collect RIB (retraining incentive benefits) until he stopped 
working in the coal mining industry. The Supreme Court held that the award of the plaintiffs 
attorney fee is premature until such time as the claimant is entitled to receive the RIB. 
Earthgrains v. Cranz, 
Ky. App., 999 S.W.2d 218 (1999). 
The employer challenged the constitutionality ofKRS 342.320(2)(c), which requires an employer 
to pay up to $5,000.00 in an attorney fee to the plaintiffs attorney if the employer appeals a 
benefit review determination of an arbitrator or an order of an ALl and does not prevail. The 
Court held that the amendment was constitutional. The discrepancy of financial resources 
available to an employer and its insurance carrier is comparison to the financial resources 
available to a partially or wholly disabled employee is a rational basis sufficient to justify 
requiring employers to pay attorney fees upon losing an appeal, while not requiring employees 
to do likewise. 
COMMENT: This issue has been appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court in another City of 
Louisville v. Slack, 98-CA-2330-WC. 
Duff Truck Lines. Inc. v. VezoIles, 
Ky. App., 999 S.W.2d 224 (1999). 
Vezolles was injured on 8/30/85. He settled in 1989 for a lump sum payment. In 1997, the 
employer filed a motion to reopen to contest its liability for chiropractic expenses. The 
Arbitrator found the chiropractic treatment to be reasonable and necessary. Duff appealed to the 
ALl, who also found the treatment to be reasonable and necessary. Scott Miller filed a motion 
for approval of an attorney fee in the amount of $500.00. ALl denied the motion on the ground 
that no additional income benefits were recovered. WCB reversed, holding that the attorney was 
entitled to an appropriate recompense to be taken from the amount recovered in medical benefits. 
CA affinned. 
KRS 342.320 does not confine the award of attorney fee to actions involving income benefits. 
The claim was remanded to the ALl for a determination of the amount of an appropriate attorney 
fee and the method of payment. 
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COMMENT: The Kentucky Supreme Court had hinted in two prior decisions that a plaintiffs 
attorney is entitled to an attorney fee based upon the recovery of medical benefits. According to 
Scott Miller, the ALJ on remand ordered that the $500.00 fee be paid by the insurance 
company by withholding that amount from the amount to be paid to the chiropractor. The 
ALl also awarded Mr. Miller an additional $3,200.00 attorney fee from the employer for its 
failure to prevail on appeal. 
AVERAGE WEEEKL Y WAGE 
Hale v. Bell Aluminum, 
Ky., 986 S.W.2d 152 (1999). 
Hale worked for Bell in the installation of aluminum siding. At the same time, Hale operated his 
own aluminum siding business. He would complete his own jobs in between those for which he 
was hired by Bell. Hale was injured while working for Bell on 8/25/95. An unsigned federal 
income tax return was introduced which showed that Hale 's earnings for 1995 amounted to 
$14,466.45. Hale's earnings for the 13 weeks prior to the injury consisted of the following: 
Domino Partners - Bluegrass 
6/30/95 - 7/3/95 $2,038.76 
Bell Aluminum 
6/30/95 - 8/1/95 1,367.14 
Gatchell's - Market Street 
7/27/95 - 8/19/95 5,966.28 
Bell Aluminum 
8/23/95 - 8/25/95 766.00 
ALl found that the average weekly wage was sufficient to justify maximum benefits, based upon 
his earnings with Bell, regardless of whether or not his self-employment income is considered. 
WCB affirmed. CA reversed. SC affirmed. 
It has previously been held that a worker's wages from a concurrent employment relationship are 
not to be included in the computation of the workers'; average weekly wage pursuant to KRS 
342.120(3) when such employment has been specifically excluded from coverage under the Act. 
Since it has previously been determined that independent contractors are not employees and, 
thus, fall outside the scope of the Act, Hale's earnings as an independent contractor per his own 
aluminum siding company should not be added to those wages earned per Bell in order to 
compute his average weekly wage. 
Subsection ( e) of KRS 342.140( 1), i.e. the less than 13 week employee, should be utilized in 
computing Hale's average weekly wage. Such application allows for a true reflection of Hale's 
actual weekly earning capacity with Bell. Namely, not unlike the situation in C & D Bulldozing 
v. Brock, Ky., 820 S.W.2d 482 (1991), Hale's employment periods with Bell were sporadic due 
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to the nature of the employment relationship, and it is only appropriate to conclude that Hale's 
wages would have continued to be the same based on the pattern of his actual employment with 
Bell. Thus, we are persuaded that Hale's average weekly wage is to be calculated by dividing 
what he received from Bell during the five week period by 13. This results in an average weekly 
wage of$164.00. 
COMMENT: There was no reason to publish this opinion, as it is simply an application of 
Brock and not a new announcement of law. 
Huff v. Smith Truckint:, 
Ky., 6 S.W.3d 819 (1999). 
Smith bought timber rights to a parcel of land and hired Huff as a timber cutter. Huff and Smith 
were the only persons working on the tract. Smith anticipated that the project would take 15 to 
20 days of actual work, however, it was expected to extend over a longer period because the work 
could only be performed in good weather. Huff was paid a daily wage of $75.00 for the days 
that he worked. Huff worked for five days over a two-week period when he sustained a head 
injury on January 18, 1993. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the most appropriate 
way to measure average weekly wage would be to divide the total salary ($375.00) by the 
number of weeks worked (2) to produce a figure of $187.50. Workers' Compensation Board 
reversed and remanded to the Administrative Law Judge for further findings and for a 
determination of average weekly wage pursuant to KRS 342.140 (1) (e). WCB construed the 
statute to provide that the average weekly wage should reflect what the claimant would have 
earned had he been employed for a full 13 weeks in the same occupation before being injured and 
that this could be based upon evidence concerning whether work was available to workers 
employed by other employers. On remand, the Administrative Law Judge detennined from 
Huffs testimony that timber cutting work was available in the area where he resided and that 
typically it pays $75.00 per day. Based upon that evidence, the Administrative Law Judge 
concluded that the average weekly wage was $375.00. WCB affirmed. CA reversed, concluding 
that there was no evidence concerning the practices of other employers and no substantial 
evidence that Huff would have worked every day and earned $375.00 per week. CA was 
persuaded by the employer's argument that Huffs total earnings of $375.00 must be divided by 
13 weeks to yield and average weekly wage of $28.85. SC reversed. 
Although KRS 342.140 (1 ) (e) may be less than artfully drafted with regard to a casual labor 
situation, it is clear that casual laborers are not exempted from workers' compensation coverage 
under the Act and that no special provision has been enacted for computing their average weekly 
wage. The same holds true for workers employed by newly established businesses which have 
been in operation for less than 13 weeks when a work injury occurs. 
In view of the unique facts which were present in this case, we conclude that the Board properly 
construed KRS 342.140 (1) ( e) as authorizing a consideration of evidence concerning the wages 
earned by timber cutters who worked for other employers in the area where the claimant lived 
and concerning the availability of such work. We are persuaded that claimant's uncontradicted 
testimony sufficiently demonstrated that timber cutting work was available at $75.00 per day in 
the area in which he resided. It is clear, however, that in arriving at an average weekly wage of 
$375.00, the Administrative Law Judge and Board failed to consider the effect of the weather 
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upon the average weekly wage that Huff could reasonably have expected to earn as a timber 
cutter during the 13 weeks preceding his injury. The only evidence in that regard came from 
Huffs actual experience and indicated that the weather permitted timber cutting approximately 
50 percent of the time. In view of the uncontradicted evidence, we conclude that there was no 
substantial evidence indicating Huff would have worked everyday during the relevant 13-week 
period. The claim was remanded to the Administrative Law Judge for the entry of an award 
based upon an average weekly wage of $187.50, which was calculated by $75.00 per day 
multiplied by 5 days per week multiplied by 50 percent weather factor. 
CALCULATION OF BENEFITS 
Robinson v. Bailey Minin~ Company, 
Ky., 996 S.W.2d 38 (1999) . 
Robinson severed his left forearn1 in 1980 while employed by Bailey Mining Co. That claim was 
settled for a lump sum payment representing 78.268% PPD. He returned to work, and was 
injured on 1/8/94 while working for Consol of Kentucky. He filed a claim for the 1994 injury and 
a motion to reopen the 1980 injury. AU found 100% permanent total disability, and 
apportioned 50% to prior active disability due to the 1980 injury and 50% due to psychiatric 
residuals of the 1994 injury. ALJ awarded 50% PTD benefits for the 1980 injury based upon 
Campbell v. Sextet Mining Company, Ky., 912 S.W.2d 25 (1995). WCB reversed the 
application of Sextet. CA and SC affirn1ed. 
The imposition of additional liability pursuant to reopening is authorized only in those instances 
where an increase in occupational disability is the direct and proximate result of the injury which 
is the subject of the award. 
COMMENT: A few of the demons were recaptured and put back into Pandora's box. 
Coots v. Whittaker, 
Ky., 998 S.W.2d 491 (1999). 
Coots settled with the employer. ALJ found 100% disability due to cwp (coal worker's 
pneumoconiosis, more commonly known as black lung), and apportioned 75% to the Special 
Fund. ALJ also found 70% PPD due to injury, and apportioned 50% to the Special Fund. ALJ 
required the Special Fund to pay both awards during the 520 weeks that the awards overlapped 
up to a maximum weekly benefit of $415.94, which was the statutory maximum for total 
disability. After the 520 weeks, the Special Fund was ordered to pay its share of the cwp award 
($311.96 per week), until benefit were tiered down at age 65. WCB, CA, and SC affirmed. 
Computation of the Special Fund's share of the combined benefits for each of the 520 weeks that 
the two awards overlap may be summarized as follows: 
1. Compute the effective amount of the weekly occupational disease benefit as follows: 
Maximum weekly benefit for 100% disability $415 .94 
Less weekly injury benefit -218.37 
Effective weekly occupational disease benefit $197.57 
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II. Compute the Special Fund's liability for each weekly benefit. 
Injury: 50% of $218.37 
Disease: 75%of$197.57 
III. The sum of its liabilities for the two benefits equals the Special Fund's combined weekly 
liability. 
50% of injury benefit $109.19 
75% of disease benefit +148.18 
TOTAL $257.37 
COMMENT: These black lung and injury combination calculation cases are very boring and 
tedious. Memo to the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court: Please stop publishing these 
cases!!!! ! 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Shamrock Coal Company v. Maricle, 
Ky.,5 S.W.3d 130 (1999). 
Nineteen fonner employees of Shamrock filed a civil action in Leslie Circuit Court alleging that 
they contracted coal worker's pneumoconiosis as a consequence of their employment and were 
entitled to damages. The plaintiffs alleged that Shamrock was negligent, careless, and reckless in 
its mining operations, and conducted its operations in gross disregard of their health, safety, and 
welfare. They also alleged that Shamrock intentionally violated safety procedures established by 
statutes and regulations. The plaintiffs alleged that they contracted category 1 cwp and have 
respiratory of less than 20%. All 19 employees would potentially have been entitled to RIB 
under the Act prior to the 1996 amendments, but they are not entitled to any benefit after the 
1996 amendments. . 
Shamrock filed a motion to dismiss based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction, CR 12.01(a), 
and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Judge Maricle held that the 
exclusive remedy provision of KRS 342.732 was unconstitutional because it denied the plaintiffs 
a jural right to a remedy. Judge Maricle also ruled that the opt out provisions of the Act were 
unconstitutional because it amounts to a waiver by mere inaction of the right to bring a tort 
action. 
Shamrock sought a writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeals, which was denied. The Court 
held that the judge had jurisdiction because the pleadings alleged intentional acts. The Court of 
Appeals also held that the exclusive remedy provision of the Act does not confer exclusive 
jurisdiction on the DWC to decide matters within the purview of the Act, but is merely an 
affinnative defense that must be pled and proven in circuit court. SC reversed. 
In the case at bar, the plaintiffs brought suit under the Workers' Compensation Act. Therefore, 
Shamrock, on the face of the complaint, was entitled to the protection of the exclusive liability 
provision. Consequently, the Leslie Circuit court has no subject matter jurisdiction over this 
case, and the writ is appropriate. 
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This Court specifically upheld the constitutionality of the presumptive acceptance provision of 
the Workers' Compensation Act in Wells v. Jefferson County, Ky., 255 S.W.2d 462 (1953). We 
find nothing raised herein which compels us to revisit the issue and, therefore, we reaffirm our 
decision in Wells. 
Shamrock's exclusive liability to the plaintiffs is workers' compensation benefits. There is no 
other remedy available. There was no common law cause of action for non-disabling category 
one pneumoconiosis in existence at the time of the adoption of the present Constitution; 
therefore the jural rights doctrine is inapplicable. Regardless, the fact that a remedy for a work-
related injury is unavailable under the Workers' Compensation Act does not authorize bringing a 
civil action for damages in circuit court. 
Absent willful and unprovoked physical aggression by an employee, officer, or director, there is 
no exception to the exclusive liability provision of the Act. 
COMMENT: Justice Graves pointed out in his dissent that the Court did not explain why the 
plaintiffs are not entitled to a remedy in circuit court if a remedy for their injuries is not available 
to them in KRS Chapter 342, and if the Kentucky Constitution guarantees a remedy for any 
injury. Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution provides as follows: All courts shall be open, 
and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial 
or delay. (This author does not pretend to be a constitutional law scholar, but it appears that 
Justice Graves has presented an argument that the Court did not adequately address.) 
In discussing the "intentional acts" exception to the exclusive remedy provision, the Court 
considered only the language ofKRS 342.690(1). The Court did not consider KRS 342.610(4), 
which provides: If injury or death results to am employee through the deliberate intention of his 
employer to produce such injury or death, the employee or his dependent *** may bring suit 
against the employer for any amount they desire *** (and) may take under this chapter, or 
in lieu thereof, have a cause of action at law against the employer as if this chapter had 
not been passed, for such damage so sustained by the employee as is recoverable at law. The 
language in KRS 342.690 was taken out of context by the Court. In fact, the language relied upon 
by the Court does not address the exemption from liability given to the employer, but rather the 
extension of that exemption that is given to the employer's carrier and personally to all 
employees, officers, directors or such employer or carrier while acting in the course of their 
employment, unless the injury or death is caused personally by one of those persons through 
unprovoked and willful physical aggression. This part of the decision is a major ruling by the 
Court, that was dispatched with in a single short paragraph. The Supreme Court really laid an 
egg with this part of its decision, and we are all left to speculate about the reasons. Perhaps this 
issue needs to be revisited with the Court when the case does not involve broad issues of 
constitutionality? 
COURSE AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
Phillips v. Jenmar, Inc., 
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Ky., 998 S.W.2d 483 (1999). 
Phillips suffered from alcoholism. A day or two before the accident, he was taken to a clinic for 
emergency medical treatment during working hours by the owner's secretary. Phillips decided to 
quit drinking, and began to suffer symptoms associated with delirium tremens. Phillips returned 
to work at some time before 8:00 a.m. on Friday, experienced severe tremors, fell from a rack, and 
struck his head on concrete. The evidence was conflicting, and the ALJ chose to believe the 
testimony of the employer that he had told Phillips not to return to work until the following 
Monday. ALJ determined that the injury did not occur within the course and scope of the 
employment, and dismissed the claim. Phillips argued that instead of dismissing the claim, the 
ALJ should have only reduced benefits by 15% for a violation of a safety rule. WCB, CA, and 
SC affirmed. 
More was involved than the mere disobedience of an order concerning the manner in which work 
duties should be performed. The employer had an unqualified right to limit the scope of the 
employment, and the employer had expressly ordered the employee not to undertake any work 
on the day in question. The worker's conduct was on a purely voluntary basis, unknown to and 
unaccepted by the employer. Phillips was injured because he disobeyed an order not to work 
due to his physical condition. 
CUMULATNE TRAUMA 
Special Fund v. Clark, 
Ky., 998 S.W.2d 487 (1999). 
In 1985, Clark injured his right knee. He received TTD benefits and returned to work. In 1987, 
he underwent surgery to both knees, and missed five months of work. The benefits were paid 
under the employer's sickness and accident program. He returned to work without restrictions. 
His symptoms grew progressively worse over time. He continued to work until 7/27/94, and 
then underwent a total knee replacement on his left knee. ALJ ruled that Clark suffered an 
injury in 1985, which required surgery in 1987; that the 1985 injury resulted in 30% prior active 
disability; that the 1985 injury was followed by work-related cumulative trauma to Clark's knees 
which became manifest on 7/27/94, and which accounted for 45% PPD. 
WCB reversed on the grounds that the 1985 injury involved only the right knee, and there was no 
evidence that the 1987 surgery on both knees was related to the 1985 injury. On remand, the 
ALJ concluded that the entire 75% PPD was due to cumulative trauma, that the cumulative 
trauma became manifest in 1987, that Clark continued to be subject to cumulative trauma through 
7/27/94, and that his disability progressively increased during the period between his return to 
work from the 1987 surgery until the 1994 surgery. Based upon his conclusion that Clark's 
disability was related to his entire career, of which only 55 weeks came within the two-year 
period of limitations, the ALJ prorated the 75% PPD over Clark's work life, and awarded 
benefits for 3.3% PPD and medical benefits. WCB affinned. CA reversed. SC reversed. 
In Alcan v. Huff, Ky., 2 S.W.3d 96 (1999), we construed the meaning of the term "manifestation 
of disability", as it was used in Randall Co. v. Pendland, Ky. App., 770 S.W.2d 687 (1988), as 
referring to physically and/or occupationally disabling symptoms which lead the worker to 
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discover that a work-related injury ahs been sustained. Once a worker is aware of the 
existence of a disabling condition and the fact that it is caused by work, the worker would also be 
aware that continuing to perform the same or similar duties was likely to cause additional injury. 
For that reason, the rationale which supports the decision in Randall Co. v. Pendland does not 
support tolling the period of limitations for whatever additional injury is caused by trauma 
incurred after the worker discovers the existence of a work-related gradual injury. KRS 
342.185 would operate to prohibit compensation for whatever occupational disability us 
attributable to trauma incurred more than two years preceding the filing of the claim. The claim 
was remanded to the ALl for a finding as to when Clark became aware that work contributed to 
the development of the degenerative condition in his knees. 
Alcan Foil Products v. Huff, 
Ky.,2 S.W.3d 96 (1999). 
Huff, Cox and Grant were long time employees of Alcan. Beginning in 1967, Alcan conducted 
annual audiological examinations of all employees. Each of these three employees had a 
documented hearing loss by the early 1970's, and very little progression of the hearing loss since 
that time. The medical evidence was that any present restrictions on the employees' ability to 
work as a result of hearing loss were the same as would have been imposed in the mid-70's. ALl 
found that each of these three employees was aware of their hearing loss and its cause prior 
to 1985. ALl then found that the three claims, all filed on 9/7/95, were barred by the two-year 
statute of limitations. WCB reversed. CA affirmed. SC reversed and reinstated the ALl 
decision. 
In Randall Co. v. Pendland, Ky. App., 770 S.W.2d 687 (1988), the court concluded that in cases 
where the injury is the result of many mini-traumas, the date for giving notice and the date for 
clocking the statute of limitations begins when the disabling reality of the injuries becomes 
manifest. 
The question remains whether the phrase "manifestation of disability" refers to the physical 
disability or symptoms which cause a worker to discover than an injury has been sustained or 
whether it refers to the occupational disability due to the injury. We conclude that it refers to 
the worker's discovery that an injury had been sustained. Nothing in Pendland indicated 
that the period of limitations should be tolled in instances where a worker discovers that a 
physically disabling injury has been sustained, knows it is caused by work, and fails to file a 
claim until more than two years thereafter simply because he is able to continue performing the 
same work. 
COMMENT: Does Clark in any way change the ruling in Alcan, or is Clark simply an extension 
of Alcan to the fact situation involving the compensability of continuing cumulative trauma that 
occurs after the manifestation of disability? 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
Jecker v. Plumbers' Local 107, 
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Ky. App., 2 S.W.3d 107 (1999). 
In 1993, lecker's application to a five-year apprenticeship program was accepted by Local 107. 
The program required the apprentice to work for member contracors for 1700 hours each year 
and to attend 216 hours of classroom instruction. The apprentices were not paid by Local 107. 
Rather, each contractor paid the apprentice wages for the hours he worked for that contractor. 
The apprentices were not paid for attending the mandatory training classes. On 3/25/94, lecker 
was injured during a training class. AU found that he was an employee of Local 107. WeB 
reversed. CA affinned. 
In Salvation Anny v. Mathews, Ky. App., 847 S.W.2d 751 (1993), the court stated that it is 
axiomatic that one of the threshold requirements in a compensation claim is that the claimant 
must be an employee for hire. Where there is an issue as to whether or not the claimant is an 
employee for hire, the claimant must show that a contract of employment existed between 
him and the purported employer as required by KRS 342.640. Since lecker was injured while 
being instructed in the classroom, as activity for which he received no remuneration from either 
Local 107 or the member contractors, the holding of Salvation Anny v. Mathews was, we 
believe, correctly applied to this case. 
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
Matthews v. G & B Trucking, Inc., 
Ky. App. , 987 S.W.2d 328 (1999). 
Matthews was employed by G & B as a coal truck driver. G & B contracted with Pryamid 
Mining, Inc. to haul coal. G & B was uninsured for workers ' compensation liability. Matthews 
brought a civil action against G & B, and filed a workers ' compensation claim against Pyramid as 
the "up the ladder" employer. The workers' compensation claim was settled. The trial court 
granted summary judgment for G & B finding that Matthews' claim was barred by the exclusive 
remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. CA reversed. 
Pyramid, having become liable for workers ' compensation benefits as the general contractor who 
contracted with an uninsured subcontractor, is immune from tort liability under KRS 
342.690(1). However, we do not agree that Pyramid's statutory immunity should extend to G & 
B. To have protection of the Workers' Compensation Act, KRS 342.690 requires an employer 
to secure payment of compensation as a condition of benefiting from the exclusive liability 
provision. KRS 342.610 and 342.690(1) were not intended to insulate the immediate employer 
from liability if it has failed to obtain coverage. 
EXTRA TERRITORIAL COVERAGE 
HANEY V. BUTLER, 
Ky., 990 S.W. 2d 611 (1999). 
Haney Leasing was in the business of hauling cargo on the waterways of Kentucky, Alabama, 
Mississippi, Tennessee, and Louisiana, and was responsible for maintaining the barges and tow 
boats which it leased for use in its operations. Its business offices were located in Paducah. 
Butler was hired in Kentucky and had an office at the Paudcah facility, although he resided near 
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Nashville. There was no evidence that Haney owned or leased any property at an Alabama port 
or maintained a business office in Alabama. Butler acted as a trouble shooter, inspecting casualty 
damage and supervising repairs. Approximately 80% of his work was performed in Alabama, 
although he performed some work in Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Louisiana. There 
was no evidence concerning what portion his work time was spent in each state. On 11129/92 
Butler was sent to Mobile, Alabama to supervise the inspection and repair of a leased tow boat 
and barges which had sustained storm damage. He subsequently died in a vehicular accident near 
Greensboro, Alabama. ALJ determined that there were several places of business in Alabama 
which the corporation operated and that the decedent presumably was working out of one those 
places of business. ALJ concluded that Butler's employment was principally localized in 
Alabama and because there was no evidence that Alabama law did not apply to the claim, the 
ALJ concluded that the claim did not come within the jurisdictional requisites of KRS 342.670; 
therefore, it was dismissed. WCB affirmed. CA reversed. Supreme Court affirmed. 
We conclude that for an employment to be principally localized within a particular state 
for the purpose of KRS 342.379 (4)(d)(1), the employer must either lease or own a location 
in the state at which it regularly conducts its business affairs, and the subject employee 
must regularly work at or from that location. There was no substantial evidence that Haney 
Leasing maintained a place of business in Alabama. Because neither party disputes the finding 
that the employment was not principally localized in Kentucky and because there is no 
substantial evidence that the employment was principally localized in Alabama, Tennessee, or 
any other state, it must be concluded that Kentucky has jurisdiction over the claim pursuant to 
KRS 342.670 (1)(b). 
COMMENT: It would have been a much more simple and correct resolution of this appeal to 
have ruled that Butler worked at or from the office in Paducah. The primary impact of this case 
being published is that it will now become more difficult to determine when an employee works 
at or from a business location. If these facts were not enough to make that conclusion, then what 
does "working from" a business location mean? 
FUNCTIONAL IMP A1Rl\ffiNT 
\Vhittaker v. Johnson, 
Ky., 987 S.W.2d 320 (1999). 
Johnson sustained a back injury in 1995, and returned to light duty work at full wages. ALJ 
found that the injury resulted in 2.5% functional impairnlent to the body as a whole, but that the 
injury had not resulted in any appreciable degree of pennanent occupational disability. ALJ 
awarded income benefits based upon the functional impairment rating. WCB and CA affirmed. 
SC reversed. 
Just as KRS 342.730(1)(c) [formerly KRS 342.730 (1)(b)] requires the worker to have sustained 
at least some occupational disability as a threshold requirement for becoming entitled to an award 
of income benefits for permanent partial disability, the amended version of KRS 342. 730( 1 )(b) 
requires the worker to have sustained at least some occupational disability before becoming 
entitled to such an award. Cook v. Paducah Recapping Service, Inc., Ky., 694 S.W.2d 684 
G-ll 
(1985). 
COMMENT: It would have been nice for employers to have had this opinion from the Court 
while they were still litigating the bulk of the 1994 Amendment claims. With our super-fast track 
litigation, by the time the Supreme Court decides what the law means, most of the claims for 
which that law applies have already been adjudicated by the original fact-finder. Then, there is 
the specter of the $5,000.00 attorney fee if the employer appeals and does not prevail, which has 
a chilling affect on the employer's right to appeal issues such as this. Prior to this decision, there 
were several unpublished Court of Appeals opinions holding to the contrary, and the Arbitrators 
and ALl's generally did not agree that Cook applied to 1994 Amendment claims. That is small 
consolation for the employers that did not appeal the incorrect application of the law in hundreds 
or thousands of claims that this ruling could have affected. 
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
KI USA Corp. v. Hall, 
Ky., 3 S.W.2d 355 (1999). 
On 6/5/97, Hall filed a claim for an injury on 3/21/95. Following the benefit review conference, 
the Arbitrator entered an order placing the claim in abeyance and ordering the employer to pay 
interlocutory TTD and medical benefits to continue until further order. ALl denied the 
employer's appeal as having been brought from a non-final, non-appealable order. WCB, CA, 
and SC affinned. 
We are persuaded that the conclusion which we reached in Ramada Inn v. Thomas remains valid 
after the 12112/96 amendments to the Act. We conclude that a "benefit review determination" is 
a written document which resolves "all matters at issue" with regard to a particular claim and, 
therefore, does not include an interlocutory award ofTTD. An arbitrator's order granting 
interlocutory benefits is not a "final order" as defined in 803 KAR 25:010, Section 12(1) and, 
therefore, may not be directly appealed to an ALl. 
COMMENT: This opinion has been a soundly criticized by the defense bar, who have 
experienced awards of interlocutory relief when there are material issues of fact and law, and 
when there is no way that the Arbitrator or ALl can later return the employer to its original 
position in the event that the proof ultimately results in an adjudication of less benefits than 
provided by the interlocutory award. 
JOINDER 
Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Turner, 
Ky., 981 S.W.2d 544 (1999). 
Kidd was injured on 7/1/93 while employed by B & E Hydroseeding & Contracting. He filed a 
claim, and the UEF was joined because B & E was uninsured at the time of the injury. On 
12111/95, at the pre-hearing conference, Kidd, the UEF, and the Special Fund agreed to settlement 
for 10% PPD. The agreement was approved on that date, and provided in part that Kidd would 
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be deposed within 90 days to enable UEF to determine whether there was a statutory employer 
from whom it could pursue a claim for reimbursement or subrogation. Kidd's deposition was 
taken, and on 5/30/96, UEF moved to join Coal Mac, Inc. as a statutory employer. The motion 
was overruled. WCB, CA and SC affimled. 
When an award becomes final, relief from its terms may be obtained only if it is reopened 
pursuant to the provisions of KRS 342.125. The tenns of the settlement agreement were 
approved by an ALJ and became a final award which temlinated the action, precluding the 
subsequent joinder of an additional party. No motion to reopen was filed, and the UEF has 
asserted none of the statutory grounds for reopening the award. Furthermore, the evidence upon 
which the UEF bases its assertion that Coal Mac was a statutory employer was available before 
the UEF agreed to settle the claim. UEF may be entitled to relief by means ofa common law 
action for indemnity if it can demonstrate that it discharged an obligation that rightfully should 
have been discharged by Coal Mac. 
COMMENT: There was no reason to publish this opinion. 
OPERATING PREMISES 
Pierson v. Lexington Public Library, 
Ky., 987 S.W.2d 316 (1999). 
Pierson was employed at the main branch of the Library. The Library leased approximately 144 
parking spaces for staff and patrons from the owner of a parking garage which is located adjacent 
to the Library but is a separate structure. Employees were requested to park on the seventh 
floor of the garage, although particular spaces were not reserved for their use. The Library 
provided free parking for its employees. They were required to descend to the first floor in order 
to enter the Library. On 1112/94, Pierson was returning from lunch when the elevator dropped as 
she was exiting and caused her to injure her left knee and elbow. ALJ concluded that the injury 
was compensable. WCB reversed. CA affirmed. SC reversed. 
Workers' compensation legislation was not intended to protect workers against the risks of the 
street. As a general rule, injuries which occur while an employee is on the way to or from the 
worksite are not compensable. This principle is commonly known as the "going and coming 
rule". However, an employer is responsible for work-related injuries that occur on its entire 
"operating premises" and not just at the injured workers' worksite. Whether a particular area 
comes within an employer's operating premises depends on the facts and circumstances of the 
case. Hayes v. Gibson Hart Co., Ky., 789 S.W.2d 775 (1990); K-Mart Discount Stores v. 
Schroeder, Ky., 623 S.W.2d 900 (1981); Harlan Appalachian Regional Hospital v. Taylor, Ky., 
424 S.W.2d 580 (1968); Smith v. Klarer, Ky.;, 405 S.W.2d 736 (1966). 
The facts of this case are not controlled by Hayes. More accurately, they fall somewhere 
between those present in K-Mart and Taylor. The Library did not own, operate, or maintain the 
parking structure, and it was used by the general public as well as the Library. However, the 
evidence also indicates that the Library leased approximately 144 spaces in the structure, 
making it a major customer with some degree of influence over the owner. Furthemlore, 
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the Library influenced claimant's decision over where to park by providing her with free parking 
in that particular garage as a part of its employee benefit package. If claimant had chosen to park 
elsewhere in downtown Lexington, she would have been required to pay the cost of parking 
herself. Under those circumstances, we are persuaded that there were sufficient indicia of 
employer control to support the ALJ's conlclusion that the Library should be responsible for the 
effects of an injury to an employee which occurred in the garage. 
COMMENT: This was bad law. This case should have been ruled by K-Mart, as that case 
cannot legitimately be distinguished from the facts in this claim. According to the defense 
attorney, there was no actual evidence in the record as to whether the Library had any 
influence over the owner of the parking lot. This was apparently merely convenient speculation 
by the court. Other than parking meters on the street, this is the only parking structure within 
several blocks of the library. 
REOPENlliG 
Mountain Clay, Inc, v. Frazier, 
Ky. App., 988 S.W.2d 503 (1999). 
Frazier injured his neck and back as the result of a 6/91 work injury. ALJ found that Frazier 
suffered a compression fracture at T5, but found no permanent disability, and the award made no 
mention of medical benefits. Frazier filed a motion to reopen in 12/96 alleging an increase in 
disability. A different ALI found no increase in disability, but did award medical benefits related 
to the T5 injury. WCB and CA affirmed. 
The first ALI should have awarded medical benefits for the T5 injury in the original opinion. We 
find no reason why the second ALI was precluded from awarding such benefits on reopening. 
KRS 342.125 allows the ALI to reopen and review any award or order ending, diminishing or 
increasing the compensation previously awarded or change or revoke his previous order. 
Wheatly v. Bryant Auto Service, Ky., 800 S.W.2d 767 (1993). 
COMMENT: Why publish a case that applies to only one claim in a million? 
Whitaker v. Rowland, 
Ky., 998 S.W.2d 479 (1999). 
Rowland was injured in 2/87. He settled for a lump sum payment representing 28.84% PPD. 
On 7/3/96, he filed a motion to reopen. ALI found that at the time of settlement, Rowland was 
actually 40% PPD, and that his condition had worsened to 100% PTD. ALI ordered that 
benefits be paid for 100% PTD from the date of the motion to reopen, and allowed the employer 
and Special Fund a credit in the amount of 40% PPD for the period that the original 425 period 
overlapped with the award on reopening. WCB, CA, and SC affirnled. 
Defendants argued that Rowland waived the compensability for 40% of his ultimate disability by 
settling the initial claim, and that credit for the proceeds of the settlement should equal 40% of a 
permanent, total disability award for its entire duration. 
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Rowland's actual occupational disability at settlement was 40%; therefore, it was the benefit for 
a 40% PPD that was compromised for the lump sum, not 40% of the benefits for 100% PTD. 
Rowland was entitled to receive the applicable statutory benefit for total disability, less the 
statutory benefit for 40% PPD during the remainder of the overlapping 425 week period, and 
then was entitled to receive the statutory benefit for total disability. 
RE-OPENING RIB 
Neace v. Adena Processing, 
98-CA-2763-\VC 11124/99 
Neace filed an application for RIB in January of 1994. He submitted X-ray reports from Dr. 
Anderson showing 111 and Dr. Lane showing 110. The claim was settled for a lump sum of 
$16,000. In July 1997, Neace filed a Motion to Re-Open based upon an alleged worsening of his 
pulmonary condition. He submitted the report of Dr. Myers, who interpreted a chest X-ray as 
showing III pneumoconiosis. He also submitted spirometric test results showing values less than 
80% as predicted. Administrative Law Judge dismissed the re-opening. WCB and CA affinned. 
Re-openings are governed by KRS 342.125. That section provides that an affected employee 
may move to re-open his rib claim upon a showing of progression of his previously-diagnosed 
occupational pneumoconiosis resulting from exposure to cold dust and development of 
respiratory impainnent due to that pneumoconiosis. In deternlining whether there was a 
progression in the disease on chest X-ray, the Administrative Law Judge was presented with 
conflicting medical opinions from Dr. Anderson and Dr. Lane. It is well-settled that when the 
medical evidence is conflicting, the question of which evidence to believe is the exclusive province 
of the Administrative Law Judge. The Administrative Law Judge compared the X-ray 
interpretation of Dr. Anderson with the subsequent X-ray interpretation on re-opening by Dr. 
Myers, and found that there had been no progression of the disease. The evidence does not 
compel a contrary result. 
SUBROGA TION 
Jefferson County Board of Education v. Estate of Cowles, 
Ky. App., 982 S.W.2d 224 (1998). 
Stith, an employee of the Board, was injured when the school bus she was driving collided with a 
car driven by Cowles. The Board is self-insured under the Workers' Compensation Act, and it 
paid $11,966.17 to Stith in workers' compensation benefits. Pursuant to KRS 342.700, the 
Board filed suit in circuit court against Cowles to recover the benefits it had paid to Stith. Stith 
subsequently filed a separate suit against Cowles, which was consolidated with the Board's suit. 
Prior to trial, Cowles moved the court to grant her a $10,000 "credit" against the Board's 
subrogation claim. The basis of Cowles' motion was KRS 304.39-060, which "abolished" a 
person's right to recover damages for automobile accidents due to bodily injury, sickness or 
disease to the extent that such injuries are payable by basic reparation benefits (BRB). The 
maximum amount ofBRB is $10,000. Thus, Cowles argued that the Board should not be entitled 
to recover the first $10,000 of BRB since Stith would not be entitled to recover that amount. 
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The trial court granted the motion. CA reversed. 
The issue is apparently one of first impression in the Commonwealth. We do not perceive that 
allowing the Board to recover the first $10,000 in benefits paid to Stith would be allowing the 
Board to have a more elevated status than Stith. If Stith were allowed to recover the $10,000 
from Cowles in addition to the benefits she received from the Board, then she would be enjoying 
double compensation, which is clearly forbidden. No such double compensation would exist if 
the Board recovered the first $10,000 paid to Stith. Rather, such a recovery would merely make 
the Board whole, which appears to be one of the goals of KRS 342.700. Furthermore, if the 
Board is unable to recover the $10,000 in question, then the tort-feasor would avoid any liability 
for that $10,000 while the Board, an innocent party, would be forced to assume that 
responsibility. 
Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Morris, 
Ky., 990 S.W.2d 621 (1999). 
On 12/20/93, Morris was struck and injured (severed leg and closed head injury) by a vehicle 
driven by Tedford while he was loading refuse onto a sanitation truck owned by his employer, 
Medora Sanitation. The sanitation truck was covered by a liability insurance policy purchased by 
Medora and issued by Philadelphia. Medora's workers' compensation carrier paid $200,000 in 
TTD and medical benefits. Morris filed a civil action against Tedford, who was insured by 
Allstate. Allstate tendered its policy limits of $25,000.00, and the claim against Tedford was 
dismissed. Morris then added Philadelphia as a defendant, and sought a declaration of rights as IO 
whether he was entitled to UIM benefits. Circuit court dismissed the amended complaint. Court 
of appeals reversed. SC affirmed. 
The Kentucky Supreme Court decided two issues: 
KRS 342.690( 1), the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, does not 
bar an employee from recovering under-insured motorist benefits (UIM) from his 
employer's motor vehicle insurance policy. 
Any provision in the employer's UIM endorsement, which requires that workers' 
compensation benefits be reduced or set off against the VIM policy limits is 
unenforceable because it is a violation of public policy. 
The Court noted that the Court of Appeals also ruled that workers' compensation benefits 
were properly deducted from the total amount of damages incurred to determine the 
extent to which there remained uncompensated damages to which the VIM coverage would 
apply, but that this issue was not raised on appeal to the Supreme Court. 
COMMENT: When the Supreme Court goes out of its way to identify an issue that was not 
presented on appeal, that is a strong hint to litigants that it would hold contrary to the court 
below. 
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SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS 
Whitaker v. Smith, 
Ky., 998 S. W. 2d 476 (1999). 
Smith was injured on 1/6/84. He filed a claim and was awarded benefits for 100% PTD. Smith 
died on 1110/95 from a nonwork-related cause. On 9/3/96, the widow filed a motion to be 
substituted as a plaintiff for continuation of benefits. Employer did not object. Special Fund, 
relying upon Hammons v. Tremco, Inc., Ky., 887 S.W.2d 336 (1994), filed a special answer on 
10/22/96 asserting that the one-year statute of limitations contained in KRS 395.278 had expired. 
ALl awarded the continuation of benefits. WCB, CA, and SC affirmed. 
This appeal does not concern the revival of an action that was pending and, therefore, abated 
upon the plaintiffs death. It concerns compliance with the provisions of a final workers' 
compensation award with regard to surviving dependents. Unlike a pending action, a judgment 
survives the death of a judgment creditor. For that reason, the rules concerning the survival of a 
pending cause of action do not apply to this case. We view the provision of KRS 342.730 with 
regard to a continuation of benefits to a survivor to be implicit in the terms of the original award. 
Riddle v. Scotty's Development. Inc., 
Ky. App., 7 S.W.3d 395 (1999). 
Riddle was killed at work on 10/18/94. She was not married, but was the mother of four children 
whose ages ranged from 4 to 13. ALl found that her average weekly wage was $8.46, and noting 
that KRS 342.750 contained no provision for a minimum amount of benefits in such a claim, 
awarded the children 50% of that wage, or $4.23 per week during their dependency. On petition 
for reconsideration, benefits were increased to 75% of the average weekly wage, or $6.34 per 
week. The benefits were awarded against the up-the-Iadder employer. WCB reversed on the 
grounds that the ALl failed to find that the uninsured employer was primarily liable for the 
award of benefits, and detennining sua sponte that the award should be increased to the statutory 
minimum of $83.19 per week. The Board relied upon KRS 342.740(2), which it believed clearly 
indicated a legislative intent to provide a minimum benefit rate for death claims. The Board 
remanded the claim to the ALl with directions that the ALl enter an award holding the uninsured 
employer primarily liable for it. On remand, the ALl awarded benefits based upon the statutory 
minimum. WCB reversed, because the employer cited Mills v. Vaughn, Ky. App., 581 S.W.2d 
29 (1979), which specifically held that dependents were not entitled to a minimum weekly death 
benefit. CA affirmed. 
Prior to 1972, KRS 342.070, the predecessor to KRS 342.750, provided for both a maximum and 
a minimum weekly benefit payable for death. In 1972, KRS 342.070 was repealed and replaced 
with KRS 342.750. Since its enactment in 1972, KRS 342.750 has never provided for a minimum 
weekly death benefit. 
VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 
Pinkston v. Teletronics. Inc., 
Ky., 4 S.W.3d 130 (1999). 
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Pinkston was injured in 3/90. He had a GED, had studied electronics, and had a master 
electrician's license. He was awarded benefits for 60% PPD. The ALl also ordered a vocational 
rehabilitation program. Pinkston subsequently enrolled in a 22 month full-time program in major 
appliance repair. Pinkston traveled 97 miles round-trip from his home to the vocational school 
five days per week. The employer voluntarily paid for registration fees, books, and tuition, but 
refused to pay mileage expenses. Pinkston filed a motion to reopen arguing that he was entitled 
to mileage expense, that he was not limited to a 52 week program, and that he was entitled to an 
increase in income benefits to 80% of his average weekly wage during the period of rehabilitation. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the award of mileage expense, even though the statute specifically 
provides that travel was compensable only where rehabilitation requires residence at or near the 
facility or institution, away from the employee's customary residence. Here, claimant could not 
avail himself of the vocational rehabilitation services to which he was entitled without making a 
daily commute of 97 miles. We conclude that because the training facility was a significant 
distance from claimant's customary residence, the payment of mileage would come within the 
travel expenses contemplated by KRS 342.710(4). See C & L Construction v. Cannon, Ky., 884 
S.W.2d 647 (1994). 
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on the issue of allowing 22 months of 
vocational rehabilitation benefits, rather than limiting this to 52 weeks. The statute limits the 
award to 52 weeks, except in unusual cases when by special order of the ALJ after haring and 
upon a finding, determined by sound medical evidence which indicates such further 
rehabilitation is feasible, practical and justifiable. Considering claimant's age (born in 1944) 
and his occupational and educational background, we are persuaded that the medical evidence 
offered in the initial claim was sufficient to support the ALl's determination that the 22 month 
program was compensable. 
The Supreme Court reversed the award of income benefits at the rate of 80% of the average 
weekly wage during the period of rehabilitation. KRS 342.715 authorizes enhanced income 
benefits only where the injured worker is eligible for permanent total disability benefits. 
COMMENT: Justice Cooper presented a well-reasoned dissent on these two issues. He first 
pointed out that the AU based his decision to award benefits in excess of 52 weeks on the 
testimony of the claimant and the director of the school, not on any medical evidence, and went 
on to note that no medical evidence whatsoever was offered in support of this motion for an 
extension of the 52 week period. None of the doctors testified as to the need for rehabilitation 
or whether it should exceed 52 weeks. The Court re-wrote the statute, which specifically does 
not authorize the payment of mileage expenses in this fact situation. Justice Cooper addressed 
the travel expense issue in two pages of text, noting that the majority undertook to provide 
workers' compensation benefits which the legislature has chosen not to provide. 
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EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
Brewer v. Hillard, 
Ky. App., 15 S.W.3d 1 (2000). 
Kenneth Hillard was employed by Consolidated 
Freightways as a local deliveryman. Jeff Brewer was 
employed by CF as a dispatcher and supervisor. 
~rrnrrlinn ~n gill~rrl hpninninn in lQQ? Rrpwpr r~llprl 
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him sexually explicit names, would grab his buttocks 
and make sexual cowments, would rub his crotch and make 
lewd cowments, and made requests for oral and anal sex. 
Hillard alleged that he developed psychological 
conditions asa result of the actions of Brewer. 
Hillard brought a civil action against Brewer for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
against CF for same-gender hostile environment sexual 
harassment. In May of 1993, Hillard \AJas advised by his 
treating physician to stay off work for several weeks. 
He filed a workers' compensation claim i and ultimately 
received TTD benefits for the time he missed. Brewer's 
motion for judgment as a matter of law was denied. en,. 
affirmed. 
Brewer contends that by having filed a workers' 
compensation claim, Hillard is precluded from 
maintaining a tort action against him. Brewer relies 
upon the exclusivity provisions of KRS 342.690(1) and 
Zurich ~~~rnerican Ins. Co. v. Brierly, Ky., 936 S.W.2d 
561 (1997), holding that if death of employee results 
from deliberate intent of employer to cause death, 
employee's dependents can either proceed under Chapter 
342 or sue at law4 Hillard relies on Zurich Ins. Co. 
v. Mitchell, Ky., 712 S.W.2d 340 (1986) and General 
Accident Ins. Co. v. Blank, Ky. App., 873 S.W.2d 580 
(1993) for the proposition that the tort of outrage has 
been accepted as an exception to the exclusivity 
provisions. 
We believe that all of the cases cited by the parties 
on this argument are distinguishable because they focus 
on thp 1 i:::thi 1 it-\T (\f t-hp pmpl(\\Tpr :::tnd/(\r t-hp emnl(\'upr's 
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work-related injury. In this case; Hillard's tort 
claims are raised only in regard to Brewer's conduct, 
not the conduct of the employer. 
In Russell v. }l..ble; Ky. App.; 931 S.l"J.2d 460 (1996), 
this Court used both KRS 342.690(1) and KRS 342.700(1) 
to hold that an employee who received workers' 
compensation for an injury caused by the intentional 
act of a co-employee was not precluded from maintaining 
an action in tort against the co-employee. The 
situation before us is analogous to that in Russell. 
Hillard claims that he sustained injury as a result of 
Brewer's intentional acts. Therefore, the exclusivity 
provisions of KRS 342.690(1) are not applicable to 
Brewer and the trial court did not err in allowing 
Hillard's civil action against Brewer to proceed. 
NOTICE - INJURY 
Smith v. Cardinal Construction Company, 
Ky., 13 S.W.3d 623 (2000). 
Jentry Smith operated a bulldozer at a landfill. He 
alleged that he injured his back on January 7, 1996 
when he slipped on some snow and ice, causing him to 
fall from the deck of the bulldozer onto the ground. On 
the follo'\oling day, he fell 'A/hile attempting to open a 
gate. He continued working, until he underwent lumbar 
spine surgery on January 17, 1996. An MRI scan of the 
cervical spine had been performed on January16 j 1996. 
In the operative note, Dr. Powell noted in addition to 
the lumbar spine conditions that the patient had 
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We recognize that it would have been better practice to 
have given the employer written notice of both 
conditions as soon as they became apparent. We are 
convinced, hmolever, that u-Tlder the particu~ar 
circ71m~tances which are presented by this appeal, the 
two-month delay in giving the additional information to 
the employer was not so unreasonable that 
meritorious claim should be dismissed. 
COJ:.1MENT: This case could be a severe blo\,\T to the 
notice defense, if the employer is now required to 
prove prejudice. This is a departure from prior case 
law. How much will the Court limit this ruling to 
cases involving similar "particular circumstances"? 
The court did not discuss the other 
requirement that notice be given as soon as 
practicable, which include allowing the employer to 
conduct an irmnediate investigation of the alleged 
facts. 
PENALTY FOR SAFETY VIOh~TION 
Lexington-Fayette County Urban Government v. Offutt, 
Ky. App.,- 11 S.W.3d 598 (2000). 
Karen Offutt was a member of a new recruit class to 
become a police officer. Prior to her acceptance into 
the class,- she was required to complete a training 
course. On July 11,- 1996,- during the second day of the 
recruit training, Offutt sustained a heat stroke after 
participating in a two-mile running exercise directed 
by the LFUCG. Offutt suffered a permanent brain injury 
and numerous neurological impairments as a result of 
the heat stroke. She settled her claim, with the 
exception of an allegation that the employ~r 
intentionally violated KRS 338.031, its general 
statutory duty to furnish its employees with a place of 
emplo:lment free from recognized hazards that IAJere 
causing or likely to cause death or serious physical 
harm, such that she was entitled to a 15% increase in 
benefits pursuant to KRS 342~165~ The ~~J awarded the 
15% penalty. WCB and CA affirmed. 
The ALJ relied on Nelson Tree Services, Tnr v. OSK~, 
co T:" 3...J 1,)0~ {6 th rt": r 199C.\ ~~ ~e~~"~~":~~~ ~,,+-h~r":+-" +-~ u r:. U .l.L I \"".1. ., .1. ...J} Clw P LwUClw..LV1;:: ClULllV..LLY LV 
determine whether there had been a violation of KRS 
330.031. Nelson Tree set forth the required elements 
to establish a violation of a similar federal general 
duty clause: 
a. a condition or activity in the workplace 
presented a hazard to employees; 
b. the cited employer or employer's industry 
recognized the hazard; 
c.. the hazard ,,,,as likel:l to cause death or serious 
physical harm; and 
d. a feasible means existed to eliminate or 
materially reduce the hazard~ 
The first part of the test was met in that the running 
exercise in the heat conditions that existed was a 
hazard that directly caused physical evidence to 
Offutt~ There is sufficient evidence in the record in 
the form of weather reports, safety guides, and medical 
testimony to support the finding that this hazard 
existed~ 
Substantial evidence of the second element existed 
because the testimony of each of the LFUCG training 
officers revealed that they were aware that high head 
creates a potential for hazard to individuals engaged 
in physical activities. A safety newsletter had 
included an article on overexposure to suw~er heat, 
which explained heat stroke and how to prevent it, 
idAnrl'fy l'r~ ann tre~t ir ThA Offl'rArs in ch~r~A h~d -'- _ ... _ "-', ... ~ ... '"""'" ....&.. '- .. ........... ""-...J- __ ..-...... ... ........... _ "'::)_ _ 
been trained on the dangers of exercising in heat. 
LFUCG argued that the third element was not met because 
the hazard on that day was not found to be "likely" to 
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January 30, 1997, he filed a motion to reopen alleging 
an increase in occupational disability. Reedy argued 
that reopening was prohibited by the December 12f 1996 
amendment to KRS 342.125 because less than two years 
had passed since the award was entered. Arbitrator 
dismissed the claim. }\LJ dismissed the claim on de 
novo review. WCB reversed. 
the ALJ's Order dismissing the reopening. SC reversed. 
We conclude, therefore, that the exceptions to 
reopening established in KRS 342.125(1) and (3) permit 
the reopening of any claim, at any time, upon proof of 
the requisite facts. The two-year waiting periods and 
the four-year limitation contained in KRS 342.125(3) 
govern the reqpening of claims in which an award is 
entered on or after Decemher 12, 1996. The four-year 
ljmitation contained in KPS 342.125(8) governs the 
reopening of c1.aims decided prior to December 12; 1996. 
COMMENT: The amendments to KRS 342.125, which become 
effective on July 15, 2000 entirely eliminate the two 
year waiting period following the finality of a 
settlement or award, and reduce the two-year waiting 
period following a prior motion to reopen to one year. 
The four-year limitation period remains in effect after 
July 15, 2000. 
SETTLEMENT 
Huff Contracting v. Sark,-
Ky. }\pp.; 12 S. W . 3d 704 ( 2000) . 
Jirnmy Sark injured his knees at \"iork on October 23; 
1996. The parties agreed to settle the claim based 
upon 3% impairment to the body as a whole. On June 6, 
1998, the claims adjuster sent a letter to Sark's 
attorney with the settlement agreement. The letter 
included this statement: "I did include all the future 
mt=>dir:::tl t=>vnt=>nc:t=>c: sinre t-hic: ic: a Sllbrll r£:::tt-illn rlrlim,- I 
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have to wrap up these expenses or we can't settle with 
the third party." The settlement agreement contained 
the following language: 
A lump sum settlement of 3%, discounted at 6%. 
Total to be paid by employer is $2,685.20. 
Employer has already paid medicals totaling 
$10,868.53 and TTD 3-11/97 to 7-23-97 totaling 
$4,034.05. This settlement is inclusive of all 
attorney fees anri also incluries all future medical 
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The ~loyee retains his right to pursue any third 
party action. This agreement is full and final 
settlement for the injury arising on 10-23-96. 
The agreement \.;-as signed by Sark, his and the 
claims adjuster, and was approved by an Arbitrator on 
July 1, 1998. The third-party claim was settled for 
C::t:.? nnn nn ~C'C'nY'c1inrr t-n C:;;::l.Y'1< "RllTT int-OY''Uonoc1 
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pursued its subrogation rights in the civil action, and 
recovered almost the entire amount of money paid out to 
Sark. On October 14, 1998; another Arbitrator denied a 
motion by Sark to set aside the settlement agreement or 
in the alternative to reopen his claim based upon 
mistake, fraud, and/or constructive fraud. The ALJ on 
de novo review dismissed the matter finding no evidence 
of mistake or fraud and further finding that Sark 
knowingly waived future medical benefits. WCB 
reversed. CA affirmed. 
The determination as to whether there was consideration 
for the waiver of future medical benefits constitutes 
an issue of fact to be found by the ALJ. The record 
does not contain substantial evidence to support the 
ALJ's factual finding that consideration had been given 
for the waiver. If Huff had in fact given up a right 
to pursue a portion of its subrogation claim, then 
perhaps there would have been valid consideration. 
However; Sark specifically denies that Huff gave its 
right to pursue the remainder of its subrogation claim. 
COMMENT: The current Form 110 includes specific blanks 
for the parties to indicate whether there is a waiver 
of past and/or future medical benefits, and the 
consideration for that term of the agreement. In this 
case, that form was probably not used. The claim was 
settled for the present value of 3% impairment; and 
that was the only consideration that the evidence in 
the record established. This is a situation in which 
the claims adjuster should have consulted with legal 
counsel in the preparation of the agreement. If the 
agreement had stated that the employer did in fact 
waive part of its subrogation claim, then the waiver 
would apparently have been enforceable~ 
UTILIZATION REVIEW 
E-town ~~arry v~ Goodman, 
Ky. App., 12 S.W.3d 708 (2000). 
In February of 1995,- Gary GoodIuan's arm was crushed in 
a conveyor. He developed post-traumatic stress 
disorder and depression. He was awarded benefits for 
100% disability. In May of 1997, E-town sought 
utilization review to assess the reasonableness and 
necessity of the continued psychiatric treatment by Dr. 
Shared Patel. On May 29, 1997, Dr. Daniel Wolens 
conducted a medical records review and concluded that 
since Goodman's psychological condition had not changed 
in a year, and he was no longer suicidal, the 
counseling sessions could be significantly reduced or 
eliminated with a lower level of care by a psychologist 
or social worker and only occasional visits to a 
psychiatrist for review of his drug treatment. In 
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interviewed Good~an and performed testing. He felt 
that Goodman's condition had been treated appropriately 
and was improving. He recornmended a limited 3-month 
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reopen to resolve medical fee dispute concerning the 
reasonableness or necessity of medical treatment. 
As with every other issue in the workers' compensation 
system, the bottom line is the ALJ. If the ALJ's 
demonstrate a general attitude of giving weight to the 
utilization review physician, then UR system can become 
a useful tool and a worthwhile expense. However, to 
date, lD practice the opposite result appears to more 
often be the case. 
TO BE PUBLISHED COURT OPINIONS FOR 2000 
AIDS 
Barren Fiver District Health Dept~ v~ Hussey, 
47 K~L~S~ 4; p. 17 (4/14/00) 
1998-WC-001387-WC 
The primary issue addressed by the court was whether 
AIDS is an occupational disease or an injury. The 
Court of Appeals ruled that AIDS is an occupational 
disease. 
There was also an issue as to which insurance carrier 
was on the risk for this employer. The evidence of 
whether and when the employee was exposed to AIDS at 
work was conflicting. The court relied upon evidence 
of the first evidence as to an alleged needle stick 
from an AIDS patient, which was in 1992, and the 
medical evidence that as of February of 1995 the 
patient had been infected with AIDS for at least two 
years, to identify the carrier on the risk. 
COMMENT: This case has been appealed to the Kentucky 
Supreme Court~ 
APPEAL 
Appalachian Steel Construction, Inc~ v~ Honaker, 
K.L.S. , p. (5/26/00) 
1999-CA-002013-WC 
Allen Honaker injured his low back at work on September 
19, 1997. The Arbitrator found 19% impairment due to 
the back injury, but denied a claim for psychological 
impairment. Appalachian attempted to seek further 
review of the Arbitrator's decision by filing a 
document titled "Notice of Appeal" which stated: 
"Comes now the Petitioner,- P~.ppalachian Steel 
Construction,- Inc.,- by and through counsel,- and files 
this Notice of Appeal to the Kentucky Workers' 
Con!pensation Board from the Opinion and }\'iAJard by Hon. 
Bonnie Kittinger, dated March 26, 1999." In spite of 
the clear attempt to appeal to the Board,- the matter 
was assigned to an ALJ. Honaker moved to dismiss the 
appeal on the grounds that the notice was not 
sufficient to seek a hearing before the ALJ. The ALJ 
sustained the motion and dismissed the appeal. WCB and 
CA affirmed. 
The appellant recites many cases applying the doctrine 
of substantial compliance to the filing of a notice of 
appeal seeking review of a circuit court decision by 
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of those cases is some deficiency in the text of the 
filing which can be easily supplied by reference to the 
context of the litigation. When there are true 
omissions,- as failure to name an indispensable party or 
unexplained failure to pay the filing fee, dismissal is 
required. The situation before us is closer to the 
facts of Beard v. Corumonweal th,- Ky.,- 891 S. W . 2d 382 
(1994) , in which a party adversely affected by an 
appellate decision of the circuit court filed a notice 
of appeal to the Court of. Appeals rather than filing a 
motion for discretionary review under CR 76.20. The 
Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the attempted 
appeal on the ground that the court's jurisdiction had 
not been properly invoked. The Supreme Court 
specifically noted that the doctrine of substantial 
compliance applies only to non-jurisdictional defects. 
Here, the appellant simply sought the wrong relief from 
the wrong tribunal. The decision of the Board 
dismissing the appeal is affirmed. 
}\PPORTIONMENT 
Whittaker v. Chaffin, 
47 K.L.S. 2, p.21 (2/28/00) 
1999-CA-000476-WC 
On September 3,- 1993, Jimmy Chaffin was robbed while 
working at Tina's Cross Road Market. He was attacked 
during the robbery and suffered severe stab wounds. 
While his physical injuries did not cause any permanent 
occupational disability, he did suffer a disabling 
psychological impairment as a result of post-traumatic 
stress disorder. Dr. Robert Granacher, a psychiatrist, 
also diagnosed a pre-existing personality disorder; 
found 8% impairment; and apportioned the cause of the 
impairment equally between the attack and the pre-
existing personality disorder. ALJ apportioned all 
liability to the employer. WCB reversed. On remand; 
the ALJ apportioned the liability for PPD benefits 
50/50 be t\,,;Te en the employer and Special Fund. weB and 
CA affirmed. 
The Special Fund argued that Dr. Granacher's medical 
opinion did not meet the standard set forth in Yocum v. 
Jackson, Ky. App., 554 S.W.2d 891 (1977). However, 
the court noted that Dr. Granacher's report 
specifically stated his medical opinion within 
reasonable medical probability that Chaffin's 
personality disorder was a departure from the normal 
state of health and was capable of being aroused by the 
ordinary stresses of life. Dr Granacher's medical 
opinion constitutes substantial evidence to support the 
ALJ's findings. 
COMMENT: The Special Fund has appealed this case to 
the Kentucky Supreme Court. 
DISCRIMINATION 
Pike County Coal Co;p. v. Ratliff, 
Ky. App., 47 K.L.S. 3, p. 7 (3/10/00) 
1998-CA-002003-MR 
On January 1, 1991, Ratliff entered into a contract to 
haul coal for Pike. The contract provided that Ratliff 
would be responsible for obtaining various forms of 
insurance coverage. Ratliff's employees hauled coal 
under this contract for nearly two years until December 
14, 1992, when the contract was terminated by Pike, 
allegedly for Ratliff's failure to provide proof that 
he had both workers' compensation coverage and 
liability coverage on his coal trucks. 
On January 20, 1993, Ratliff filed a civil action 
against Pike in which he alleged that Pike terminated 
its contract with him because he refused to violate KRS 
342.197, a statute which prohibits the threatened 
discharge and/or intimidation of an employee for 
asserting a claim for workers' compensation benefits. 
The factual basis for Ratliff's claim involved Johnny 
Smith, one of Ratliff's employees who injured his back 
on March 31, 1992, and filed a workers' compensation 
claim against a subsidiary of Pike, and not his 
employer. Ratliff testified that Pike looked to him to 
get Pike dismissed as a party to that workers' 
compensation claim. Ratliff testified that he had no 
control over Smith's claim, and that despite the 
pressure from Pike he at no time attempted to coerce or 
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in response to a request from Pike, Ratliff caused his 
attorney to provide Smith's attorney with the name of 
Ratliff's workers' compensation insurance carrier. The 
workers' compensation claim against Pike was eventually 
dismissed. Smith was eventually awarded benefits 
against Ratliff's carrier. Before Pike was dismissed 
from the workers' compensation claim, it terminated its 
contract with Ratliff. 
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not apply for reemployment. In January of 1997, she 
was awarded benefits for 50% PPD. She filed a civil 
action seeking damages for retaliatory discharge 
pursuant to KRS 342.197. Trigg Circuit Court granted 
the employer's motion for surrunary judgment. CA.. 
affirmed. 
While Noes avers that Elk Brand retaliated by 
discharging her because she sought workers' 
compensation benefits, the circuit court correctly 
determined that the evidence of record, viewed in the 
light most favorable to Noel, does not support her 
claim. 
COMMENT: Motion for discretionary review is pending 
before the Kentucky Supreme Court. 
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
Turner v. The Pendennis Club, 
47 KoLoS. 5, po 20 -(5/12/00) 
1999-CA-00425-MR 
Turner worked as a dishwasher. In 1990, she injured 
her leg at work. She was unable to work for 
approximately six weeks, and then returned to work. 
She later resigned and filed a civil action based upon 
racial and gender discrimination. She further alleged 
in that civil action that the employer had violated the 
Workers' Compensation Act as to her injury. The 
employer's motion for summary judgment was granted on 
all counts. With respect to the workers' compensation 
issue, the court held that her claim was barred by the 
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compensation claims. CA affirmed. 
The record shows that Turner has never filed a workers' 
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compensation for her medical expenses. Turner states 
that she notified her super~isor of her injury and that 
the Club failed to notify her of her rights or to 
fulfill any of its statutory duties. The Workers' 
Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy of an injured 
employee against an employer covered by the Act. Based 
upon the exclusivity of the Act, the court properly 
dismissed her claim since her remedy for any work-
related injury comes so91ely within the purview of the 
Act. Her failure to seek compensation for her work-
related injury pursuant to the Act cannot be salvaged 
in an improvidently asserted tort claim. 
COI:1MENT: The trial court was wrong. The lssue was not 
whether a civil action for workers' compensation 
benefits was 
limitations. 
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In fact, if the employer did not file the 
proper forms with the DWC, the workers' compensation 
claim may not be barred, even today. As to exclusive 
remedy, there are discrimination issues under the 
Workers' Compensation Act that can be litigated in a 
civil action, but it did not appear from the court's 
suwmary of the plaintiff's allegations that there was 
any allegation of a violation of that part of the Act. 
FALSE STATEMENT IN JOB APPLICATION 
Gutermuth v. Excel, 
K.L.S. ,p. (6/2/00) 
1999-CA-002031-WC 
Cheryl Gutermuth started working for Excel on July 8, 
1996. As part of the hiring process, she completed a 
"medical history questionnaire" 
nhuQ.ir;o<1 oY;o<min;o<t-inn nn 1111u ? 
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a claim for a September 4, 1997 
and underwent a 
1996. Gutermuth filed 
injury to her neck, 
back and arms, when the cherry picker she was driving 
struck a hole in the floor. ALJ found that Gutermuth 
had knowingly and willfully made a false representation 
as to her physical condition on the medical history, 
that the employer relied upon that false representation 
in the hiring process; and that there was a causal 
connection between the false representation and the 
injury. The claim was denied pursuant to KRS 
342.165(2). WCB and CA affirmed. 
In the medical history questionnaire, Gutermuth had 
indicated: 
1. she denied having been off work due to a work 
injury when in fact, she had been off work for 
six upper extremity surgeries; 
2. she denied ever having trouble with recurring 
back, knee or shoulder problems, but the record 
was replete with evidence that she has had 
prior neck, knee, and shoulder problems; 1992 
diagnostic tests revealed hypertrophic 
degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine 
and a herniated disc in her neck; a course of 
cervical traction; a cervical MRI scan in 1996 
which showed a herniated disc; and four days 
prior to completing the medical history 
questionnaire; treatment with a doctor for 
chronic musculoskeletal pains related to 
repetitive motion injury with cervical 
degenerative disc disease. 
On appeal; Gutermuth contended: 
a. that a more accurate and complete medical 
history had been related to the doctor who 
performed the pre-employment physical 
examination, than was reflected on the written 
questionnaire; 
b. that the general manager had testified that if 
he had been aware of the prior physical 
complaints, he would still have hired her, but 
he would have required a medical clearance to 
perform the work before allowing her to work; 
c. that the university evaluator's opinion as to 
causation was entitled to presumptive weight; 
d. that the ALJ had misunderstood and made 
erroneous conclusions about the testimony of 
the employer representative; 
e. that there was no false representation because 
she told her prospective employer she had 
surgery to her hands; 
There was no evidence in the record so overwhelming to 
compel a finding contrary to the ALJ's. 
MINORS 
Roberts v. George W. Hill & Co., 
47 K.L.S. 4, p. 43 (4/20/00) 
1998-SC-0937-TG 
Michael Chad Roberts, age 15, injured his hand on 
October 9, 1997 while working for Hill. Two months 
after the injury, he completed and forwarded to the 
employer a notice of rejection of the Act. He then 
filed a civil action against Hill in Boone Circuit 
Court. The trial judge sustained Hill's motion for 
su~~ary judgment on the grounds of the exclusive remedy 
provisions of the Act. CA affirmed. 
Roberts argued that his emplol®ent was illegal because 
minors are forbidden by law to operate dangerous 
machinery. KRS 342.650 provides that every person, 
including a minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully 
employed, is subject to the provisions of Chapter 342. 
Roberts' second argument was that KRS 342.210 provides 
that no time limitation shall run against a minor, and 
that this prohibition applies to the time requirement 
that the notice of rejection of the Act be filed prior 
to the date of the injury. The Court first noted that 
this statute applies only to minors who have no 
corr..mittee, guardian, next friend, or other person 
authorized to claim compensation for him. Here, 
Roberts had brought the civil action through his 
parents acting as his next friends. Additionally, we 
note that KRS 342.210 refers to the filing of claims, 
not to the filing of a notice of rejection of workers' 
compensation coverage. Therefore, it does not apply to 
the timing of an election permitted by KRS 342.650(6). 
Roberts argued that KRS 342.395 is unconstitutional 
when applied to a minor because it is a denial of 
rights ensured under the jural rights doctrine. 
Because implied consent hangs on one's action, in this 
case one's acceptance of emplol®ent, rather than on the 
failure to reject, the parent's act of causing or 
permitting a child to participate In the action covered 
by the statute subjects the child to the limitations 
imposed by the' law. 
Roberts finally argued that workers' compensation 
benefits are so negligible as to render it a violation 
of jural rights. The court noted that the trade-off of 
workers' compensation benefits for a civil action 
included medical benefits, and was not negligible, 
while a recovery in a civil action is always 
speculative. 
COJl1MENT: ~~ petition for rehearing is currently 
pending. 
PENALTY FOR SAFETY VIOT.~TION 
Brusman v. Newport Steel COrporation, 
47 K.L.S. 5, p. 22 (5/18/00) 
1999-SC-0430-WC 
Brusman was employed as a switchperson on a rail\-vay 
within the employer's facility. Her duties involved 
moving along the rail\-vay line with the train and 
throwing the switches necessary to route the train to 
its destination. On February 28, 1997, Brusman was 
riding on a personnel ladder attached to the side of 
the first of three rail cars which was being pushed by 
an engine on the main railway line. JLTlother car, which 
had been designated to be scrapped or repaired because 
its sides were bowed out approximately two feet, was 
parked on an adjoining spur line near the point where 
it joined the main line. When the car on which Brusman 
was riding passed the pinch point, the clearance 
between the train and the damaged car was only five 
inches. As a result, Brusman was caught between the 
two cars and crushed to death. 
There is no specific statute or regulation pertaining 
to in-plant railways. A KOSH inspector investigated the 
accident, and issued a citation for a serious violation 
of KRS 338.031'(1) (a), the "general duty" provision. 
The citation recited that transportation employees were 
not trained in cornmon railway safety procedures and 
listed several specific examples, including the failure 
to instruct workers in the recognition and avoidance of 
unsafe conditions in their work environment. The KOSH 
citation was contested and settled with no admission of 
violation. The ALJ awarded the 15% penalty pursuant to 
KRS 342.167. WCB affirmed. CA reversed. SC reversed. 
The ALJ's finding was supported by evidence that (1) an 
obvious hazard was created by the presence of the 
railroad cars with bowed sides; (2) complaints about 
such cars had been raised at a safety meeting a month 
before the accident; and (3) workers' routinely rode 
railway cars, including the lead car, without 
punishment. Although the evidence in this case was not 
as egregious as in Apex Mining v. Blankenship; Ky., 918 
S.W.2d 225 (1996), it was substantial and sufficient to 
support the ALJ's award of a 15% penalty. The fact 
that the employer settled the KOSH citation without 
admitting a violation is iwmaterial. In the context of 
a workers' compensation claim, it is the responsibility 
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traveled to his first appointment, which was scheduled 
at a bank at 9:00. He arrived at the bank between 8:30 
and 9:00. The bank did not open until 9:00, and he 
could not get the attention of a bank employee to let 
him inside the bank. He then drove to a fast-food 
restaurant 5 to 10 minutes away for a cup of coffee. 
He slipped and fell while inside the restaurant. ALJ 
denied the claim. WCB and CA affirmed. SC reversed. 
As a rule, a deviation from a business trip for 
personal reasons takes the worker out of the course of 
the employment unless the deviation is so small that it 
may be disregarded as insubstantial. For that reason, 
an injury sustained during a personal mission generally 
is viewed as having occurred outside the course of the 
employment; however, under certain circumstances, an 
injury resulting from acts by a worker which minister 
to his personal comfort while at ,""ork may be considered 
related to work pursuant to the doctrine of comfort and 
convenience. Pursuant to this doctrine, some workers 
are deemed not to have left the course of their 
employment while ministering to personal needs, 
provided that the departure from the employment is not 
so great that an intent to abandon the job temporarily 
may be inferred or that the manner of the departure is 
not so unreasonable that it cannot be considered an 
incident of the emplo~~ent. 
Although workplace injuries which occur shortly before 
or after the usual working hours generally are 
considered to have occurred in the course of 
emplo~~ent, the course of emplo~~ent is considered to 
be suspended if a worker, having arrived early, takes a 
coffee break before beginning work. Larson indicates, 
however, that during an enforced hiatus in work,- a 
certain amount of wandering around and even undertaking 
what otherwise might seem to be distinctly personal 
activities has been permitted in a number of 
jurisdictions unless there was evidence that the 
worker's duties required him to remain in a particular 
place. 
We agree that it is not unreasonable to place some 
limit on the distance a worker may travel in pursuit of 
personal comfort and still be viewed as working, 
particularly in those instances where the accident 
occurs while the \i\rorker is traveling. In the instant 
case, the accident could just as easily have occurred 
had the restaurant been located next door to the bank 
or in the same building. For that reason, although 
distance may be a significant factor in deciding other 
claims, we are not persuaded that the distance between 
the bank and the restaurant should be dispositive on 
these particular facts. 
The nature of Meredith's work included periods of 
enforced hiatus. There was no evidence that his 
employer restricted his activities during such periods 
or that he was prohibited from taking a coffee break if 
there was time to spare between appointments. Finally, 
the type of activity in which he was engaged when he 
was injured was not so unreasonable that it must be 
viewed as a departure from his duties. Under those 
circumstances, we are persuaded that Meredith's 
injuries should be viewed as arising out of and in the 
course of his employment and, therefore, to be 
compensable. 
PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Halls Hardwood Floor Co. v. Stapleton, 
47 K.L.S. 4, p. 11 (4/7/00) 
1999CA-001333-WC 
Charles Stapleton ,,,,as injured in August of 1997. He 
was awarded income benefits based upon 7% impairment 
with the 1.5 multiplier for loss of physical capacity 
to return to the type of work he performed at the time 
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REOPENING - PNEL~OCONIOSIS 
Whittaker v. Hurst, 
47 K.L.S. 4, p. 14 (4/7/00) 
1999-CA-000414-WC 
Jack Hurst was last exposed to coal dust on February 
16, 1994. He filed a black lung claim on February 23, 
1994. He settled with the Spec~al Fund based upon Tier 
II benefits for $282.35 per week for 318.75 weeks. The 
settlement was approved on October 20, 1994. Hurst 
moved to reopen his settlement against the Special 
Fund based upon a ,,,,orsening of his pulmonary 
impairment. The ALJ dismissed the motion to reopen on 
the grounds that KRS 342.125(2) (a) requires evidence of 
both a progression of pneumoconiosis on x-ray and 
increased respiratory impairment. WCB reversed. CA 
affirmed. 
The statute does not require evidence of progression of 
the disease to reopen a Tier II award. 
COMMENT: This case has been appealed to the Kentucky 
Supreme Court. 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
Rue v. Kentucky Retira~ent Systems, 
47 K.L.S. 5, p. 19 (5/12/00) 
1999-CA-001071-MR 
Rue was unable to return to work after sustaining a 
back injury in the course of his employment as a 
mechanic with the Kentucky State Police. RRS 61.607 
provides that the maximum disability retirement benefit 
shall be determined by a formula that adds the monthly 
benefit from the retirement plan ,,,,ith any amount 
received from Social Security and any monthly benefit 
received from workers' compensation. Rue argued that 
the formula should not use the_gross amount of his 
workers' compensation award, bur rather the net amount 
he actually receives after the reduction to recover his 
attorney fee. Kentucky Retirement Systems calculated 
the amount of retirement benefits by using the gross 
a"\..,.rard of "\..,.rorkers' compensation benefits. CA affirmed. 
The plain language of the statute dictates that the 
combined monthly benefit is to be determined using the 
basic disability allm..,.rance j not the amount the employee 
receives if he selects any of the various optional 
plans available to him. If the General Assembly 
intended to reduce the amount of the workers' 
compensation award by applicable attorney's fees, the 
wording of the statute would have reflected that 
intent. Kentucky is not one of the several states that 
treat attorney1s fees as an "add-on" or double benefit 
that the employer must pay in addition to the 
compensation award itself. Furthermore, in a similar 
vein, we are convinced that it cannot be legitimately 
argued that because a paycheck is reduced by voluntary 
deductions for insurance, car pa1~ents, deferred 
compensation and the like the amount of take-home pay 
presents the true amount of one's compensation. We 
view Rue's suggested methodology for computing the 
amount of his workers' compensation award to I much the 
same light. 
RETK~INING INCENTIVE BENEFIT 
Whitaker Coal Company v. Melton, 
47 K.L.S. 5, p. 1 (4/21/00} 
1998-CA-002861-WC 
Melton was last injuriously7 exposed to coal dust on 
March 30, 1995, and filed a RIB claim on February 10, 
1997. He was first diagnosed with the disease in 
November of 1996,- and gave notice to the employer two 
weeks.later. ALJ awarded RIR. WCB and CA affirmed. 
Whitaker contends that ~nrollment in a retraining 
program is a prerequisite to receiving RIB,- on the 
grounds that the 1996 amend~ents to KRS 342.732 were 
remedial and retroactive. In our opinion; the 1996 
amendment to KRS 342.732, unlike the 1994 amendment, 
affects vested rights of claimants and cannot therefore 
be applied retrospectively without a specific 
expression by the Legislature of its intent for the 
provision to be so applied. 
Whitaker further argued pursuant to Ne,-vberg v. Slone, 
Ky., 84 S.W.2d 694 (1992) that Melton failed to give 
due and timely notice of this claim. In Slone, the 
notice was not given until six months after the 
diagnosis. In the instant claim, notice was given 
within two weeks of the diagnosis,- and there is no 
evidence that Melton had experienced a distinct 
manifestation of the disease in the form of symptoms 
reasonably sufficient to apprise him that the had the 
disease. 
Golden Oak ~ning Compa~y v. Kentucky Coal Workers' 
Pneumoconiosis Fund, 
47 K.L.S. 5, p. 30 (5/18/00) 
1999-SC-0638-WC 
Claimant was last exposed to doal dust on December 26,- . 
1996. On January 14, 1997, he enrolled in a program of 
study at a diesel college. On February 7, 1997, he 
filed a claim for RIB. Dr. Myers and Zadeh found 
category 1.0 cwp. Dr. Zadeh reported an FVC of 75% of 
predicted and an FEV-1 of 57% of predicted. The 
employer's expert, Dr. Westerfield, found category 1/1 
C\o;Tp. Dr. Joyce, the university evaluator found 0/0 
cwp. The employer and claimant settled the RIB claim 
for a lump sum payment of $6,500.00. The employer 
requested participation of the KCWPF, but the Director 
denied the request. The employer appealed the denial 
to an ALJ; who ordered the KCWPF to reimburse the 
employer for one-half of the settlement. WCB reversed. 
CA and SC affirmed. 
Although an approved settlement agreement is binding 
upon the parties, the KCWPF may not be required to 
participate in a settled RIB claim unless there is 
prima facie medical evidence of record which would 
authorize a RIB award. 803 K~R 25:010 Section 29(1) (c) 
requires the employer to certify that a worker 
receiving a RIB meets the relevant statutory criteria 
and makes no exception for those RIB claims that are 
settled. We conclude, therefore, that the KCWPF may 
not be required to participate in a settled RIB claim 
unless the employer so certifies. In this claim; the 
employer failed to provide the required certification. 
Because this was a case of first impression; and 
because the parties and the ALJ were unclear about 
precisely what was required, the case was remanded to 
the ALJ to allow the employer an opportunity upon 
remand to provide that certification. 
SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS 
Brusman v. Newport Steel COrporation, 
47 K.L.S. 5, p. 22 (5/18/00) 
1999-SC-0430-WC 
Donna Sue Brusman was fatally injured on February 28, 
1997. She was survived by her husband, Robert, and two 
children. Donna and Robert were separated; and a 
divorce action had been filed and was pending at the 
time of her death. ALJ awarded death benefits to the 
children, but not to the husband on the grounds that he 
was neither actually nor presumptively dependent upon 
Donna at the time of her death. WCB reversed with 
respect to the denial of benefits to Robert. CA 
reversed. SC reversed. 
Three things are apparent from the language of KRS 
342.750 and KRS 342.730(3): 
(1) With respect to widows, widowers and children, the 
statutory schemes are virtually identical, except 
that the benefits are greater if the employee's 
death was work-related; 
(2) Whereas former versions of KRS 342.750 had 
required a widow, widower or child to be actually 
dependent in order to be entitled to death 
benefits, the present statutes contain no such 
requirement; and 
(3) Whereas KRS 34-2.075(1) (b) presumes that a child is 
wholly dependent only up to age sixteen, a child 
is entitled to benefits under KRS 342.750 and KRS 
342.730(3) up to age eighteen regardless of 
dependency .. 
The Supreme Court overruled White v. Stewart's Dry 
Goods Company, Ky.'. 531 S.W.2d 504 (1975), and 
reaffirmed Palmore v. Jones, Ky., 774 S.W.2d 434 
(1989) " 
TEMPOR~~Y TOTAL DISABILITY 
Halls Hardwood Floor Co .. v. Stapleton; 
47 K.L.S. 4, p. 11 (4/7/00) 
1999CA-001333-WC 
Stapleton injured his knee in August of 1997. He did 
not return to work until January of 1998. After he 
returned to work, he was still experiencing pain in his 
knee and was unable to perform all of his previous 
duties (i.e. installing, sanding, coating and 
refinishing hardwood floors). In March of 1998, 
Stapleton advised Halls that he was unable to perform 
his duties without assistance and he left Hall's 
employ. On August 30, 1997, Dr. Richard Hoblitzell; the 
treating physician, released Stapleton to return to 
work at his regular hours at modified duty, which 
provided that he did not lift more than ten pounds, did 
not kneel, did not bend or squat, and did not climb 
stairs. Hall testified that he did not have any light 
duty jobs available for Stapelton. Dr. Hoblitzell 
released him to return to work with no restrictions on 
December 26, 1997. 
ALJ awarded TTD benefits for the period from the date 
of injury in August of 1997 through December 27, 1997. 
WCB and CA affirmed. 
Temporary total disability lS statutorily defined as 
~the condition of an employee who has not reached 
maximum medical improvement from an injury and has not 
reached a level of improvement that would permit a 
return to employment. It is clear that one would have 
to kneel, squat, and bend over in order to perform the 
type of work in which Stapleton has engaged. 
Stapleton's adult work history was in manual labor 
jobs, meaning that it would have been very difficult 
for him to return to any type of gainful employment on 
August 30. 1997. Finally, the ALJ had the right to 
reject Dr. Hoblitzell's opinion as to when Stapleton 
was able to return to work. In short, the ALJ's 
decision is supported by substantial evidence and must 
be affirmed .. 
COMMENT: COMMENT: This decision was not appealed to 
the Kentucky Supreme Court, and became final on 
5/17/00. 
This case should have been appealed to the Kentucky 
Supreme Court, as these issues need to be addressed in 
a more comprehensive manner than occurred in this 
decision. Further, the Supreme Court issued an 
unpublished opinion on December 16, 1999 in Leach v. 
James River Corporation, 99-SC-0248-WC, which is 
arguably at odds with the Court of Appeals decision in 
Stapleton. The definition of TTD does not include a 
consideration of whether the employer cannot or does 
not accowmodate modified duty restrictions. 
The court in Stapleton curiously did not identify 
exactly what other evidence in the record constituted 
substantial evidence that the claimant was temporarily 
totally disabled during the contested period. If the 
medical opinion of Dr. Hoblitzell was uncontradicted 
that Stapleton was physically able to return to work 
with restrictions, then the court was correct that the 
ALJ could reject that evidence, but the ALJ would have 
to provide a reasonable explanation for rejecting that 
uncontradicted opinion. The court did not identify any 
conflicting medical opinion in that regard, and did not 
identify any reasonable explanation that may have been 
made by the ALJ for rejecting uncontradicted medical 
evidence. Further, there was no discussion of 
Stapleton's level of education or vocational skills, 
and whether those factors were considered by the Court 
in making its decision that he was totally unable to 
work.. The Court seems to equate "very difficu~t for 
him to return to work" 'v{i th TTD, and that is not in 
accordance with the statute. If the only evidence in 
the record was that the employee was physically capable 
of returning to emplo2~ent during the contested period, 
then the statute provides that he is not entitled to 
TTD benefits. 
TERMINATION OF INCOME BENEFITS 
McDowell v. Jackson Enercy RECe r 
K.L.S. (2/25/00) 
1999-CA-001086-WC 
McDowell was sixty years of age at the time she became 
totally disabled as a result of bilateral carpal tunnel 
syndrome in May of 1997. ALJ awarded income benefits 
of $387.31 per week beginning on May 30,1997 and 
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pursuant to KRS 342.730(4) as amended effective 
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amendment \AlaS unconsti tutional. Cl~. ruled that the 
statute could be construed to be constitutional. 
We hold that in its most recent passage of KRS 
342.730(4), the Legislature intended the statute to 
mean "that all income benefits payable ... shall 
terminate as of the date upon which the employee 
qualifies for, [ann to the extent she is entitLed to 
receive] normal old-age Social Security retirement 
benefits ... " Our interpretation that workers' 
can"'1,ensation benefits under this statute are set-off, 
noLLar-for-doLLar, by the amOll..1'lt of oLd-age SociaL 
Security benefits to which the cLaimant is entitLed, is 
consistent with both purposes of the statute; this is, 
avoiding duplication of benefits and lowering insurance 
premiums. At the same time, this interpretation 
insures that no injured worker, regardless of her age, 
is deprived of receiving an amount that equals the 
higher of her workers' compensation benefits 
;=<t-t-rihllt-~hlp t-n ;=< wnrk--rpl~t-prl in-illrv nr hpr nlrl-;=<rrp 
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Social Security retirement benefits. 
COMMENT: This case has been appealed to the Kentucky 
Supreme Court. 
UNIVERSITY EVALUATOR 
Magic Coal Company v. Fox, 
47 K.L.S. 5, p. 32 (5/18/00) 
1999-SC-0163-WC 
These workers' compensation claims concern the portion 
of KRS 342.315(2) which became effective December 12; 
1996, and which states that the findings and opinons of 
designated university medical evaluators "shall be 
afforded presumptive weight". At issue is whether the 
amendment governs claims which arose before its 
effective date, and what type of evidence is necessary 
to overcome presumptive weight. 
We view KRS 342.0015 as expressing a clear legislative 
intent for KRS 342.315 and KRS 342.316(3) (b)4.b to 
apply to all claims pending before an arbitrator or ALJ 
on or after December 12, 1996. 
The term ~presumptive weight" is one which the parties 
concede is not found in prior Kentucky law and one 
which is not defined in Chapter 342. KRS 342.315(2) 
does not evince a legislative intent for the clinical 
findings and opinions of a university evaluator to be 
conclusive. It anticipates that the opponent of a 
university evaluator's report may introduce 
countervailing evidence which will overcome the report; 
furthermore, KRS 342.315(2) does not prohibit the fact-
finder from rejecting a finding or opinion of a 
university evaluator but requires only that the reasons 
for doing so must be specifically stated. In the 
absence of a definition of the term ~presumptive 
wpi(Tht- fT 
•• ~~"':?.~ , 
statute, 
either by prior judicial decision or by 
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create a rebuttable presumption. 
to 
Unless evidence is introduced which rebuts the clinical 
findings and opinions of the university evaluator, they 
may not be disregarded by the fact-finder. To the 
extent that the university evaluator's testimony favors 
a particular party, it shifts to the opponent the 
burden of going forward with evidence which rebuts the 
t-pc:.t-imnnu Tf t-hp nnnnnpnt- f:=lilc:. t-n rin c:.n t-hp n:=lrt-u 
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whom the testimony favors is entitled to prevail by 
operation of the presumption. Stated otherwise, the 
clinical findings and opinions of the university 
evaluator constitute substantial evidence with regard 
to medical questions which, if uncontradicted, may not 
be disregarded by the fact-finder. 
COMMMENT: l\s a practical matter, unless the medical 
evidence is uncontradicted, the university evaluator's 
opinions just became "other evidence" for the ALJ to 
consider. Of course, if the J4....LJ's as a whole show a 
tendency that they will choose to give more weight to 
the university evaluator's opinion, then university 
evaluator program will become much more significant. 
Whether to request a university evaluation in an injury 
claim is a point of crucial litigation strategy for 
plaintiff's and employers. 
